Translation Tag: russia-ukraine
A researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, the PLA’s main research institute, argues that Russia’s performance in the Ukraine war so far has revealed a range of military deficiencies, including relatively limited battlefield situational awareness, underdeveloped automation of weapons systems, and military personnel shortages. That said, the author argues that Moscow has successfully used nuclear deterrence to discourage NATO from direct military intervention.
This piece from the U.S. studies program at Ministry of State Security-linked think tank China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations argues that the Ukraine war heralds the end of the post-Cold War order. The article argues the United States has been the biggest beneficiary of the war so far, leveraging the crisis to strengthen its alliance network and fight a proxy war with Russia. The authors of the report warn countries in Asia to remain vigilant to what they describe as U.S. efforts to preserve and expand its hegemony in ways that might destabilize the region.
Feng Yujun, a senior Russia expert at Fudan University, argues that while Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated precipitously since its invasion of Ukraine, China-Russia ties have been characterized by regular diplomatic contact, increased trade, and alignment in international organizations. Feng argues that strong and stable ties with China are increasingly critical for Russia as its international status and influence decline.
Zuo Xiying, one of China’s top experts on international security, examines evolving U.S. deterrence strategies in light of rising strategic competition with China. He argues that the gap in conventional deterrence capabilities between China and the U.S. is rapidly narrowing owing to China’s technological and military advances and what he sees as the decline of the U.S. industrial base. As a “stress reaction” to this perceived decline, Zuo argues U.S. policymakers have begun to discuss declining American conventional deterrence capabilities vis-a-vis China more frequently. Zuo warns that Beijing should approach shifts in relative capabilities cautiously, and recognize that the U.S. is expanding its “toolbox” of mechanisms that can be leveraged flexibly to deter China, particularly in the case of heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
In this roundtable, scholars from Fudan University and several invited guests debate the degree of convergence between U.S. and EU outlooks on China, the likely trajectory of EU trade and investment ties with China, and what type of role the EU should play in China’s international strategy going forward. Most of the scholars argue that Europe-China relations have deteriorated over the past years. However, many appear optimistic that there is considerable room for EU-China cooperation going forward, on matters from the green energy transition, to supporting developing countries weather shocks from COVID-19, to the Ukraine war. On the Russia-Ukraine war, one scholar suggests that a “substantial push by China to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict would help greatly to improve China-EU relations,” while others suggest that the degree to which the EU leads a resolution will be a “weathervane of its strategic autonomy” and determine whether the EU can avoid being marginalized in China’s foreign strategy.
A scholar from Tongji University argues that while Europe is increasingly emphasizing systemic rivalry with China, there is still “potential for deepening high-level cooperation” because many of China’s policy priorities (including ensuring food security, improving supply chain resilience and security, achieving self-reliance in science and technology, and boosting innovative capabilities) “share a common language” with those of the European Union. As a result, she argues that Europe should jettison what she refers to as its “Cold War mentality” and achieve “ideological independence,” so that China and the EU can work collectively to “inject more certainty, security, and development momentum into the world.”
A prominent Russia scholar at Fudan University argues that the Russia-Ukraine war has accelerated disruptions to global supply chains, reevaluation of global trade and investment rules, and efforts to reform and reshape security architecture both globally and regionally. However, he sees these trends as best characterized as a “small divergence” in the international order, rather than a move toward a Cold War-style confrontation between two hostile camps. Notably, Feng makes a point to distance China from Russia’s war. He argues that given meaningful differences in U.S. assessments of Russia and China, Beijing can play an important role in reducing the risk of what he terms global “re-campification” (再阵营化).
How is Beijing assessing the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence approaches vis-a-vis Taiwan? Writing in one of China’s leading IR journals, Renmin University’s Zuo Xiying argues that while the U.S. “failed to deter Russia from taking military action,” its actions since the invasion to support Ukraine and punish Moscow have “produced a powerful deterrent effect against China with regard to the Taiwan issue.”
The Deputy Director of Xiamen University’s Taiwan Research Center argues that while Beijing’s preference remains to “reunify” peacefully, Taiwan “separatists” and the United States are “touching the red line drawn by the mainland.”
This excerpt from a lengthy news report, written in April 2022, examines the global energy market amid the Russia-Ukraine war and takeaways for China. The author suggests that “although the Russia-Ukraine conflict is far from Asia, the global energy market is unitary in nature.” He argues that high oil prices are a “further warning of the importance of diversifying energy supplies for energy security.”