For Russia to achieve national revitalization, it is not a simple historical process. It requires both the support of the country’s citizens and a sound external environment. After President Vladimir Putin came into power, he launched a series of domestic and foreign strategies, hoping to achieve these ambitious goals and restore Russia’s status as a great power. Although Russia’s national strength has recovered significantly with the help of its resource advantages, due to the decade of impact following the international financial crisis and the Crimea crisis, Russia’s economic development has been sluggish, and social divisions have become increasingly serious. and the United States and Europe have continued to strengthen economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia to weaken the country’s international influence. Against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic, drastic changes in the international landscape have created opportunities for Russia’s comprehensive revitalization but have also brought about unprecedented and severe challenges.

1. Russia’s Great Power Revival: Basic Course and Target Selection

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia fell at once into a serious crisis. The economy nearly collapsed, and the political situation was turbulent. When Putin became president in 2000, Russia was going through a very difficult historical period. Putin had a clear understanding of this: “For the first time in the past 200 to 300 years, Russia faces the real danger that it could be relegated to the second, or even the third tier of global powers.” From ordinary people to national elites, Russians began to long for the former glory of the Soviet Union and strongly hoped for national revitalization. Putin leaned into this appeal with confidence: “Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence.”¹ Putin has made Russia a “great power on an equal footing with the United States” as his governing goal, which has been highly recognized by the people. The realization of Russia’s historic revival as a great power is regarded as the source of legitimacy for Putin’s long-term rule, and he has been in power steadily for more than 20 years.

(1) Russia’s tortuous road to national revitalization

If we examine Russia’s national revitalization in a cycle of about 10 years, then the first cycle is the period of Yeltsin’s reign (1991-1999). Due to the decision to expand the power of the Federal Assembly following the revision of the constitution, the Russian ruling authorities attached great importance to the election and made arrangements in advance to ensure that the political party United Russia could guarantee an absolute advantage in party elections and elections for single-seat constituencies, thus continuing to hold an absolute majority in the parliament. With this majority, they would be able to provide legislative support for Putin to formulate policies and introduce strategies, facing no obstacles in the appointment of important positions. In this way, they would guarantee the swift implementation of Putin’s orders, safeguard national sovereignty, and ensure social stability with a “strong” regime, providing a solid political guarantee for the implementation of Putin’s major policies and the strategic national revitalization. Although Yeltsin adjusted his diplomatic strategy after suffering international setbacks, implemented a “double-headed eagle” policy that took into account the East and the West, and established a strategic partnership of coordination with China in 1996, the economic transformation progressed slowly and economic development was stagnant for a long time.

The second cycle spanned a longer period, including the eight years when Putin was first president and the four years when Medvedev was president and Putin was prime minister. At this stage, Russia seemed to be very close to Putin’s goal. The ruling authorities first strengthened the control of the central government over the localities, solved the Chechen problem that had plagued Russia’s national unity and security for many years, and then ruled out the threat to the regime from the oligarchs. Diplomatically, Russia got along well with Europe, and the relationship between Russia and the United States was rekindled. Even the “Five-Day War” with Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008 did not affect the relationship with the United States and Europe, receiving active mediation from France and Germany. Due to high energy prices, the economy has maintained high growth for several consecutive years, and the country’s wealth has increased rapidly, but it has also caused the economy to be highly dependent on energy, solidifying an untenable economic structure. After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the Russian economy was hit hard, and it spread to other CIS countries.

The third cycle ran from 2012 to 2021. Putin once again took over power from Medvedev, who had been in power for four years, despite opposition from the West, and soon encountered the crisis in Ukraine. The geopolitical confrontation with the West has led to severe economic sanctions from the United States and Europe, but Russia still maintains a strong aggressiveness in diplomacy, sending troops to Syria and putting forward the “Turn to the East” and “Greater Eurasian Partnership” plans. Russia has not been defeated by Western sanctions and remains strong on the international stage, though economic difficulties have hindered Putin’s dream of becoming a great power. The rapid deterioration of the COVID-19 pandemic and the international environment, coupled with the tremendous pressure of domestic social division, has forced Putin to change his strategic plan. The revival of Russia’s great power has also entered a new period of adjustment.

With the help of the high price of oil, Russia’s GDP rapidly climbed from the 22nd in the world to the ninth in the world in the middle of the second cycle, returning to a level last seen before the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then, however, growth has remained stagnant. As the economy relies upon energy and raw materials, it is also often affected by price fluctuations in the international market. If you only look at economic performance, it seems difficult for Russia to maintain its original status. However, in terms of land area, resource endowment, and technological potential, it is hard to compare Russia to other countries. Russia’s military strength, in particular, still strikes fear in the United States. In fact, Putin’s national revitalization strategy reflects Russia’s real national interests to a considerable extent, and the country has begun to restore its self-confidence as a great power, which has been widely recognized by domestic elites and ordinary people alike. After Crimea returned to Russia in 2014, Putin’s approval rating in the polls soared rapidly, reaching as high as 89%, indicating that Putin’s strongman politics has a high degree of trust, known as the “Crimea Consensus.”

(2) Adjustment and change of social and economic development goals

Economic strength is the most important manifestation of a country’s comprehensive strength, and the setting and completion of economic goals occupies a particularly important position in Putin’s national revitalization strategy. During Putin’s first term, energy prices in the international market brought rapid growth to the Russian economy, the country increased its investment in society, and people’s living standards were instantly and significantly improved. But affected by the financial crisis, Russia’s economy fell into a slump again, so Putin issued a broad plan to revive the society and economy after returning to the Kremlin in May 2012, known as the “May Orders.” The ambitious plan included 11 elements, covering social policy, improving health care and education systems, and addressing housing supply and the quality of community services. In Putin’s view, relying on strong state control and huge resource advantages, Russia could soon become a global economic power, and even at first, experts thought that the estimates were too conservative (if the annual GDP growth rate is not less than 8%, it could reach the level of Portugal or Spain in 15 years; if a growth rate of 10% is maintained, it can reach the level of the United Kingdom or France in 15 years). He believed that “we are not that far behind these countries, we can catch up faster.”² Putin personally grasped the implementation of the “May Orders” and convened various government departments many times to listen to reports on the implementation of the orders. Many ministers were “rebuked” by the president for their poor implementation.³ There are many reasons for the failure of the “May Orders” to be completed on time, and the Western sanctions and withdrawal of capital after the Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly an important reason.

On May 7, 2018, Putin, beginning his fourth presidential term, signed a new order, known as the “New May Orders,” planning the strategic development tasks and goals of the Russian Federation before 2024 and specifically setting forth the economic goals of the revitalization to a great power, with special emphasis placed on the solution of social problems. The main contents include: The government should reduce the country’s poor population by half, ensure the stable growth of residents’ income, and increase the rate of retirement pensions to be higher than the rate of inflation. Raise the average life expectancy of the Russian population to 78 years and build or renovate housing to meet the needs of 5 million households every year. To enter the top five economies in the world by 2024, Russia must ensure that Russia’s GDP growth is higher than the global average every year, and the inflation rate does not exceed 4%. ⁴ The orders not only included indicators of people’s livelihood but also included “heavy blows” such as environmental governance and economic structure adjustments.

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, on July 21, 2020, Putin signed another decree on the national development goals for the next 10 years, emphasizing that while maintaining macroeconomic stability, Russia would ensure that GDP growth is higher than the global average by 2030 and that the five national development goals will be achieved, namely, the sustainable growth of the country’s population and concern for the health and well-being of the people, providing citizens with a comfortable and safe living environment, providing opportunities and platforms for talent development, increasing the proportion of the country’s fixed asset investment scale by an increase of at least 70% compared with 2020, and improving the quality of national education and striving to achieve the goal of ranking among the top ten in the world for the quality of general education. It could be seen that Putin had begun to recognize the harsh reality and believed that it was more important to consolidate political and social stability through economic development. For example, in his many speeches in 2021, he paid special attention to the issue of ensuring employment and proposed that as the current unemployment rate in Russia was about 5%, it should be reduced to 4.6% from 2022 to 2024, reflecting that the plan he formulated was more pragmatic.

(3) The revitalization of Russia as a great power portends multiple strategic goals

When Putin came to power in 2000, he made a comprehensive set of long-term strategies for national revitalization. The first is to recognize that Russia is no longer a country that represents the highest level of economic and social development in the contemporary world, and the country faces the real danger of becoming a second- or third-rate country. The second is to take the interests of the country and the nation as the foothold and starting point of all policies and policies. To this end, it is necessary to carry forward Russian ideology and values, including, as a great power, the consciousness of a strong country, the role of the state, and social solidarity. The third is that domestic goals are more important than foreign goals, and that Russia’s position in the world depends on whether domestic problems can be solved smoothly. The fourth is to establish a development model suitable for Russia’s national conditions rather than blindly following the West, as Russia cannot become a copy of the United States or the United Kingdom. Fifth, Russia’s foreign policy must be linked to its security strategy, combining domestic security, peripheral security and international security. By revising security strategies and military doctrines, Russia will drive adjustments to foreign policy, enhance the potential of nuclear deterrence, defend national sovereignty, safeguard national dignity, consolidate its status as a great power, demand the establishment of international relations in line with Russia’s national interests, and undertake international obligations commensurate with its national strength. The sixth is to oppose a unipolar world and promote multi-polarity to build a multi-polar world. ⁵

Russia believes that the current global military and political situation is characterized by the formation of new global and regional power centers and the intensification of the struggle for spheres of influence among them, which is clearly reflected in the new version of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. In Russia’s view, the increasing importance of military power as a tool for countries to achieve their own geopolitical goals reflects that in the absence of economic backing, the country can only return to traditional means. Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, pointed out in an article on Russia’s foreign policy in 2020 that military power has once again become the main tool of foreign policy, and international mechanisms have taken a back seat. ⁶ In this sense, Russia is still a global power and one of the important “players” and power centers in the existing international structure.

With the changes in the international state of affairs, Putin believes that the international state of affairs, the confrontation between China and the United States, and the division of Europe have opened up new development “opportunities” for Russia’s revival and even feels that a “strong Russia” seems to be at hand. Historically, Russia, even when it was most prosperous, had obvious economic and social “shortcomings,” and it relied more on strong military strength and pragmatic diplomacy to become one of the great powers. Whether it was participating in the fanatical geopolitical Great Game as one of the European powers of the 19th century or the bipolar confrontation with the United States in the Soviet era, Russia has successfully increased its influence in the region and the world, seeking or safeguarding its own strategic interests. As a very realistic leader with “great power sentiment,” Putin, on the one hand, recognizes the complex changes in the post-Cold War world and frankly admits the decline of Russia’s national strength; on the other hand, he firmly believes that Russia has the necessary ability and conditions to return to the ranks of the global powers.

2. Revitalization Strategy Under the New State of Affairs: Realistic Dilemma and External Pressure

After Putin started a new term in 2018, Russia’s strategy of great power revival became clearer. Those in power realized that, on the one hand, they are getting closer to “maintaining” or “losing” the country’s strength, and on the other hand, they also saw that Russia’s political and economic process is encountering new difficulties. The sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on Russia are still ongoing, and they grow tougher with each new round. Since Biden took office, the hostile policies of the United States and Europe to Russia have continued unabated. There have been constant crises and turmoil around Russia, and the external environment has further deteriorated. Putin’s hopes of improving relations with the West or dividing the United States and Europe are even more difficult to achieve. Strong foreign policy is an important part of Russia’s national revitalization strategy, but it is difficult to display it calmly under the new state of affairs. Having suffered frequent blows in handling relations with the United States and Europe, Russia has to pay more attention to cooperation with “non-Western” powers such as China and India. At the same time, in the face of increasingly severe internal and external challenges, it is extremely difficult to achieve the goal of economic “catch-up” in a short period of time through rapid growth.

(1) The domestic economic and social state of affairs is severe

The worrying economic and social state of affairs is the biggest problem Putin is currently facing. The “New May Orders” suffered a major blow. According to Russian scholars, there are many problems in the Russian economy, and the potential to increase welfare only by relying on hydrocarbon resources has been exhausted. The most acute problem is the devaluation of the ruble, with a price increase of 600% in 20 years; the proportion of investment in GDP is significantly behind. In the past 10 years, the Russian economy has grown by only 9%, with an average annual growth rate of less than 0.9%. In the same period, the average annual growth rate of the world economy is about 3%. There is a saying of a “lost decade.” The birth rate has continued to fall, and a population crisis has broken out. ⁷ In 2019, the poverty rate in Russia was 10.9%. The Russian government plans to reduce it to 6.5% by 2030, but the annual growth rate of residents’ real income is only about 3%, and the inflation rate is as high as 5%. ⁸ If you only look at economic indicators, Russia has even been left behind by South Korea and Turkey in recent years, accounting for less than 2% of the world economy. Since 2014, the actual income of the Russian people has been declining year after year, which has caused dissatisfaction in the society. In particular, there were large-scale demonstrations in response to the unfair distribution of wealth and government corruption. Navalny, a representative of the opposition, took advantage of public dissatisfaction and mobilized through the internet to repeatedly set off waves of opposition to Putin and his ruling party.

If only measured by economic indicators, whether it is the rationality of the economic structure or the global ranking of GDP, there is a gap between Russia and the standard of a global power. In 2020, Russia’s GDP was 106.6 trillion rubles at current prices, a year-on-year decrease of 3.1%; the GDP converted at the annual average exchange rate was about 1.474 trillion U.S. dollars, and the world ranking fell to 11th; per capita GDP is about 728,000 rubles, equivalent to only 10,100 in U.S. dollars (it was close to 16,000 U.S. dollars in 2013). Putin, however, still has confidence in long-term economic development. At the economic meeting held on September 21, 2021, he emphasized that Russia’s annual GDP growth can be stabilized at 4.2%, and industrial growth from January to July will reach 4.4%, sparking a return in investor confidence. Putin believes that the Russian economy has overcome the negative impact of COVID-19 and has shown a good momentum of rebounding.

Under difficult circumstances, Putin felt enormous pressure from society. Although he does not face many political challenges, with Putin still maintaining a high approval rate, the prolonged epidemic and crisis have not only made economic recovery weak, but also the problems of social security and even national sovereignty have become more prominent. At the same time, it is unrealistic to rely on cooperation with Asian countries to achieve balanced development of the regional economy. Although Russia straddles Eurasia geographically, it is closer to Europe in culture, and the elites have even long been “disdainful” of Asian culture and distrust Asian countries in terms of politics and security. Under this kind of thinking, whether it is to develop the Far East or to integrate into East Asia economically, it will be difficult to achieve in the short term.

Foreign military action also has a high economic price. In order to maintain its influence as a global power, Russia is unwilling to give up its traditional “sphere of influence” and even takes military action, which also brings a series of heavy burdens. Strength and purpose are difficult to match completely. For example, in military operations in West Asia, Russia has successively sent 63,000 ground troops to Syria. It is speculated that Russia spent more than 5 billion U.S. dollars on the war in the past 6 years, not including the 10 billion U.S. dollars in aid provided to the Syrian government. ⁹

(2) External challenges have increased and resources have decreased sharply

First, the relationship between major powers is unstable, and the geopolitical game with the United States and Europe is constantly escalating.

During the Yeltsin period, Russia’s diplomatic “reversion” to the West had received some “rewards,” including being drawn into the traditional club of Western powers, the G7. The Denver summit in 1997 was named the G8 for the first time, but at that time, Yeltsin could only participate in political and security discussions and was excluded from the discussion of the global economy. In the early days of his administration, Putin actively improved relations with the West. He formally joined the G7 in 2002 and hosted the G8 summit in 2006. Putin soon realized that the Western countries were more concerned with exchanging financial assistance for Russia to destroy nuclear weapons and that the West could not truly “accept” Russia. As the confrontation between the two sides escalated over the Ukraine issue, Russia was “kicked” out of the Western “club of great powers,” and the G7 resumed in 2014. Since then, the G7 summit has continued to put pressure on Russia, and the two sides have also turned from partners to enemies. It is difficult for Russia-EU relations to follow the trajectory designed by Russia, while Russia-U.S. relations have been in a downward spiral for more than 20 years.

In the context of deteriorating Sino-U.S. relations, Russia once wanted to “sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight,” believing that the Sino-U.S. dispute was Russia’s “window of opportunity.” This, however, backfired, and the relationship between Russia and the United States has not improved. ¹⁰ Putin and Trump “appreciated one another,” but there has been no positive change in the relationship between the two countries. After the 2020 U.S. presidential election, Biden took office and further “tightened” the Russia policy. In January 2021, there were protests in Russia over Navalny’s arrest, the United States publicly sided with the opposition, and even the U.S. embassy in Russia played a disgraceful role. The two sides fought fiercely in Syria and other places, and at one point recalled ambassadors from each opposing country, indicating that it was difficult for the relationship between the two countries to “break the ice” in the short term, and distrust still dominates the policy coordinates.

The rise of populist sentiment has made Europe’s hostility towards Russia difficult to eliminate, and the previously stable Russia-Germany relationship has also cracked. Biden’s anti-Russian policy of aligning with the EU has deepened the hostility of the EU and most Central and Eastern European countries to Russia. After the “poisoning” incident of Navalny in September 2020, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she would not rule out the option to sanction Russia through the Nord Stream-2 natural gas pipeline project jointly built by Germany and Russia. The EU has accused Russia of launching an information war and using a Trojan horse of aiding Italy in its fight against the epidemic with the intention of dividing the EU. In turn, Russia also believes that after the Belarusian presidential election, Germany and France openly supported the large-scale demonstrations held by the Belarusian opposition, with the West openly challenging the country’s own strategic interests. Under the background of the COVID-19 pandemic, the geopolitical game between Russia and Europe has further escalated.

Second, the surrounding strategic environment is deteriorating day by day.

Driven by Western powers, a series of new chaotic events emerged around Russia, from the impasse in the Belarusian election to the third “revolution” in Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary election, to the resignation of Moldovan pro-Russian President Dodon in the general election, and the sharp escalation of the armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular, has threatened Russia’s strategic interests. Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan are all members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization and are staunch followers of Russia in terms of diplomacy and security. In the end, Russia helped its “allies,” stabilizing the political situation in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, and facilitated the final ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh through strong intervention, barely maintaining regional influence, but the cost was high: Russia provided Belarus with another 1.5 billion U.S. dollars in lending, forgave Kyrgyzstan’s tremendous debt and provided the country with financial assistance, not to mention other remaining issues. Instigated by the West, especially the United States, Russia now has more and more geopolitical opponents, and the surrounding areas are facing new pressure. Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, and other “old enemies” have rushed to the front line of the push against Russia. Although these countries are not Russia’s opponents militarily, they have the support of NATO and the United States behind them, and Russia cannot carelessly deal with them. The post-Soviet bloc of countries are stepping up their “de-Russification,” and multiple sets of bilateral relations must be rebuilt.

Third, traditional partners have gradually begun to alienate Russia.

Russia wants to maintain its special relationship with India, Brazil, South Africa, and other BRICS countries, and also wants to consolidate its traditional influence in Southeast Europe, West Asia, Southeast Asia, South America, Africa, and elsewhere. For example, with the West imposing severe sanctions on Russia, India’s friendly neutrality has special significance to Russia, but Russia and India are partners, not military and political allies. This means that the interests of the two countries are not always aligned, not only affected by Russia-India relations with third countries, but also by changes in the global situation and various crises. In recent years, there have been discordant voices in Russia-India relations. For example, Indian media and experts have portrayed Russia as a “Chinese vassal.” Russian media and experts have accused India of being prepared to play the role of a small partner of the United States in Asian affairs and have discussed India’s pro-American policy of undermining the development of Russia-India relations.

(3) The dual characteristics of Putin’s strategy of strengthening the country

With the economy failing to meet expectations, experts in Russia have begun to question Putin’s national revival strategy. After Putin started a new term in 2018, Russia’s political and economic process encountered new difficulties. After the outbreak of COVID-19, the problem of social differentiation has become more prominent, and the problem of unemployment has become more serious. Putin has felt the tremendous pressure from society. At the same time, the sanctions against Russia by the United States and Europe continue, and they grow tougher with each new round. After Biden took office, Putin’s hopes of improving relations with the West or dividing the United States and Europe have become much more difficult to achieve. Faced with the grim situation, Putin first responded vigorously with diplomacy. In April 2021, Putin emphasized in his annual State of the Nation address that the focus of Russia’s foreign policy was to ensure Russia’s peace, security, and stable development. Russia is open to extensive international cooperation but has its own national interests and will resolutely safeguard its own position. Provocations that threaten Russia’s fundamental interests will not succeed. If anyone thinks Russia’s goodwill is a sign of weakness, they should know that Russia’s counterattack would be asymmetrical, fast, and tough. ¹¹

Internationally, there are various interpretations of Putin’s strategy of great power revitalization: Some talk of a “restoration of the Soviet Union,” that is, a rebuilding of a great power with Russia as the center in the geographic space of the former Soviet Union. Others talk of “imperial succession,” believing that Putin and his team want to retrace the development trajectory of the Russian Empire created during the time of Peter the Great. Others say there is a “New Russia” that, under the leadership of Putin, will embark on a new development path, live in peace with other major powers, and establish an unprecedented “country of Putin.” The evaluation of Putin’s great power revival strategy in Russia is also different. Some people, as represented by the former “think tank” Surkov, believe that Putin’s policies can make Russia a strong country with deep influence. ¹² Some scholars have argued that there are realist and liberal alternatives to Russia’s path to recovery: Realism refers to a route that strengthens Russia’s sovereignty and makes Russia an autonomous and fully independent decision-making center, including cultural independence. ¹³ Liberalism refers to the desire to integrate into a Western-dominated global system in which rules, values, and priorities are set by the West.

Therefore, Putin’s strategy of great power revival actually includes two attributes: Realism and liberalism. Putin himself does not trust the West and obviously prefers the former. The lessons of the 1990s also made Russian society more accepting of realism, or conservatism, as good for national interests. However, there are also liberal supporters in Putin’s ruling party. There are actually two different options and prospects for Russia’s revival, and the implementation of its strategy of building a strong country is prone to swings and repetitions.

3. Returning to Reality: New Adjustments to the National Revival Strategy

Because economic revitalization could not be achieved smoothly in a short period of time, Putin adjusted the national revival strategy, with a clearer direction, and became ever more convinced to maintain the continuity and stability of politics and diplomacy, clearly reflecting the characteristics of conservatism. Economically, Russia must not only focus on energy production and exports but must also attempt to make certain changes in its model of growth, resetting long-term goals according to objective realities so as to be more pragmatic. At the same time, in order to alleviate what ails the people, issues that have accumulated over the years and ahve been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia must increase investment in the social field and solve practical problems such as employment and poverty. Due to the failure of economic development to meet expectations, great-power diplomacy, which is an integral part of Russia’s national revitalization strategy, also has great uncertainty. Though Putin must make certain changes, he still insists on the basic goals and realization paths of national revitalization.

(1) Strengthening and safeguarding the ability of the regime to control the overall state of affairs

To consolidate his ruling status and the effective operation of the power system at the institutional level, Putin has amended the constitution and has enacted various laws, granting greater power to the Russian National Security Council and the Federal Council of State, guaranteeing the continuity of Putin’s domestic and foreign policies. At the beginning of 2020, Putin decided to make a comprehensive revision of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, not only to solve the problem of how Putin could continue to govern in 2024 but also to solidify the policies and principles of Russia’s domestic and foreign affairs over the past 20 years, asserting Russia’s future development direction of Russia. The new version of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation in July 2021 further strengthened various measures to maintain the security of the regime.

In the eighth Russian State Duma election in September 2021, the United Russia party, which supports Putin, won another big victory, taking 324 of the 450 seats. Due to the decision to expand the power of the Federal Assembly due to the revision of the constitution, the Russian ruling authorities attached great importance to this election and made arrangements in advance to ensure that the political party United Russia can guarantee an absolute advantage in party elections and elections for single-seat constituencies, and continue to hold an absolute majority in the parliament. , to provide legislative support for Putin to formulate policies and introduce strategies in the next step, and there will be no obstacles in the appointment of important positions, so that Putin will use a “strong” regime to ensure that orders are banned, safeguard sovereignty security and social stability, and provide Putin’s major policy The implementation of the policy and the strategy of revitalization of a powerful country provides a solid political guarantee.

(2) Stabilize the surrounding area and strengthen the Russia-led Eurasian integration

Russia is a traditional European power with deep-rooted geopolitical thinking in its diplomacy and has always attached great importance to preserving its “sphere of influence.” Putin once again emphasized the need to strengthen geopolitical interests in the CIS region at a press conference in December 2020. Western scholars believe that the way Russia implements its global strategy has fundamentally changed since 2014 as it has adopted an aggressive policy toward its neighbors. Russian scholars emphasized that Russia is in a state of confrontation with the West and will maintain in this state for a long time. Therefore, Russia’s foreign policy is not to end the confrontation, because it is impossible to achieve, but rather to control this confrontation, which requires both sides to understand one another’s bottom lines. ¹⁴

Putin has always believed that the premise of Russia’s revival is to occupy an absolute priority in the post-Soviet bloc and to build a tight alliance dominated by Russia. Due to opposition from allies such as Kazakhstan and Belarus, Putin temporarily abandoned political and military integration and launched the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, while strengthening the cohesion of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Against the background of being isolated by the West, Russia increasingly values the role of international organizations and multilateral mechanisms that it can lead or influence and hopes that the Eurasian Economic Union will become an important support for Russia to enhance its geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. In 2020, a series of tumultuous events occurred around Russia, posing severe challenges to the Russian-led regional cooperation mechanism. Russia directly intervened in volatile countries in different ways, showing that it still has special influence in this region.

(3) Realize economic growth as soon as possible and pay attention to people’s livelihood issues

After Putin started his new term in 2018, the new ‘May Decree’ first proposed that the Russian economy should return to the top five in the world by 2024. The ‘July Decree’ in 2020 again focused on stabilizing the economy, proposing that the actual growth of commodity exports other than raw materials and energy commodities should be at least 70% higher than before, with investment in the country’s IT doubled from 2019, with the 12 main directions of work reduced to five in the new orders. Putin explained that the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic had forced Russia to adjust its national development goals and some of its established plans, “but Russia has maintained macroeconomic stability” and the country’s long-term development goals would remain unchanged.¹⁵ The 2021 State of the Nation address required the federal government to issue the Unified Plan for the Achievement of the National Development Goals of the Russian Federation before 2030 by October 1 in accordance with the ‘July Decree’ of the previous year.

The complicated domestic situation forced Putin to “sink” the goal of great power revitalization step by step in exchange for the trust and patience of the people. At the two plenary sessions of the 20th Congress of the United Russia party held in June and August 2021, Putin particularly emphasized the need to solve the problems of people’s livelihoods, including raising wages, addressing employment, and increasing life expectancy, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of population security and the development of Siberia and the Far East. He also pointed out that the foundation of Russia’s national strength is “the strength and wealth of the family,” in particular that Russia would not make the mistakes of the past and would not intervene in the conflict in Afghanistan. ¹⁶ Putin pointed out that the important thing is to carry out the work in a planned and substantive manner, which requires not only money, time, and energy but also ideas. He also specifically mentioned the “ecological” standards of national projects, requiring the reduction of carbon emissions and the improvement of the environment, as well as the establishment of strict indicators. Putin ordered the strict supervision of the implementation of the federal “Clean Nation” government project by local governments so as to ban private garbage dumps. In addition, the Government of the Russian Federation was ordered to ensure that strategic measures in the field of economic and social development were integrated into unified planning. Putin proposed that the digital transformation strategy for the economy, social fields, and public administration should be determined as soon as possible. His new policies won the support of the Russian people. According to polling, 79% of respondents expressed their support, and only 11% voiced opposition. ¹⁷

(4) Going tit-for-tat with the United States and refusing to make concessions on major strategic interests

Russia does not hesitate to use military tools to make up for its lack of diplomatic resources, strengthening its influence in the West Asian region while also noting the global layout, promoting a process of multi-polarization to reshape its status as a major power on an equal footing with the United States. On January 26, 2021, Biden and Putin had a phone call, after which the two countries extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. In fact, other than discussing reaching a new arms control agreement to limit strategic nuclear weapons, the topics that the United States and Russia can discuss bilaterally are very limited. On April 15, the United States imposed large-scale sanctions on Russia and expelled 10 Russian diplomats. The next day, Russia announced reciprocal countermeasures, recalled its ambassador to the United States, and “de-dollarized” foreign exchange reserves and sovereign funds. On the day of Putin’s State of the Nation address, the Russian Foreign Ministry asked 10 U.S. diplomats in Russia to leave the country. Russia has also made a tough response to NATO’s exercises in the Black Sea. In June, Russian bombers warned British warships in the Black Sea and even dropped bombs. The June meeting between Putin and Biden in Geneva also failed to yield substantial results. In October, in response to NATO’s unreasonable treatment of Russian diplomats, Russia decided to suspend the work of Russia’s permanent mission to NATO. Russia believes that NATO continues to challenge Russia’s “strategic bottom line” because the United States refuses to give up its policy of suppressing Russia. The relationship between the two sides has continued to deteriorate.

(5) Accelerating the “turn to the East” diplomatically

In Russia’s geopolitical layout, “Eastern countries” generally refer to non-Western countries, especially countries in East Asia and the South Asian subcontinent. “Turning to the East” not only reflects the active development of relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region in diplomatic actions, but also means weakening the “Western-centric” or “European-centric” diplomatic thinking in Russia. The “turn to the east” before 2014 was based on the fact that Russia, as a major Eurasian country, must ensure a relatively balanced development between the eastern region and the European part, and adjust the diplomatic strategy of “focusing on Europe and less on Asia” in the long run; on the other hand, Russia is trying to take advantage of the rapid economic growth of Asia-Pacific countries to promote the economic development of its eastern region. After the Ukraine crisis in 2014, along with the triple blow of the international oil price crash, Western sanctions and the devaluation of the ruble, Russia’s economic growth and international image have encountered severe challenges. Putin’s government has attempted to expand Russia’s diplomatic influence by accelerating the deployment of the “Turn to the East” strategy to find a breakthrough in reversing the passive state of geopolitics and a new growth point for economic recovery. ¹⁸ With Europe becoming more and more unreliable, for the first time since the Cold War, Russia has clearly focused its diplomacy on Asia, with particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination with China.

(6) Safeguarding national security becomes the top priority

In his State of the Nation address to the upper and lower houses of the Federal Assembly in April 2021, Putin emphasized that Russia’s foreign policy focuses on ensuring the country’s peace, security, and stable development and that the country is open to extensive international cooperation, though the country will resolutely uphold its own national interests. Putin also specifically listed the installation and deployment of a series of advanced weapons and equipment and pointed out that the construction and update of Russian weapons and equipment is normal. He said that in 2021, the proportion of modern weapons in Russia’s nuclear triad will exceed 88%, and by 2024, the proportion of modern weapons and equipment in the Russian army will be close to 76%. ¹⁹ On July 3, 2021, Putin officially signed the new version of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and released it to the public. The strategy pointed out that some countries that have lost their leading position have attempted to use unfair competition, unilateral sanctions, and openly interfere with the internal affairs other sovereign countries to put pressure on members of the international community. These practices undermine international norms and diplomatic consensus, shake the foundation of international law, escalate military confrontation, and reduce political mutual trust in international exchanges. ²⁰ He criticized U.S. plans to deploy short- and medium-range missiles in Europe and the Pacific as a threat to international strategic security and stability. Under a series of Western sanctions, Russia has demonstrated its resilience to the world, proving its ability to withstand the pressure of external sanctions. ²¹

Over the past 30 years, Russia’s political and economic transformation has encountered many difficulties, both institutional and psychological. The nostalgia for the glory of the Soviet Union and the great power of the Russian Empire has been a powerful spiritual support but also comes with strong side effects. Neither Putin nor the Russian people can accept that the “dormant period” before the country’s revitalization will last too long. Eagerly looking for the road to a strong country, it is easy to fall into traditional thinking and methods. The information revolution has brought about industrial upgrading. While countries have accelerated the economic transformation of S&T innovation achievements and seized the top of the global product chain, Russia is still strengthening its traditional advantages in energy and raw materials. Economic development is difficult to achieve, so Putin has sought to “fulfill” the expectations of the people with a strong military and strong politics and uses the tools of public opinion to form efficient propaganda. Some analysts believe that from the “Crimea Consensus” to breakthroughs in cutting-edge weapons and military technology, Russia seems to be regaining its self-confidence as a great power, but it may miss good development opportunities to some extent.

Conclusion

If only measured by economic indicators, whether it is the rationality of the economic structure or the global ranking of its GDP, there is a certain gap between Russia and the standard of a global power. However, in terms of land area, resource endowment, and S&T potential, it is difficult for other countries to match Russia, and the country’s military strength, in particular, still causes great unease for the United States. Despite the unsatisfactory economic development, Putin’s national revitalization strategy has been widely recognized by domestic elites and ordinary people. A “strong Russia” must win the respect of the world, and the country has begun to restore its self-confidence as a great power. To a large extent, it reflects the actual national interests of Russia.

Today, people have come to widely different conclusions about whether Putin’s road to national revitalization has been successful or not due to different interpretations of his goals and based upon different standards. Some believe that Putin has fulfilled his original promise and that Russia has not only maintained its global leadership in some fields but has regained a pivotal international influence. Some say that the country’s strength and strategic position are still far behind those of the Soviet Union. Many other commentators feel that Russia cannot be truly rejuvenated and is actually in the process of decline, ²² as Putin’s efforts are nothing more than slowing down this inevitable trend. Therefore, Russia’s “revitalization” must be comprehensively measured from various aspects. Some fields must recover, and some fields must catch up to globally advanced levels. Putin’s goal of building a strong country was once formulated around economic recovery and growth. Later, under the impetus of the ruling authorities and social sentiments, it was redesigned as Russia’s national revival, not only in economic strength, but also political strength, military strength, ideological strength, and cultural strength. Based on this, the main starting point and foothold for his revival strategy was determined.

Faced with the superposition of international changes and the COVID-19 pandemic, internal and external challenges are becoming more and more severe. Russia must escape the difficult situation of internal and external difficulties, and Putin, who had been relatively cautious in policy, has responded and made strategic adjustments and continues to exert efforts at each level to strongly promote the integration of Russia and Belarus. On the international stage, Russia must pay more attention to its strategic relations with major powers, seek opportunities for dialog and easing relations with the United States and Europe, enhance interaction with emerging market countries such as China and India in global and regional governance, and jointly maintain the integrity of the multilateral system to ensure stability, close cooperation, and interaction in a range of international organizations. As an extension and expansion of the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination at the regional level, the international influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been continuously enhanced. Putin particularly emphasized in November 2020 that the SCO member states should strengthen cooperation. In terms of domestic policy, Putin must focus on maintaining political stability and sovereignty security, on solving a series of urgent livelihood issues, unifying the strength of the country and enriching the people, and planning the sustainable development of the country over the long term.