Latin America and the Caribbean constitute an important part of the Global South and are an important force for safeguarding world peace and stability and promoting global development and prosperity.¹ In January 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized in a video address to the Seventh Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States that “China is ready to continue working with Latin American and Caribbean countries to help each other and make progress together, and champion peace.”² In pursuit of independence, autonomy, and economic development, Latin American countries also desire to further deepen their cooperative relations with China. In May 2025, Brazilian President Lula emphasized in a collective interview with Chinese media that he hoped to “join hands with China to make the voice of the Global South stronger, defend multilateralism and free trade, and advance the achievement of climate goals.”³

In recent years, Latin American countries have generally expressed a strong desire to develop cooperative relations with China and, on this basis, have actively developed their relations with China. More than 20 Latin American countries have announced their participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, including Latin America’s major economies as well as Colombia, a traditional ally of the United States. However, owing to such practical factors as great-power competition, geopolitical pressure, and internal political processes in Latin American countries, the development of China–Latin America relations is bound not to be entirely smooth, but rather to exhibit an upward spiral. On the one hand, the U.S. factor is the primary obstacle impeding the steady and sound development of China–Latin America relations. The United States has engaged in strategic competition with China, revived the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, and intensified its efforts to exclude China from the region, making Latin America yet another arena of great-power competition. In November 2025, the United States released the 2025 edition of its National Security Strategy, placing the Western Hemisphere first in its global strategy and declaring that “the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.”⁴ Under U.S. coercion, Panama announced in February 2025 that it would not renew the Memorandum of Understanding on Belt and Road cooperation, dealing a serious setback to China–Panama relations. On the other hand, the alternation in power between left- and right-wing parties in Latin American countries, particularly the successive rise to power of far-right forces in Latin America, has caused the relations of some Latin American countries with China to regress to a certain extent. For example, since Milei took office in Argentina in 2023, although the overall direction of China–Argentina relations has not changed, the relationship is clearly not as close as it was under former President Fernández. Argentina even declined to join BRICS.

Therefore, against the broader backdrop of China–U.S. competition, clear policy divergence has emerged within Latin America regarding how to respond to China–U.S. strategic competition. One policy choice is to expand strategic cooperation with China while also maintaining basically friendly relations with the United States. Brazil is the most typical example of this policy orientation. Within the framework of solidarity and cooperation among the Global South, Brazil has actively developed strategic cooperation with China since Lula began his third term in office and has announced that it will work with China to “build a China–Brazil community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet.”⁵ At the same time, however, Brazil also maintains basically friendly relations with the United States. In September 2024, Brazil invited the militaries of both China and the United States to participate in a joint military exercise that it hosted. A second policy choice is to maintain a certain degree of pragmatic cooperation with China while drawing closer to the United States at the strategic level or aligning with U.S. positions on major international issues. Argentina under Milei is an active practitioner of this orientation. Although the Milei government still expresses a willingness to engage in pragmatic cooperation with China on currency swaps and trade, it aligns with U.S. positions on major international and regional affairs and keeps its distance from Global South cooperation. A third policy choice is, under U.S. influence, to markedly distance the country from China and even exhibit hostility toward and resist China. Panama is a typical country that has adopted this orientation. Under direct or indirect U.S. pressure, Panama announced in February 2025 that it would not renew the Memorandum of Understanding on Belt and Road cooperation.

This article aims to reveal the policy manifestations and internal logic of Latin American countries’ responses to China–U.S. strategic competition⁶ in order to explore the reasons for the divergence in their foreign policies toward China and the United States. Latin America is a natural extension of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and an important part of the Global South. Answering this question will help provide policy recommendations for China to better conduct its diplomacy toward Latin America amid the profound changes unseen in a century.

I. Literature review

(1) Review of Existing Literature

Existing literature has noted that Latin American countries have adopted foreign policies toward China and the United States that combine balance and flexibility, and has attempted to explain the logic of these countries’ foreign policies at both the international-system and domestic political levels.

In response to China–U.S. strategic competition, Latin American countries have adopted foreign policies toward China and the United States that combine balance and flexibility. Some scholars have pointed out that Latin American countries generally believe that China and the United States have entered a “new Cold War.” To respond to China–U.S. strategic competition, Latin American countries have primarily adopted a balanced foreign policy of “active non-alignment” in order to avoid the risks of great-power conflict and maintain diplomatic autonomy and independence.⁷ At the same time, on the basis of balanced diplomacy, Latin American countries also display a certain degree of policy flexibility toward China and the United States in response to changing circumstances in order to maximize their interests. Some scholars have analyzed the policy logic of Latin American countries’ responses to China–U.S. competition over critical minerals. They have pointed out that when Latin American resource-producing countries hold the advantage in the trilateral competition over resources among China, the United States, and Latin America, and both China and the United States are highly dependent on Latin American minerals, Latin American resource-producing countries tend to seek dominance over resource networks; when China holds the advantage in the trilateral competition over resources, China–U.S. competition over minerals will intensify, and Latin American resource-producing countries tend to increase their bargaining power by adopting resource-nationalist policies; and when the United States dominates the trilateral competition over resources, China–U.S. competition over minerals will ease, and Latin American resource-producing countries will therefore relax their assertion of resource sovereignty.⁸

At the international-system level, U.S. intervention in Latin America and China’s economic attractiveness to Latin America constitute the primary reasons for Latin American countries’ development of relations with China. First, U.S. pressure on Latin American countries to choose sides is the primary factor constraining their development of relations with China. On the one hand, China is a potential source of external support to which Latin American countries can turn when faced with U.S. threats. Analyses of Venezuelan foreign policy during the Chávez era maintain that Venezuela sought to achieve the geopolitical goal of breaking free from U.S. control by strengthening political and economic cooperation with China.⁹ On the other hand, the United States generally seeks to restrict China–Latin America cooperation. Some U.S. scholars have pointed out that the policy toward Latin America consistently pursued by the United States since 1823 has been to prevent extraregional powers, regardless of their ideology or motives, from acquiring territory in Latin America or exerting influence over the region.¹⁰ Some Chinese scholars have pointed out that, after Trump took office in 2017 and revived the Monroe Doctrine, the United States stepped up its obstruction of the development of China–Latin America relations by making “anti-China” statements, suppressing left-wing Latin American governments while courting right-wing governments, and warning countries that had newly established diplomatic relations with China.¹¹ Some Brazilian scholars maintain that the pattern of great-power competition seen during the Cold War has reappeared in Latin America. China’s influence in Latin America has caused concern in the United States, leading it to reintroduce the Monroe Doctrine with China directly in its sights.¹² Other scholars maintain that, because the United States regards China as its principal “strategic competitor,” it views the development of China–Latin America relations as a threat to the United States.¹³ Second, China’s support for and assistance to Latin American countries are the primary driving force behind these countries’ development of relations with China. Some scholars maintain that, owing to the growth of China’s overall national strength and its ability to guide global governance, Latin American countries have made China a priority of their “Pacific strategy” based on the practical need to strengthen economic and trade ties and the geopolitical interest in increasing their diplomatic independence.¹⁴ At the same time, Latin American countries hope to achieve their own development by taking advantage of the opportunities brought by China’s development. Accordingly, “Chinese solutions” and “Chinese initiatives” have received positive responses from Latin American countries.¹⁵ Other scholars have pointed out that “promoting sustainable development and resolving issues affecting people’s livelihoods” is the foremost task of Latin American governments at present. Latin American countries have therefore, without prior coordination, all sought to achieve development and improve people’s livelihoods through green development cooperation with China.¹⁶

At the domestic political level, the alternation of political parties in power in Latin American countries causes fluctuations in the development of China–Latin America relations. Latin American countries have long experienced alternation in power between left- and right-wing parties, and the respective ideological preferences of these parties are reflected in their foreign policies after they take office. Right-wing ruling parties advocate a foreign policy of following the United States. Some scholars have found that, after taking office in October 2018, Brazilian President Bolsonaro adopted a foreign policy of following the United States and advocated supporting the global strategy of the U.S. Trump administration.¹⁷ Left-wing ruling parties, by contrast, seek diplomatic autonomy and hope to reduce U.S. influence through regional integration and multilateral diplomacy, while adopting a positive attitude toward developing relations with China. Some observers maintain that the resurgence of the Latin American left after 2020 has led Latin American countries to display independent tendencies in their foreign policies amid intensifying great-power competition, thereby managing their asymmetric relations with great powers.¹⁸

(2) Critical Assessment of Existing Literature

Existing literature has conducted useful explorations of the foreign-policy choices made by Latin American countries in response to China–U.S. competition and their causes from the perspectives of the international system and the domestic politics of Latin American countries, laying a solid foundation for research on the relevant issues. Regarding the foreign-policy choices of Latin American countries, existing literature has provided a relatively accurate characterization of their foreign-policy behavior against the backdrop of China–U.S. competition, pointing out that most Latin American countries maintain an overall balance between China and the United States while also retaining a certain degree of flexibility and oscillation. Regarding the causes of Latin American countries’ foreign policies, existing literature has pointed out that factors such as U.S. intervention, China’s support for Latin America, and the alternation in power between left- and right-wing parties in Latin American countries have influenced these countries’ foreign policies. These studies have generally covered the principal factors shaping the foreign policies of Latin American countries and have a certain degree of validity. However, current research still has some shortcomings. With respect to the foreign-policy choices of Latin American countries, existing literature has focused only on the balanced diplomacy pursued by most Latin American countries, without mentioning that a small number of Latin American countries have in fact adopted policies of bandwagoning with the United States or pointing out that some countries, such as Panama, have shifted from balanced diplomacy to bandwagoning with the United States. Moreover, existing literature has not attempted to classify balanced diplomacy into different types. For example, Argentina sought to maintain balanced diplomacy between China and the United States under both Fernández and Milei, but its specific foreign policies differed significantly between the two periods. Regarding the causes of Latin American countries’ foreign policies, existing literature has explained only their balanced diplomacy, without further explaining why some Latin American countries have not adopted balanced diplomacy or have shifted from balanced diplomacy to bandwagoning with the United States. It also lacks an overall explanatory framework that theoretically integrates the various influencing factors.

In summary, this article maintains that the foreign-policy choices of Latin American countries against the backdrop of China–U.S. competition mainly comprise three options: bandwagoning with the United States, balanced diplomacy, and bandwagoning with China. It further maintains that an analytical framework should be constructed based on factors at the international-system level, including the intensity of U.S. pressure and the magnitude of the benefits provided by China, as well as factors at the domestic political level in Latin American countries, including leaders’ preferences, in order to explain the different foreign policies adopted by Latin American countries in response to China–U.S. competition and the logic underlying them.

II. The Foreign Policies of Latin American Countries in Response to China–U.S. Competition and Their Logic

This article maintains that factors at the international-system level, including the intensity of U.S. pressure and the magnitude of the benefits provided by China, can explain why Latin American countries adopt either balanced diplomacy or policies of bandwagoning with the United States. If a Latin American country chooses balanced diplomacy, factors at the domestic political level—whether left- or right-wing parties are in power and the resulting strategic preferences of its leaders—will determine the type of balanced diplomacy it adopts.

(1) Independent Variables: Pressure Exerted by the United States and Benefits Provided by China

In the trilateral interaction among China, the United States, and Latin America, the objective interests of Latin American countries lie in simultaneously maintaining friendly relations with both China and the United States. In their relations with the United States, Latin American countries are deterred by its hegemonic position and dare not readily offend it. There are three reasons for this. First, Latin American countries generally depend on the U.S. market and technology in terms of their industrial structures. Second, the United States has used various means to control Latin America and establish exclusive dominance over it, including supporting proxies, plotting military coups, exercising economic control, and engaging in cultural infiltration.¹⁹ Third, Latin American elites identify strongly with the United States, and deep historical ties have long existed between the United States and Latin America. Although China’s Confucius Institutes and scholarship programs have achieved success in Latin America in recent years, their influence still cannot compare with that of the U.S. Fulbright Program and its alumni community, which has a history spanning several decades. U.S. influence in Latin America has imperceptibly shaped Latin American countries’ worldviews and their definitions of their own interests.²⁰ In their relations with China, Latin American countries hope to obtain greater material benefits and autonomy by capitalizing on the rapid development of China–Latin America relations. For example, former Uruguayan President Lacalle once stated frankly: “Who opens its doors to us? Who allows us to trade? Who buys our products? Today, it is China. We will develop our trade relations with China as extensively as possible.”²¹ However, the United States regards China as a competitor and coerces Latin American countries into unequivocally choosing its side. Consequently, the balanced diplomacy of Latin American countries is bound to face external interference.

U.S. pressure to choose sides is a constraining factor in Latin American countries’ implementation of balanced diplomacy. When U.S. pressure to choose sides is intense, Latin American countries are more likely to depart from balanced diplomacy and adopt policies of bandwagoning with the United States and distancing themselves from China. When U.S. pressure to choose sides is weak, Latin American countries face less external interference and are better able to implement balanced diplomacy independently and autonomously. At the same time, because Latin America encompasses a vast area and numerous countries, and because these countries differ in their size, endowments, and degree of dependence on the United States, pressure of equal intensity may produce entirely different effects on different countries. For example, even slight U.S. pressure on small Central American countries such as Panama and the Dominican Republic may be sufficient to cause them to change their foreign policies, whereas the same degree of pressure applied to Brazil would be unlikely to alter its existing foreign policy. In view of this particular situation, this article maintains that the criterion for determining the intensity of U.S. pressure to choose sides should be whether the government of an individual Latin American country can withstand the pressure exerted by the United States. In other words, if a Latin American country can withstand U.S. pressure, the pressure exerted by the United States may be considered relatively weak for that country, making it more likely to maintain balanced diplomacy. If a Latin American country cannot withstand U.S. pressure, the pressure exerted by the United States may be considered relatively intense for that country, making it more likely to depart from balanced diplomacy.

The benefits provided by China are an incentive for Latin American countries to implement balanced diplomacy. This means that when Latin American countries need the benefits provided by China, they are more willing to implement balanced diplomacy. When their need for the benefits provided by China declines, their impetus to develop cooperation with China will weaken accordingly, making them more likely to distance themselves from China under U.S. pressure. Whether Latin American countries need the benefits provided by China essentially refers to whether cooperation with China is necessary for the legitimacy of Latin American leaders. Specifically, when the United States tolerates China–Latin America cooperation, the development of cooperative relations with China helps Latin American countries obtain greater material benefits, thereby enhancing their leaders’ governing performance and legitimacy. When the United States suppresses China–Latin America cooperation, however, Latin American countries will inevitably reduce the scope of their cooperation with China as U.S. pressure intensifies, ultimately maintaining only those areas of cooperation that are most essential to consolidating their regimes and difficult for other countries to replace. Ultimately, when Latin American leaders believe that the benefits provided by China cannot easily be replaced by other countries, they will be more resolute in adopting balanced diplomacy. When they believe that the benefits provided by China can easily be replaced by other countries, their commitment to balanced diplomacy will be more susceptible to wavering.

(3) Mediating Variable: Left- and Right-Wing Parties in Power and Their Strategic Preferences

In addition to the influence of the U.S. and Chinese factors on the foreign policies of Latin American countries, the alternation in power between left- and right-wing parties within these countries also has an important influence on their leaders’ strategic preferences and foreign-policy decisions.

Latin American left-wing parties place relatively greater emphasis on Latin American countries’ identity as part of the “Global South” and hope to break free from U.S. control and establish a more just and equitable international order. Consequently, Latin American countries governed by left-wing parties are more inclined to formulate independent and autonomous foreign policies. In terms of specific actions, this is manifested in actively advancing regional integration in Latin America, participating in such Global South cooperation platforms as the BRICS mechanism, expressing their own views on major issues rather than remaining entirely aligned with the United States, and so forth. In their diplomacy toward the United States, Latin American countries governed by left-wing parties hope to maintain friendly relations with the United States but oppose its unilateral bullying and are willing to criticize and even resist it. In their diplomacy toward China, Latin American countries governed by left-wing parties are willing to engage in pragmatic economic and trade cooperation with China and cooperate with it on infrastructure construction under the Belt and Road Initiative. In the political sphere, they are willing to engage in dialogue with China regarding solidarity and cooperation among the Global South and the transformation of the global governance system, as well as to join China in expressing views different from those of the United States on major international and regional issues such as the Ukraine crisis and the situation in the Middle East. In the security sphere, they are willing to conduct military exchanges with China, including purchasing Chinese weapons and inviting China to participate in joint military exercises.

Latin American right-wing parties place relatively greater emphasis on Latin American countries’ identity as “Western countries” and hope to achieve national prosperity by strengthening ties with the United States. Consequently, Latin American countries governed by right-wing parties are more inclined to adopt distinctly pro-U.S. and pro-Western diplomacy, keep their distance from Global South cooperation, and align more closely with the United States on regional and global affairs. Latin American countries governed by the far right display an even stronger tendency to support the United States and Trump. After being elected president, Brazil’s Bolsonaro made the United States the destination of his first foreign visit, breaking with the convention that Brazilian presidents first visit Argentina after taking office. Argentine President Milei has likewise traveled to the United States several times while in office to call on Trump, and the two have echoed one another on social media.²² Consequently, in their diplomacy toward the United States, Latin American countries governed by right-wing parties not only hope to maintain traditionally friendly relations with the United States but also seek to further develop strategic cooperation with it and deepen their dependence on it. They therefore closely follow U.S. positions in the economic, political, security, and other spheres, even at the expense of their relations with China in order to accommodate the United States. In their diplomacy toward China, Latin American countries governed by right-wing parties remain willing to maintain technical cooperation with China in the economic and trade sphere out of a desire to obtain material benefits, but keep their distance from China in sensitive areas such as politics, security, and global governance.

(4) Dependent Variable: Latin American Countries’ Foreign Policies in Response to China–U.S. Competition

Against the backdrop of China–U.S. competition, the foreign policies adopted by Latin American countries in response to this competition can generally be divided into two types: Bandwagoning with the United States and balanced diplomacy. Balanced diplomacy can be further divided into U.S.-leaning cooperation and China-leaning cooperation.

Bandwagoning refers to the behavior of a weak country aligning itself with a strong country out of a desire to protect itself or obtain extraordinary gains. International relations theory offers three principal definitions of bandwagoning. First, it refers to a weak country joining the camp of the stronger side in order to achieve its own security objectives²³. Second, it refers to a weak country being compelled to cooperate with a threatening great power in order to avoid losses.²⁴ Third, it refers to a weak country aligning itself with a great power or the side prevailing in great-power competition in order to obtain extraordinary gains.²⁵ These three definitions indicate that the actor engaging in bandwagoning is generally a weak country, the form taken by its behavior is cooperation with the strategy of a strong country or great power, and its motivation is self-protection or the pursuit of extraordinary gains. Because of their geographical proximity and the U.S. diplomatic tradition of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States is both the most powerful country in the Americas and the primary source of threats facing Latin American countries. In September 2018, Trump stated in an address to the United Nations, “It has been the formal policy of our country since President Monroe that we reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere and in our own affairs.”²⁶ This effectively declared that, in the new period of China–U.S. competition, the United States had once again embraced the Monroe Doctrine, which is intended to facilitate intervention in Latin American countries. Bandwagoning with the United States therefore refers to Latin American countries passively cooperating with U.S. foreign policy in order to avoid U.S. sanctions or suppression, even at the expense of their relations with China. Bandwagoning with the United States means abandoning balanced diplomacy. Latin American countries will engage in conduct that clearly harms China’s interests, such as refusing to participate or terminating their participation in Belt and Road cooperation, conducting so-called “official” exchanges with the authorities in China’s Taiwan region, following the United States in criticizing China on issues concerning China, and even erecting barriers to Chinese goods and investment. Balanced diplomacy refers to the policy behavior whereby, when relatively weak small and medium-sized countries engage in trilateral interactions with two great powers, they maintain cooperative relations with both great powers in order to avoid hostility from either.²⁷ Balanced diplomacy does not mean equidistant diplomacy.²⁸ Small and medium-sized countries implementing balanced diplomacy neither need nor are able to maintain the same degree of cooperation with two great powers simultaneously. Instead, they will lean moderately toward one of the great powers in response to changes in the international environment and their own strategic preferences—that is, their degree of cooperation with one great power will exceed their degree of cooperation with the other. In view of this, in the trilateral interaction among China, the United States, and Latin America, the balanced diplomacy of Latin American countries can be divided into U.S.-leaning cooperation and China-leaning cooperation. U.S.-leaning cooperation refers to the behavior of Latin American countries engaging in deeper and more substantive cooperation with the United States in the economic, political, security, and other spheres while conducting pragmatic economic cooperation with China. China-leaning cooperation refers to Latin American countries conducting deeper strategic cooperation with China on such matters as Belt and Road cooperation, the Global South, and building a community with a shared future while maintaining friendly relations with the United States.

In summary, the foreign policies adopted by Latin American countries in response to China–U.S. competition are principally influenced by U.S. pressure, the necessity of relations with China, and the alternation in power between domestic left- and right-wing parties. Of these factors, U.S. pressure and the necessity of relations with China determine whether Latin American countries adopt balanced diplomacy amid China–U.S. competition, while the alternation in power between left- and right-wing parties determines the type of balanced diplomacy they adopt. The specific mechanisms and circumstances are as follows.

First, when the pressure exerted by the United States can be withstood by Latin American countries, they will continue to cooperate with China and pursue balanced diplomacy between China and the United States in order to obtain greater benefits, regardless of whether their relations with China can easily be replaced by relations with other countries. Under such circumstances, if a right-wing party governs a Latin American country, that country will be more inclined to conduct deeper cooperation with the United States in the political, economic, security, and other spheres in order to obtain U.S. political support and economic assistance, while maintaining pragmatic relations with China only in certain economic and trade areas. If a left-wing party governs a Latin American country, that country will be more inclined to conduct deeper cooperation with China in such areas or on such issues as Belt and Road cooperation and Global South cooperation in order to achieve economic development and expand its autonomy, while maintaining only traditionally friendly relations with the United States.

Second, when the pressure exerted by the United States is difficult for Latin American countries to withstand, their policies toward China will be influenced by the substitutability of the benefits provided by China. On the one hand, if the benefits provided by China to Latin American countries through bilateral cooperation are difficult for other countries to replace, Latin American governments will have to maintain balanced diplomacy between China and the United States—even at the risk of U.S. pressure—in order to preserve their governing legitimacy and regime stability. Under such circumstances, if a right-wing party governs a Latin American country, that country will conduct deeper cooperation with the United States in multiple fields while maintaining balanced diplomacy between China and the United States. If a left-wing party governs the country, it will conduct deeper cooperation with China in multiple fields. On the other hand, if the benefits provided by China through bilateral cooperation can easily be replaced by other countries, Latin American countries will yield to immense U.S. pressure and bandwagon with the United States. Under such circumstances, regardless of whether a left- or right-wing party governs a Latin American country, it will be unable to alter the reality that the country has been compelled to bandwagon with the United States.

Figure 1. Policy Logic of Latin American Countries’
Responses to China–U.S. Competition

Source: Prepared by the author.

III. Case Studies

To verify the validity of the causal mechanisms described above, this article selects for comparison and analysis Panama’s foreign policy after the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Brazil’s foreign policy under Bolsonaro, and Argentina’s foreign policy under Fernández.

(1) Panama’s Foreign Policy After Rubio’s Visit

After Trump began his second term, Panama clearly yielded to U.S. pressure, bandwagoning with the United States and distancing itself from China on multiple issues. This was principally determined by the following two factors.

1. Panama Cannot Withstand U.S. Pressure

Trump’s return to power marked a watershed in U.S. policy toward Panama: Its means of applying pressure shifted from inducement to coercion, and the intensity of its pressure increased markedly. The Biden administration regarded Panama as a “top-tier partner.”²⁹ Its principal means of exerting pressure on Panama was to reshape U.S. influence through cooperation on migrant removals, economic development, and other matters, thereby encouraging Panama and other Central American countries to align with the United States of their own accord. At this time, Panama’s perception of U.S. pressure was relatively weak. Regarding migrant removals, the Biden administration reached an agreement with Panama under which the U.S. government would fund the Panamanian government’s removal of undocumented migrants stranded in Panama.³⁰ Regarding economic development, the Biden administration used the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity and the Western Hemisphere Semiconductor Initiative to entice Panama. In June 2022, Biden announced the launch of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity at the Ninth Summit of the Americas and invited the leaders of Panama and 10 other countries to participate in its inaugural leaders’ summit that November.³¹ The Biden administration pledged to increase investment in and assistance to the participating countries. In July 2024, the Biden administration announced the launch of cooperation under the Western Hemisphere Semiconductor Initiative. It selected Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica as the first group of partner countries and pledged to help them enhance their semiconductor assembly, testing, and packaging capabilities.³²

After Trump took office, the United States used threats and coercion to force Panama to cooperate with its policy toward China. First, Trump hyped the “China threat” in connection with the Panama Canal, using it to force Panama to agree to grant the United States improper rights and interests in the canal. In December 2024, Trump publicly claimed that “Chinese soldiers” were operating the Panama Canal, complained that the United States was paying excessive fees to use the canal, and threatened to use force if necessary to regain control of it.³³ In late January 2025, Rubio announced that his first trip after taking office would be to Central America. In an article in The Wall Street Journal, he warned Central America and even all Latin American countries that “those who work with the United States will be rewarded, and those who do not will be punished.”³⁴ On February 2, Rubio arrived in Panama City. During his meeting with Panamanian President Mulino, he issued an explicit threat, alleging that Panama’s permitting of “Chinese control over the Panama Canal” violated the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. He stated that “this situation is unacceptable, and unless immediate changes are made, the United States will have to take the measures necessary to protect its rights under the treaty.”³⁵ Second, after obtaining some concessions from the Panamanian government, the United States intensified its threats to force Panama to distance itself from China. In early May 2025, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Panama, Kevin Marino Cabrera, stated bluntly at a press conference: “First among my priorities will be to strengthen our joint work to counter harmful influences in the region, such as that of China.”³⁶ In June of that year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth further stated at a congressional hearing that the Pentagon had prepared contingency plans to take over Greenland and Panama by force if necessary.³⁷

2. Cooperation with China Can Easily Be Replaced

For the Panamanian government, although Belt and Road cooperation with China benefits Panama’s economic development, it is not irreplaceable in terms of regime stability. First, once CK Hutchison Holdings withdraws from the operation of ports on the Panama Canal, U.S. capital will rapidly fill the resulting gap. In March 2025, a consortium led by the U.S. firm BlackRock reached a preliminary agreement with CK Hutchison Holdings to acquire the operating rights to most of the latter’s ports worldwide, including two ports on the Panama Canal. Second, in addition to Chinese enterprises, companies from Western countries are also willing to participate in Panama’s domestic infrastructure construction. Taking the widely watched Panama City–David railway project as an example, the governments of multiple countries, including China, expressed an interest in undertaking the project.³⁸ The Panamanian government ultimately announced, however, that the project would be financed by UK Export Finance and receive technical support from the U.S. engineering consultancy AECOM,³⁹ thereby excluding the possibility of participation by Chinese enterprises. Finally, in terms of digital infrastructure, although Chinese enterprises can provide high-quality, inexpensive services and products, Panama is not unable to find alternative sources. On June 11, 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Panama suddenly announced that it would cooperate with the Panamanian government and provide U.S. funding to replace Huawei telecommunications equipment at 13 sites in Panama with “more secure U.S. technology.”⁴⁰

Under the influence of these two factors, Panama yielded to U.S. pressure and shifted from balanced diplomacy to bandwagoning with the United States. First, after the United States maliciously hyped the allegation that “China controls the Panama Canal,” Panama voluntarily announced that it would audit Hong Kong–based CK Hutchison Holdings. On January 20, 2025, the day Trump was inaugurated, Panama’s Office of the Comptroller General announced that it was dispatching an audit team to examine the Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings.⁴¹ On February 2, following his meeting with the visiting Rubio, President Mulino once again issued a statement pledging to review investments by Chinese enterprises in Panama and audit Hong Kong–based CK Hutchison Holdings, which held the operating rights to two canal ports.⁴² In April, shortly before Hegseth’s visit to Panama, the Office of the Comptroller General announced the results of its audit of CK Hutchison Holdings, alleging multiple violations in its port operations. This gave the Panamanian government grounds to revoke the company’s concession in order to placate the Trump administration.⁴³ Second, under U.S. coercion, Panama voluntarily announced that it would terminate Belt and Road cooperation. On February 2, 2025, while deciding to audit CK Hutchison Holdings, the Panamanian government also announced that it would not renew the Memorandum of Understanding on Belt and Road cooperation. On February 6, President Mulino further announced that Panama had formally submitted documentation to China to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative.⁴⁴ Third, under U.S. pressure, Panama effectively agreed to allow U.S. forces to return to the Panama Canal Zone. From April 8 to 9, 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth visited Panama and signed with the Panamanian government a “Memorandum of Understanding on Enhanced Security Cooperation” and the “Joint Declaration Concerning the Security and Operation of the Panama Canal.” The United States thereby secured priority passage through the canal for U.S. warships and opened the door for U.S. forces to return to the Panama Canal Zone through rotational deployments.⁴⁵ Finally, the Panamanian government also followed U.S. instructions and agreed to replace digital infrastructure constructed by Chinese enterprises. After the U.S. Embassy announced that it would replace Huawei telecommunications equipment in Panama, the Panamanian government requested that the United States not use the newly installed telecommunications equipment for military purposes, but nevertheless agreed to the U.S. demand that the Huawei equipment be replaced.⁴⁶

(5) Brazil’s Foreign Policy Under Bolsonaro

Bolsonaro advanced relatively radical foreign-policy positions while campaigning for president. On the one hand, Bolsonaro maintained that Brazil was a Western and Christian country and should restore closer relations with countries governed by conservatives, such as the United States and Israel.⁴⁷ On the other hand, during his campaign, Bolsonaro “visited” China’s Taiwan region and mischaracterized Chinese investment as “buying up all of Brazil,” sending an unfriendly signal toward China.⁴⁸ After Bolsonaro took office, however, members of his governing team restrained his ideologically driven diplomatic impulses out of consideration for economic interests, and the Bolsonaro government’s foreign policy rapidly became more pragmatic.⁴⁹ During Bolsonaro’s term, although the United States demanded that Brazil choose sides on whether to allow Huawei to participate in the construction of Brazil’s 5G network, it did not exert explicit and urgent pressure on Brazil to choose sides on other issues, and Brazil was able to withstand U.S. pressure. Consequently, the Bolsonaro government continued to maintain cooperative relations with China in order to obtain greater material benefits. However, because of Bolsonaro’s far-right ideology, although his government maintained balanced diplomacy between China and the United States, it was more inclined to engage in deeper cooperation with the United States. The Bolsonaro government’s foreign-policy choices were based on the following two premises.

1. Brazil Can Withstand U.S. Pressure

The United States principally used inducements to encourage the Bolsonaro government to distance itself from China, and the pressure facing Brazil to choose sides was not pronounced. First, during Trump’s first term, the United States proposed the Growth in the Americas initiative for Brazil and other Latin American countries. In 2019, the Trump administration proposed the Growth in the Americas initiative, which planned to use a “whole-of-government” approach to mobilize private-sector resources for investment in energy, logistics, and infrastructure in Latin American countries. Its purpose was to counter the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and restrict the space available for China–Latin America cooperation. Brazil welcomed and responded to this initiative. Second, the United States made commitments favorable to Brazil on several issues of concern to the Bolsonaro government. During Bolsonaro’s March 2019 visit to the United States, Trump not only expressed support for Brazil becoming a U.S. “major non-NATO ally” or even a “NATO ally,” but also said that he would promote U.S. imports of Brazilian beef and support Brazil’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).⁵⁰ When Trump met with Bolsonaro in March 2020, he pledged to increase bilateral economic and trade ties, reiterated his support for Brazil’s accession to the OECD, and stated that he would urge the organization’s other members to join the United States in achieving this goal.⁵¹ Finally, in the science and technology (S&T) sphere, the United States attempted to use financial assistance as leverage to urge Brazil to reject Huawei’s bid to participate in the construction of the country’s 5G network infrastructure. The Export-Import Bank of the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with Brazil’s Ministry of the Economy, pledging to invest $1 billion to help Brazil construct its 5G network. The U.S. Department of State also proposed providing $10 million in financing under the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership to assist Latin America’s digital transformation and pledged to provide assistance to Latin American countries that used U.S. 5G equipment.⁵²

3. Relations with China Can Bring Material Benefits

First, China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, and China–Brazil trade ties provide a vast and stable market for Brazilian agricultural products and iron ore. In 2020, the volume of Brazil’s exports to China was three times that of its exports to the United States, making Brazil more dependent on the Chinese market. Of Brazil’s 15 principal export commodities, China is the principal importer of 11, while the United States is the principal importer of only two.⁵³ In November 2019, when Bolsonaro met in Brasília with President Xi Jinping, who was attending the BRICS Leaders’ Meeting, Bolsonaro spoke highly of the importance of relations with China to Brazil, stating that “China is increasingly becoming part of Brazil’s future.” He expressed the hope that Chinese enterprises would increase their investment in Brazilian infrastructure, iron ore, oil, gas, and other areas. He also emphasized China’s position as Brazil’s largest trading partner and expressed the hope of expanding bilateral trade and promoting access for Brazilian agricultural products to the Chinese market.⁵⁴

Second, investment by Chinese enterprises makes an important contribution to the development of Brazil’s energy, mining, infrastructure, manufacturing, and other sectors. During his October 2019 visit to China, Bolsonaro specifically invited Chinese enterprises to participate in an offshore oil auction scheduled for early November of that year.⁵⁵ Because they were unable to accept the minimum bid set by Brazil and were concerned about commercial risks, Western oil companies such as ExxonMobil, Total, and BP successively withdrew from the bidding. Petrobras, China National Petroleum Corporation, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation ultimately won the bid jointly. Bolsonaro was deeply gratified by the “timely assistance” provided by the Chinese enterprises and expressed the hope that they would increase their investment in Brazilian infrastructure and energy projects.⁵⁶

Because the pressure on Brazil to choose sides remained within the country’s capacity to withstand, the Bolsonaro government maintained balanced diplomacy between China and the United States in order to obtain greater material benefits. In its relations with the United States, the Bolsonaro government changed the independent and autonomous foreign policy of the previous Workers’ Party government and actively drew closer to the United States in the hope of advancing Brazil’s national interests by establishing closer ties with it. After taking office, Bolsonaro pursued a distinctly pro-U.S. foreign policy. First, as the “Trump of the Tropics,” Bolsonaro was highly aligned with Trump ideologically and attempted to use his personal relationships with Trump and Steve Bannon to advance Brazil–U.S. relations. Second, the Bolsonaro government voluntarily aligned its foreign policy with that of the United States. Within the region, Brazil distanced itself from Latin American countries governed by left-wing parties and explicitly supported Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó. Outside the region, it followed the United States in adopting a pro-Israel position. Finally, Brazil also aligned itself with the Trump administration on climate policy, not only refusing to host the 2019 United Nations Climate Change Conference but also threatening to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.

In its relations with China, Bolsonaro rapidly shifted from prioritizing ideology during his campaign to pragmatism after taking office. First, the Bolsonaro government sent positive signals to China. On January 2, 2019, shortly after taking office, Bolsonaro met with President Xi Jinping’s special envoy, Ji Bingxuan, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Bolsonaro stated, “China and Brazil are both great countries. Brazil’s new government attaches great importance to cooperation with China and is willing to make every effort to advance Brazil–China relations.”⁵⁷ In May, then Brazilian Vice President Hamilton Mourão visited China and emphasized that Brazil’s new government continued to attach great importance to its relations with China.⁵⁸ Second, the Bolsonaro government strengthened economic and trade cooperation with China. In October 2019, Bolsonaro visited China with a delegation comprising Brazil’s foreign minister, agriculture minister, the head of its investment promotion agency, and entrepreneurs representing 110 Brazilian enterprises. Bolsonaro’s visit to China was intended to strengthen economic and trade cooperation with China in three respects: Expanding exports to China, promoting Chinese investment in Brazilian infrastructure and renewable energy, and strengthening S&T cooperation with China.⁵⁹ During his talks with President Xi Jinping, Bolsonaro emphasized that Brazil attached great importance to China’s status as a major country and regarded developing relations with China as a priority of Brazilian diplomacy. Brazil was not only willing to achieve common development with China but also willing to work with China to safeguard multilateralism and free trade and strengthen communication and coordination on major international and regional issues.⁶⁰ Following the talks, the two heads of state issued a joint statement in which they expressed their intention to respect each other’s core interests, continue expanding the scale of trade, and increase trade diversification. They also emphasized that “synergies may be achieved between China’s development policies and international initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and Brazil’s development policies and investment programs such as the Investment Partnerships Program.”⁶¹ Finally, the Bolsonaro government did not actively follow the U.S. global campaign to exclude Huawei from 5G networks. Under pressure from Trump, Bolsonaro had attempted to exclude Huawei from the construction of Brazil’s 5G network but encountered opposition from within the government and from telecommunications operators.⁶² Following Trump’s failure to win reelection, Bolsonaro changed his position in January 2021 and stated that he would no longer prevent Huawei from participating in the construction of Brazil’s 5G network.⁶³ In October 2021, Brazilian Foreign Minister Carlos França emphasized during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that Brazil would not exclude any 5G equipment supplier.⁶⁴

The Bolsonaro government adopted U.S.-leaning balanced diplomacy. Although the Bolsonaro government maintained balanced diplomacy between China and the United States, Bolsonaro, as a far-right politician and loyal follower of Trump, regarded strengthening cooperation with the United States as the core of his foreign policy while in office. First, the Bolsonaro government actively followed the policies and positions of the Trump administration on international issues. For example, Brazil closely followed the U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem. In May 2018, the United States announced that it would relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, causing an international uproar. During his visit to Israel the following year, Bolsonaro announced that Brazil would establish a trade, S&T, and innovation office in Jerusalem.⁶⁵ In December, Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo pledged to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Brazil’s embassy in Israel would be relocated to Jerusalem the following year.⁶⁶ Second, the Bolsonaro government sought to establish closer military cooperation with the United States. In March 2019, the Bolsonaro and Trump administrations signed the Alcântara Technology Safeguards Agreement, allowing the United States to conduct commercial satellite launches from Brazil’s Alcântara Launch Center. This weakened Brazil’s strategic autonomy and created the possibility that Brazil might be passively drawn into future U.S. military containment operations against China, Russia, and other countries.⁶⁷ Bolsonaro was also the first Brazilian president to visit the U.S. Southern Command. In March 2020, he visited the U.S. Southern Command and signed the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Agreement with the United States to strengthen bilateral military cooperation.⁶⁸ Third, the Bolsonaro government yielded to U.S. trade protectionism. During his March 2019 visit to the United States, Bolsonaro pledged to permit the duty-free import of 750,000 metric tons of U.S. wheat annually, agreed to allow U.S. pork to enter the Brazilian market provided it met “science-based conditions,” and relinquished Brazil’s developing-country status in the World Trade Organization in exchange for U.S. support for Brazil’s accession to the OECD.⁶⁹ In December of that year, Brazil announced that it would permit the duty-free import of 750 million liters of U.S. ethanol annually in order to demonstrate openness toward the United States and facilitate the signing of a Brazil–U.S. free trade agreement.⁷⁰ Finally, Bolsonaro also partially accommodated the Trump administration’s containment and stigmatization of China.

(6) Argentina’s Foreign Policy Under Fernández

Fernández differed significantly from his predecessor, Macri, in his foreign-policy orientation. Fernández was closer to the Latin American left, had cool relations with both Brazil’s Bolsonaro government and the U.S. Trump administration, and hoped to strengthen cooperation with China.⁷¹ However, because Argentina required U.S. assistance in debt negotiations and oil investment, the Fernández government was unable to adopt as resolutely anti-U.S. a position as earlier left-wing governments had.⁷² During Fernández’s term, the United States principally used coercive means in an attempt to drive a wedge between China and Argentina. Because relations with China were vitally important to Argentina’s economy, the Fernández government maintained sound relations with China in order to preserve regime stability and conducted more pragmatic cooperation with China on the basis of balanced diplomacy. Argentina’s adoption of balanced diplomacy was principally influenced by the following two factors.

1. Argentina Can Withstand U.S. Pressure

The United States explicitly demanded that the Fernández government choose sides on multiple issues. However, the United States applied pressure to Argentina through verbal warnings and inducements, which were insufficient to make it completely bandwagon with the United States.

First, the United States warned the Argentine government on multiple issues. The first involved U.S. opposition to Huawei’s participation in the construction of Argentina’s 5G network. In September 2020, then Argentine Foreign Minister Felipe Solá revealed in a media interview that the United States had expressed dissatisfaction with China–Argentina cooperation on the Espacio Lejano deep-space facility in Neuquén province and had warned Argentina not to reach a 5G technology agreement with Huawei.⁷³ In August 2021, the Biden administration’s national security advisor visited Buenos Aires and, during a meeting with Fernández, warned Argentina not to use Huawei 5G equipment on the grounds that it threatened national security.⁷⁴ In October, Biden’s nominee for U.S. ambassador to Argentina again warned Argentina at a Senate hearing not to use Chinese 5G technology, claiming that Huawei’s 5G technology would allow the Chinese government to “obtain all the data and information of the Argentine people.”⁷⁵ The second involved U.S. attempts to intervene in and obstruct China–Argentina nuclear-power cooperation. In April 2022, a U.S. assistant secretary of state visited Argentina and attempted to intervene in the Atucha III nuclear power plant project being jointly constructed by China and Argentina. In April 2023, the chair of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission visited Argentina and warned it that “cooperation with China on nuclear power entails risks,” while taking the opportunity to express the United States’ desire to engage in nuclear-power cooperation with Argentina.⁷⁶

Second, the United States facilitated Argentina’s purchase of Danish F-16 fighter aircraft in order to prevent it from purchasing Chinese JF-17 fighter aircraft. After the Mirage III supersonic aircraft used by the Argentine Air Force were retired, the Argentine government launched a tender valued at $664 million in 2021 to purchase 12 fighter aircraft in order to bolster its air force. Following the Falklands War, however, the United Kingdom unilaterally imposed an arms embargo on Argentina, prohibiting it from obtaining any weapons or equipment containing British-made components. This embargo made it difficult for Argentina to purchase weapons and equipment from Western countries, forcing it to seek purchases from non-Western countries instead.⁷⁷ The United States first pressured the United Kingdom to grant Argentina an exemption permitting its purchase of Danish F-16 aircraft. The United States criticized the British arms embargo against Argentina as outdated and recommended that the United Kingdom agree to Denmark’s sale of the aircraft to Argentina.⁷⁸ After the United Kingdom tacitly permitted the arms sale between Denmark and Argentina, the U.S. government submitted a request to Congress in July 2023 seeking approval for Denmark to sell U.S.-made weapons to Argentina and urging Congress to approve the sale of 24 F-16 fighter aircraft to Argentina as soon as possible.⁷⁹

4. Cooperation with China Can Bring Material Benefits

First, China is Argentina’s second-largest trading partner, and developing relations with China is therefore conducive to the growth of Argentina’s trade. In the agricultural sector, China became the second-largest destination for Argentine agro-industrial exports in 2024. Argentina’s total exports to China reached $5.183 billion, an increase of 14 percent from $4.559 billion in 2023.⁸⁰ Argentina’s ambassador to China, Marcelo Suárez Salvia, emphasized that infrastructure investment was an indispensable part of Argentina’s development strategy and that Chinese investment in Argentine infrastructure projects had played a “fundamental role” in the country’s economic and social development, helping to improve its citizens’ quality of life and its international standing.⁸¹

Second, the China–Argentina bilateral currency swap helped alleviate Argentina’s debt pressure. First, it helped ease Argentina’s shortage of U.S. dollars. At the end of 2022, Argentina’s external debt had reached $276.7 billion, while its foreign-exchange reserves amounted to only $44.6 billion. To avoid excessive use of U.S. dollars, the Argentine government used the renminbi equivalent of $1.7 billion for the first time in June 2023 to repay external debt owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁸² Second, using renminbi for trade and investment settlement could reduce the effect of exchange-rate fluctuations on Argentina’s economy and lower the exchange-rate risks facing enterprises. In April 2023, Argentine Economy Minister Sergio Massa announced that Argentina would use renminbi to pay for imports of Chinese goods⁸³ in order to reduce foreign-exchange costs and exchange-rate risks in China–Argentina trade, ensure the dynamism of Argentina’s economy and the volume of its imports, and promote China–Argentina trade.

Because the pressure on Argentina to choose sides remained within the country’s capacity to withstand, the Fernández government also pursued balanced diplomacy between China and the United States in order to obtain greater material benefits. First, the Fernández government sought assistance from the Biden administration regarding its loans from the IMF and received a positive response. In March 2023, Fernández visited the United States and met with Biden. He emphasized the economic pressure facing Argentina and expressed the hope that Biden would support Argentina’s renegotiation with the IMF of the terms of its $44 billion debt.⁸⁴ Biden responded positively to Fernández’s request. He not only agreed to strengthen cooperation with Argentina in such areas as energy, critical minerals, and cutting-edge technologies but also stated that he would support Argentina in reaching a loan agreement with the IMF.⁸⁵ In June 2023, Fernández again wrote to Biden requesting U.S. support in Argentina’s negotiations with the IMF.⁸⁶ With the support of the Biden administration, the IMF reached an agreement with the Argentine government to provide Argentina with a $7.5 billion loan, thereby helping the Fernández government stabilize the economic situation before the election.⁸⁷ Second, the Fernández government strengthened economic and trade cooperation with China. First, it joined the Belt and Road Initiative, elevating China–Argentina relations to a new level. In February 2022, Fernández visited China, issued a joint statement with Chinese leaders on deepening the China–Argentina comprehensive strategic partnership, and signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Belt and Road cooperation between China and Argentina. The memorandum emphasized promoting bilateral investment, trade, and infrastructure cooperation and formally declared Argentina’s participation in Belt and Road cooperation. Argentina and China also signed multiple cooperation documents in such areas as green development, the digital economy, aerospace, and nuclear medicine, thereby strengthening bilateral economic and trade cooperation as well as exchanges in defense, culture, education, and other fields.⁸⁸ Second, Argentina further deepened financial cooperation with China. In November 2022, celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Argentina and a ceremony launching the renminbi clearing bank in Argentina were successfully held in Argentina.⁸⁹ This eliminated the need for China–Argentina cross-border transactions to be converted into a third currency and would increase the convenience of China–Argentina trade. In early 2023, China and Argentina also discussed and agreed to increase the bilateral local-currency swap facility from RMB 130 billion to RMB 163 billion. This helped Argentina increase its available foreign-exchange reserves and further stabilize its domestic financial situation.⁹⁰ In June 2023, the Argentine government renewed the China–Argentina Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement with China.

The Fernández government adopted China-leaning balanced diplomacy. As a member of Argentina’s Justicialist Party, Fernández upheld the party’s basic program of “political sovereignty, economic independence, and social justice.” On the basis of balanced diplomacy, he was willing to develop a more strategic cooperative relationship with China in order to achieve independence and autonomy and reduce Argentina’s dependence on the United States. First, Fernández conducted relatively frequent high-level exchanges with China, strengthening political mutual trust with Chinese leaders. Fernández and President Xi Jinping exchanged letters three times—in April and July 2020 and January 2021⁹¹—and spoke by telephone in September 2020. Fernández emphasized that “China’s development is an important opportunity for Argentina” and that strengthening relations with China was the foremost priority of Argentina’s foreign policy.⁹² Against the backdrop of Western calls for a “boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics,” Fernández also attended the opening ceremony as a Latin American political leader, visited the Museum of the Chinese Communist Party, and paid tribute at the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall. Second, the Fernández government actively participated in the BRICS mechanism and the New Development Bank as Global South governance platforms. In May 2022, Fernández wrote to the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to express Argentina’s desire to join BRICS. He emphasized that the BRICS mechanism provided an alternative to the existing world order, which served the interests of only a small number of people, and that Argentina’s interests were aligned with those of the BRICS countries.⁹³ In August 2023, Fernández delivered a national address announcing that Argentina had formally applied to join BRICS. He emphasized that joining BRICS would help Argentina “open up new markets, consolidate existing markets, promote investment flows, increase exports, and develop the application of new technologies,” and that Argentina would share its destiny with an international organization encompassing 40 percent of the world’s population.⁹⁴ Third, Fernández actively responded to the three Global Initiatives proposed by China. During the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022, the foreign ministers of nearly 40 countries, including Argentina, and heads of international organizations attended a ministerial meeting of the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, where they discussed plans for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁹⁵ In October 2023, speaking at the opening ceremony of the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Fernández stated that China had made concrete efforts in China–Argentina Belt and Road cooperation and that Argentina supported the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping.⁹⁶

IV. Conclusion

Faced with China–U.S. strategic competition, Latin American countries need to formulate response policies to protect and expand their interests, while U.S., Chinese, and domestic factors all influence these policies. At the international-system level, the pressure exerted by the United States and the benefits provided by China determine whether Latin American countries continue to maintain balanced diplomacy between China and the United States. When the pressure exerted by the United States can be withstood by Latin American countries, U.S. pressure is insufficient to compel them to bandwagon with the United States. Motivated by the desire to obtain greater material benefits, Latin American countries will continue to conduct pragmatic cooperation with China, thereby maintaining balanced diplomacy between China and the United States. When the pressure exerted by the United States cannot be withstood by a Latin American country, its policy toward China will be influenced by the substitutability of the benefits derived from its relations with China. If the benefits derived from relations with China can easily be replaced by other countries, the country will decisively distance itself from China under U.S. pressure. If these benefits are difficult for other countries to replace, the country will not readily terminate its cooperative relations with China even when facing U.S. pressure.

At the domestic political level, the alternation in power between left- and right-wing parties in Latin American countries also influences the orientation of their balanced diplomacy. Left-wing parties prefer independence, autonomy, and South-South cooperation. After taking office, they will conduct as much strategic cooperation with China as possible while maintaining friendly relations with the United States, thereby adopting China-leaning cooperation. Right-wing parties hope to achieve national prosperity by relying on the United States. After taking office, they will draw comprehensively closer to the United States in their diplomatic strategies and conduct deeper and more substantive cooperation with it in all fields while maintaining pragmatic cooperation with China, thereby adopting U.S.-leaning cooperation.

In terms of its academic value, this article constructs a comprehensive explanatory framework by integrating three factors: The pressure exerted by the United States and the benefits provided by China at the international-system level, and the governing preferences of left- and right-wing parties at the domestic political level. It thereby provides a relatively logical explanation of how Latin American countries respond to China–U.S. competition. In terms of its policy significance, this study offers certain insights into how China should conduct its diplomacy toward Latin America under the new circumstances in which the United States is placing increasing emphasis on the Monroe Doctrine and strengthening its control over Latin America. On the one hand, China needs to assist Latin American countries in expanding their national interests through pragmatic cooperation so that Latin American governments acquire a genuine “sense of gain.” On the other hand, China must place still greater emphasis on making itself irreplaceable to Latin American countries. By working together to advance the “Five Programs” of solidarity, development, civilization, peace, and people-to-people connectivity, China and Latin America can jointly write a new chapter in building a China–Latin America community with a shared future. This will strengthen the resilience of China–Latin America cooperation in the face of U.S. obstruction and enable it to better withstand challenges.