The concept of “confidence-building measures” can be traced back to 1913 in Europe, when the practice of inviting observers from different countries to observe one’s own military exercises and training emerged. In the 1920s, a Norwegian strategic analyst defined this as a tool for “communicating credible evidence to prove that the feared threat does not exist.”¹ In 1973, at the preparatory meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, the term “confidence-building measures” (CBMs) was proposed by Belgium and Italy and included in the Helsinki Final Act, named Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament.² Generally speaking, CBMs can be understood in a broad sense and in a narrow sense. In a broad sense, CBMs mainly refer to a series of arrangements aimed at delaying an arms race, reducing hidden dangers of conflict, and weakening suspicion at all levels among countries through the establishment of institutionalized exchanges and information exchanges in the economic, political, diplomatic, and military fields and comprehensive and multi-field positive interactions among the government, business communities, academic communities, and the public. In a narrow sense, CBMs mainly refer to all formal or informal unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral military and political measures adopted among countries to build trust in the military and security fields and with the aim of preventing and resolving uncertainties among countries.³

I. Background to US-USSR CBMs

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a number of agreements covering the military, political, economic, and other fields. These agreements constituted the framework of CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union. US-USSR CBMs had a specific strategic background, which can be summarized in the following four aspects.

(i) Changing Balance of Power between the U.S. and USSR

During this period, the United States was mired in the quagmire of the Vietnam War, and it carried heavy political, economic, and diplomatic burdens. The hegemony of the United States and its role as the world’s police force was under serious challenge. Specifically, the relative decline of U.S. power was manifested in three aspects: weakening economic hegemony, decline in political hegemony, and loss of nuclear monopoly. The weakening of U.S. economic hegemony was mainly reflected in the dollar crisis and the continuous concessions made by the United States in several rounds of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations. More importantly, the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the world had been shaken. The decline of U.S. political hegemony was mainly reflected in the fact that the unquestioned leadership of the United States in the Western world was broken, and its aggressive policies and power politics were often strongly condemned by socialist and developing countries. The loss of the U.S. nuclear monopoly was reflected in the successive acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China, and especially the rapid development of Soviet nuclear weapons, which caused the United States to lose the nuclear advantage it had enjoyed in the early days of the Cold War.

Compared with the United States, the strength of the Soviet Union had developed rapidly, which had enhanced its confidence in seeking status as a world power. Specifically, the development of Soviet power was mainly reflected in three aspects: rapid economic growth, a substantial increase in military strength, and expansion of international influence. In terms of the economy, from 1951 to 1971, the average annual growth rate of the Soviet Union’s national income, industrial output value, and agricultural output value all surpassed those of the United States, and its output of dozens of industrial products approached or exceeded that of the United States, ranking first in the world. In terms of the military, Brezhnev invested substantial manpower, material, and financial resources in the construction of armaments, especially the fastest possible development of nuclear weapons, and won an advantage in the strategic balance of power over the United States. In terms of politics, the Soviet Union held frequent international activities and launched fierce diplomatic offensives, which won it a certain international reputation and expanded its international influence.

Generally speaking, at this stage, the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union had undergone changes in terms of the economy, politics, and military affairs. Especially in the military field, a strategic equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union had been formed.

(ii) Deeper Understanding of Nuclear Weapons on the Part of the U.S. and USSR

In the early days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly developed strategic nuclear weapons. Especially after Eisenhower’s “massive retaliation strategy” was introduced, the United States and the Soviet Union fell into an unhinged nuclear arms race. In the 1960s, both sides possessed massive nuclear arsenals, which consumed large amounts of human, material, and financial resources, while also creating a tense situation in the world. With the escalation of the US-USSR nuclear arms race, the danger of a nuclear war was constantly increasing. Especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the leaders of the two countries came to the profound realization that, in the nuclear age, in the event of a full-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the consequences would be unimaginable and could lead to disaster for the entire human race. On this point, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union reached a consensus, which was the basis for dialogue between the two sides. At the same time, the arms race affected the economies of both sides to varying degrees. In particular, the economic development of the Soviet Union was seriously unbalanced. There is no doubt that the arms race, including the nuclear arms race, cost both sides dearly. In addition, since the 1950s, people all over the world strongly opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and this peace movement continued to swell. As a result, nuclear arms control became a necessity and CBMs became a top priority.

(iii) Changes in the International System

In the early days of the Cold War, most of the countries in the world were in the post-war recovery stage. They were mainly striving to build a stable social order and promote national economic development, so their enthusiasm for participating in international affairs was not high. By the 1960s, this situation changed. The national power of Western Europe and Japan was gradually recovering, and they hoped to implement an independent foreign policy. The third world was growing stronger and demanded a greater role in international affairs. In short, the international system at that time already presented a multipolar trend, and the external conditions for the United States and the Soviet Union to formulate strategies were changing. In addition, both the United States and the Soviet Union were affected by disturbances in the external environment. The United States was seriously troubled by the Vietnam War, which was “a nightmare of sudden anguish, thwarted hopes, and disillusionment” for the United States. In order to make up for the economic and political losses caused by the Vietnam War and prevent the country from becoming involved in similar troubles again, the United States decided to moderate its relationship with the Soviet Union and embarked on measures to build confidence with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union suffered persistent problems in the triangular relationship between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated and became severely confrontational, while Sino-U.S. relations gradually thawed. In order to reverse its unfavorable position in the triangular relationship, the Soviet Union actively promoted the détente with the United States, thereby accelerating the process of CBM negotiations.

(iv) Changing Conceptions of U.S. and USSR Decision-makers

The conceptions of decision-makers often influence a country’s foreign policy and national strategy. Changes in the conceptions of decision-makers played an important role in the transition from fierce confrontation to détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and from mutual criticism to CBMs.

The conceptual change among Soviet policymakers began with Khrushchev’s theory of “peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, and peaceful competition.” Khrushchev believed it was possible to “achieve peaceful coexistence throughout the period until the social and political problems currently dividing the world are resolved.” ⁴ Khrushchev believed that a war between the two camps would be devastating, and there would be no winner in the end. Therefore, between peace and devastating war, the Soviet Union should choose peace, and it can only choose peace. Brezhnev inherited this idea and developed it further. He put forward a six-point peace program. The third point was the “prohibition of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and bacteriological weapons, stopping nuclear tests, convening disarmament agreements among countries with nuclear weapons, and establishing nuclear-free zones” and the fourth point was to “stop the arms race and withdraw foreign military bases.”⁵ These clarified the goal of CBMs with the United States.

The shift in conception among U.S. policymakers began with Kennedy’s “Strategy of Peace.” The purpose of the “Strategy of Peace” was to use military strength as backing support, emphasize the use of peaceful means to strengthen the status of the Western allies, and conduct “peaceful evolution” with respect to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Although this strategy was an evolution of the “containment strategy”, it still had a relatively positive effect. Kennedy believed that through the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, they could find some “shared fundamental interests and goals” and should therefore “concentrate on those issues where agreement can be reached.” According to Kennedy, these “sprouts of common interest” were reflected in: escaping the heavy burden imposed by the arms race; neither side wanting a nuclear war; monopoly of nuclear weapons, not wanting too many countries to master nuclear weapons and have the ability to launch nuclear war; trying to develop their own economies and achieve more scientific achievements. ⁶ This view was inherited and carried forward by Nixon. In his speech at the 25th session of the UN General Assembly, he stated: “Détente is an agreement between nations with different interests. It does not mean that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement on all issues, but that although the two countries have differences on most issues, they want to reach an agreement on some issues and do not want to fight over any issue.” [Translator’s note: Many of the quotes of U.S. and Soviet leaders used in this article seem to be condensations or summaries rather than literal translations of actual speeches.]

II. Main Content of U.S.-USSR CBMs

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union issued numerous declarations and statements and signed many treaties and agreements. According to their purposes and functions, they can be divided into the following two main categories.

(i) Crisis Management and Control Measures

CBMs intended to regulate the behavior of both parties so as to effectively respond to and control crises and prevent the two countries from escalating the crises to a level that would result in an outbreak of war between them can be called crisis management and control CBMs.

During the Cold War period, the United States and the Soviet Union competed fiercely and regarded each other as rivals. They had conflicts and contradictions in many regions, and international crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crisis, and Cienfuegos Crisis broke out. After the 1960s, the US-USSR maritime crises occurred frequently, such as ship collisions, interceptions, close-range maneuvering, simulated attacks on opposing ships and aircraft with guns and missiles, and low-altitude and close-distance flights over ships. The degree of danger was soul-stirring. In order to effectively deal with the above crisis, on June 20, 1963, the two countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link (the “Hotline Agreement”) in Geneva, which became the first CBM agreement. The two sides then communicated directly by radio and telephone, ensuring that the leaders of the two countries remained in contact during a crisis.

On May 25, 1972, the U.S. and Soviet navies signed the Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. This agreement strictly restricted all military activities of the two sides on the surface of international waters and in the air above international waters and laid out specific regulations. At the same time, it clarified that the two sides should notify each other in advance of their intentions to engage in activities such as naval exercises.

On September 15, 1987, in order to prevent accidental nuclear wars, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington, agreeing to establish “nuclear risk reduction centers” in the capitals of the two countries to monitor, report, and prevent accidental nuclear wars, and to hold regular meetings every year for mutual coordination.

In 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities in Moscow. On the basis of the 1972 agreement, this agreement clarified four types of “dangerous military activities” that needed to be prevented, specifically the entry of the personnel and equipment of one party’s armed forces into the territory of the other party due to force majeure or unintentional acts; the use of lasers; obstructing the movement of personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other side in a “zone of special caution”; and interference with command and control networks. At the same time, procedures for communication and entry into each other’s territory were established.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States urged the 27 member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to sign the Treaty on Open Skies in Helsinki in 1992. The treaty stipulated that, in principle, the signatory countries can carry out aerial reconnaissance of each other once a year. After any one of the contracting parties completes the reconnaissance mission, the information obtained from the reconnaissance shall be shared among the countries that signed the treaty.

Crisis management and control CBMs mainly rely on transparent means and restrictive means to achieve the purpose of managing crises and avoiding conflicts by increasing the military transparency of both sides and limiting the extreme behaviors of both sides. For example, the Treaty on Open Skies mainly served to increase the military transparency of the two sides, while the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities aimed to regulate the behaviors of both sides. The United States and the Soviet Union were well aware that direct conflict could escalate into an uncontrollable nuclear war at any time. The greatest significance of crisis management and control CBMs is that they could effectively avoid direct conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union and effectively reduce the probability and intensity of crises. For example, after the signing of the Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, the frequency and intensity of US-USSR maritime emergencies were significantly reduced and the situation in international waters improved significantly.

(ii) Arms Control and Disarmament Measures

In the late 1960s, the United States implemented a strategic contraction to reduce the pressure from military spending. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union tried to ease the intense pressure it was under from confrontation with the United States. The two sides began to seek to limit the strategic arms race within a certain range on the premise of restraining the other party without compromising their own strategic positions. In order to achieve the above goals, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on a large number of arms control CBMs. On May 20, 1972, the two countries reached two agreements, namely the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, collectively referred to as the First Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). This stipulated that the land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and guided-missile submarines of both sides would be frozen at their actual levels as of July 1, 1972, and the number and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles would be restricted. To conclude a “permanent treaty,” the United States and the Soviet Union continued to carry out a second round of negotiations. On June 18, 1979, they signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as SALT II. It stipulated the total quotas of strategic weapons for both sides and limited the heavy missiles of both sides, the Soviet “Backfire” bombers, and U.S. cruise missiles. On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as START I in Moscow. This treaty set limits on the number of intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and strategic nuclear warheads for both sides and stipulated a series of restrictions and verification measures. In addition, on December 8, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). This required both parties to stop producing and testing medium- and short-range missiles after the treaty took effect, destroy all medium- and short-range missiles (with a range of 500 to 1,000 km) and their launch devices and auxiliary facilities within 18 months, and destroy all medium-range missiles (with a range of 1,000 to 5,500 km) and their launch devices and auxiliary facilities within 3 years.⁷

In addition to the above-mentioned agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union also concluded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, Helsinki Final Act, Outer Space Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and other agreements.

Arms control CBMs include methods such as declarations, communications, transparency, restrictions, and verifications, relying mainly on restriction and verification methods. For example, the two rounds of SALT included content such as limits on the number of weapons and specified verification methods.

Arms control CBMs helped the United States and the Soviet Union jointly formulate some reasonable rules for their arms race, control the blind increase in the number of weapons by the two countries, and coordinate the pace of the arms race between the two sides. The two sides adopted arms control CBMs to control the nuclear arms race so that it remained within a certain scope or certain degree. This not only achieved stability in the arms race but also made the two sides fully realize that there was no advantage in carrying out a first strike. As a result, a “nuclear balance of terror” was formed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the deterrence strategies of both sides were applied to maximum effect. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union led the establishment of arms control CBMs in Europe, which went a long way toward easing the pressure of the military confrontation and arms race between the two major blocs, the East and the West. In summary, arms control CBMs effectively controlled the direction, scale, and speed of the US-USSR arms race.

III. Experience from US-USSR CBMs

By summarizing the content and functions of US-USSR CBMs and tracing the historical development of US-USSR CBMs, we can obtain the following experience.

(i) Advantages of US-USSR CBMs

1. Create a favorable political environment.

CBMs mainly restricted and regulated the military and political activities of both parties in the form of signed agreements. They were a kind of inter-state political behavior. Thus, creating a favorable political environment can facilitate CBMs. In the early days of the Cold War, conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union were fierce, and bilateral relations were poor. Mutual communication between the two sides had basically come to a standstill and CBMs became even more difficult. In the middle of the Cold War, and especially after the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union successively implemented détente policies, and the communications and contacts between the two sides steadily increased. In the 1970s alone, the United States and the Soviet Union held five summit meetings. In this favorable political environment, CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union developed rapidly, and the two sides signed a number of important agreements. This period was seen as the golden age in the development of US-USSR relations. In the early 1980s, after Reagan took office, the foreign policy of the United States changed, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union turned cold, and the political environment deteriorated. CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union also stagnated. This shows us that the political environment has a strong influence on CBMs. A favorable political environment promotes CBMs, and a poor political environment hinders them.

2. Focus on using private communication channels.

CBMs rely on agreements, and the signing of agreements depends on exchanges and communication between the two parties. Information communication is a process of “pressure” and “compromise.” Through effective information transmission, both parties can assess the bottom lines of the other party and determine the interests amenable to compromise and their common interests. This allows them to reach an agreement and achieve the purpose of CBMs. There are two types of communication channels, official and private. The flexible use of private communication channels can effectively promote CBMs. In 1969, at the beginning of the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger had many private exchanges with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, which led to the first summit meeting between the two sides. This was a great contribution to the improvement of US-USSR relations and CBMs. Private communication has many advantages. It gives the president full control over the foreign policy of the United States, without interference from other departments. Private communication channels are confidential. During negotiation and consultation through private channels, the president can also win the support of the people through official statements and speeches, thereby eliminating the negative impact of reaching compromises. In short, private channels are more flexible, and both sides in the negotiations can be open and honest without worrying about interference from the outside world. The effective use of private communication channels can facilitate CBMs.

3. Adhere to the principle of gradual, step-by-step progress.

CBMs are a kind of negotiated cooperation, and the content and form of cooperation are the results of repeated negotiations and compromises between the countries. Therefore, CBMs are difficult to achieve overnight, and the principle of gradual, step-by-step progress should be followed. In the process of establishing CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union, the nuclear-related agreements had the distinctive feature of gradual, step-by-step progress. The two sides first took the lead in signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which limited the external proliferation of nuclear weapons. After that, the two sides signed SALT I, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which restricted the number of weapons, test locations, and test yields through agreements. In the end, the two sides signed the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty” and realized the reduction of nuclear weapons. From restriction to reduction, the United States and the Soviet Union went through a long negotiation process. Its effect is also obvious. Since the establishment of nuclear CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries gradually achieved the goal of nuclear arms control.

4. Promote CBMs through cooperation among multiple fields.

CBMs are mainly concentrated in the military and security fields and are often related to core national interests such as national security. Therefore, it is difficult for the negotiating parties to make concessions and compromises, which makes it more difficult to sign agreements. When the two sides are stuck in a position where compromise is difficult, cooperation in other fields can promote negotiations in the military and security fields, thereby promoting CBMs between the countries. In 1969, the Soviet Union proposed a summit meeting of top leaders, and the United States responded. In 1970, for reasons such as the Cienfuegos “crisis”, the top-level summit meeting was postponed, and CBMs between the two sides were blocked. At that time, the United States adopted a series of economic and trade measures to facilitate the holding of the top-level summit meeting. At the end of November 1971, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans led a delegation to visit the Soviet Union and signed contracts worth $136 million for grain transactions and $125 million for mining and drilling equipment. In early 1972, the Nixon administration decided to promote economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, instructing the State Department to study the issue of debt from the Lend-Lease Act and instructing the Department of Agriculture to study the issue of grain exports to the Soviet Union. This round of economic and trade cooperation strengthened the material basis for US-USSR détente and effectively allowed for the first summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union since the Cold War, thereby promoting progress in US-USSR CBMs. This example demonstrates that cooperation in economic and other fields was able to promote CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union focusing on the military and security fields. It was a positive technique.

(ii) Lessons from US-USSR CBMs

1. CBMs have limited binding force.

At present, the main CBM method is to sign agreements that restrict the behavior of both parties through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. An analysis of the implementation of the agreements by the United States and the Soviet Union shows that the binding force of such agreements is limited. Therefore, CBMs based on agreements have limited binding force. This can be seen in two aspects: First, the text of the agreement can be purposefully distorted. The content of an agreement can be interpreted in many ways. When a country wants to break the constraints of the agreement, it can distort the text to suit its purpose. For example, after Reagan came to power, he formulated a strategic defense plan, which violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, American scholars and officials used what they call a “broad interpretation” of the treaty. Then-Secretary of Defense Weinberger said in his memoirs: “The treaty itself provided the means for both parties to take steps beyond the limits of the treaty.”⁸ Second, it is easy to reduce the effectiveness of a treaty during the implementation process. This shows that there is still opacity and non-cooperation in the process of monitoring the fulfillment of an agreement, which makes it difficult for CBMs to achieve their expected goals. For example, the United States and Russia signed the Treaty on Open Skies to increase military transparency and thereby enhance mutual trust. However, during the implementation process, the United States and Russia schemed against each other. They ordered troops along the reconnaissance route to camouflage in advance of flights and transferred and hid their latest weapons and equipment. As a result, air reconnaissance flights were nicknamed “air inspections.” This greatly reduced the effectiveness of the treaty.

2. CBM should not be excessively compromised.

CBMs are a process of strategic gamesmanship, and certain compromises and concessions are required if the countries are to reach an agreement. However, in the process of compromise, it is necessary to be attentive that the level of concessions is roughly equal on both sides. Countries must never compromise too much for CBMs so that their national interests are damaged.

When Gorbachev was in power, the Soviet Union focused its diplomacy on actively improving and developing relations with the United States. Gorbachev was too keen on US-USSR cooperation and adopted a position and policy of comprehensive concessions and compromises. In order to win the support of the United States, and bowing to the pressure from the United States, Gorbachev made a series of major concessions. These involved four main points: First, the Soviet Union agreed to decouple the reduction of strategic offensive weapons from the strategic defense plan of the United States. Second, the Soviet Union withdrew completely from Europe. Third, the Soviet Union retreated from the third world. Fourth, when Gorbachev handled domestic issues he would first consider how the United States would respond. The four points of compromise above enabled the United States to gain a strategic military advantage over the Soviet Union, which led the United States and other NATO countries to progressively make greater and greater demands. Gorbachev’s excessive concessions weakened the Soviet Union’s status as a superpower.

In recent years, as U.S. strategy has shifted east, the potential for conflicts between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region has increased. Although both sides emphasize mutually beneficial cooperation and that they do not want conflict with each other, they both regard each other as the main target for war preparations. Looked at in this way, effective management and control of the relationship between the two sides to avoid the outbreak of a large-scale military conflict is a top priority and always has a certain significance. Learning from the experience of CBMs between the United States and the Soviet Union and realizing the continuous development of CBMs between China and the United States in both depth and breadth is an effective way to improve China’s security environment.