The rise of China and the United States’ implementation of the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy have changed and are changing the content and character of Sino-U.S. relations. As geopolitical competition between China and the United States intensifies, deterrence, compellence, coercion, and coercive diplomacy—popular terms during the Cold War, and also U.S. policy measures used after the Cold War against some small and medium-sized countries—are appearing increasingly often in the strategic narratives of both countries. On issues such as the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and nonproliferation, the Obama administration frequently exercised deterrence and coercion against China, and its policy toward China became more proactive, coercive, and aggressive. On some hot issues, the policy maneuvering room of both China and the United States is shrinking. In the future, if the Trump administration adopts the Republican party’s traditionally hawkish policies on defense, the likelihood of the United States escalating coercive measures against China and of China enhancing the strength of its countermeasures will increase.

I. Deterrence, Coercion, and Coercive Diplomacy

Deterrence and compellence are two kinds of strategy. Deterrence refers to deterring an adversary from doing something by threatening to use force, whereas compellence is forcing an adversary to do something or stop doing something by threatening to use force. From a timing perspective, issuing a threat before an adversary act is deterrence, and issuing a threat after an adversary act is compellence. ¹ In terms of their nature, deterrence is somewhat passive and reactive, while compellence is more proactive and aggressive. ² Compellence is divided into coercive diplomacy and blackmail. The former forces an adversary to stop and/or undo an action already initiated and implemented, and the latter forces an adversary to initiate or implement a new action.³ Relatively speaking, blackmail is more aggressive than coercive diplomacy. Western international relations theory holds that coercive diplomacy is inextricably military, with the threat or use of limited military force being the necessary means for coercion. Other means include non-military coercion such as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and non-coercive means such as persuasion and conditional accommodation.⁴

Deterrence and coercion are commonplace in international relations, but coercive diplomacy in the modern sense is a product of the Cold War. Compared to defeating an adversary by force and forcing it to submit, successful coercion is “very attractive” because it achieves policy goals at a lower cost. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Kennedy administration forced the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba through a policy of brinksmanship combining deterrence and coercion. During the 1994 Haiti crisis, the United States forced the Haitian junta to give up power without bloodshed through a small-scale invasion. The United States has been the most frequent practitioner of coercive diplomacy since World War II, but “subduing without a fight” has never been easy to pull off. U.S. strategist Robert Art has said that, unless policymakers are ready to either use force or disengage, they should not initiate coercive diplomacy lightly. Should it fail, policymakers will face a difficult choice between war or retreat: choosing to retreat would not only mean losing face, but would also weaken the ability to bargain in the future, while choosing to use force would be costly. ⁵ Late in the Cold War and after it ended, the United States was confident of its ability to coerce its adversaries (hostile middle powers or small states) into submission, but the coercive diplomacy it initiated failed more often than it succeeded.⁶

With the development of globalization and strengthened international economic interdependence, the willingness of the United States to wage large-scale wars has decreased. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States spent massively but failed to achieve its ultimate military and political goals, proving once again the dilemma of wars of conquest and occupation. At the same time, the diffusion of technology has enabled more countries to master advanced military technologies and weaponry such as precision guidance and cruise missiles, and land powers now have considerable advantages in the game with sea powers, at least in near-shore waters, further curbing the willingness of the United States to wage large-scale wars. During President Obama’s administration, faced with the impact of the financial crisis and rising domestic war-weariness, the attitude toward war was more cautious, and the role of force in achieving national policy goals was explicitly reduced. Hillary Clinton, who served as Secretary of State during President Obama’s first term, proposed and promoted “smart power” diplomacy, which sought to “reinvigorate the power and influence of the United States” using a combination of economic, military, cultural, and cyber tools without resorting to direct military force. One of the key features of the Obama Doctrine, which has been described as “not doing anything stupid,” is the more aggressive use of military deterrence and non-military coercion to maintain the United States’ hegemonic position.⁷ A RAND report argues that the power to coerce, i.e., the strategy of responding to an adversary without the use of force, should and is receiving greater attention than hard and soft power. The report argues that, with the cost of using force too high and China and Russia both using coercive measures, the United States should take full advantage of its financial, trade, cyber, and diplomatic strengths, and make more frequent use of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, support for the opposition in target countries, and cyberattacks to defend U.S. national interests.⁸ In the course of implementing the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy, U.S. officials and scholars have accused China of coercing its neighbors, such as Japan and the Philippines, while arguing that the United States is also deterring and coercing China.⁹

II. Major U.S. Deterrence and Coercion Measures Against China

Deterrence and coercion were important elements of U.S. strategy toward China during and after the Cold War. Typical applications of the coercive strategy include the U.S. nuclear blackmail against China during the Korean War and the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis to try to force China to stop deterring “Taiwan independence” forces. Against China, the Obama administration did not implement coercive diplomacy, with the threat of force at its core, but instead used military deterrence and non-military coercion, mainly in the form of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions against China on a number of hot issues.

First, the United States implemented military deterrence against China on issues including the Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea air defense identification zone, and Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal]. Military deterrence is part of the United States’ post-Cold War preventive policy toward China. The Obama administration’s deterrence against China was mainly aimed at China’s strong defense of its territorial sovereignty. After Japan announced its so-called “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands, in order to deter China from taking military action or other measures to control the islands, senior U.S. officials, including President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, stated repeatedly that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to “all places over which Japan has authority, including the Senkaku Islands.” In response to rumors that China might establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, Evan Medeiros, then the Senior Director for Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council, said the United States neither accepted nor recognized the ADIZ established by China, and that the establishment of a new ADIZ by China would be a “provocative and destabilizing development” that would “result in changes in our presence and military posture in the region.”¹⁰ Medeiros did not explicitly threaten to use force, but the “change in military posture” constituted a vague deterrent. While awaiting the outcome of the South China Sea arbitration case, in order to deter China from taking “retaliatory” measures against the Philippines, such as setting up a South China Sea ADIZ, land reclamation on Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal], and delineating the territorial baselines or exclusive economic zones of the Spratly Islands, the U.S. military sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to operate in the Western Pacific, and several ships to operate within 14-20 nautical miles of Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal] and the Chinese-controlled Spratly Islands. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter threatened that if China took action on Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal], the United States and other countries in the region would respond, which “would not only cause tensions, but would isolate China.”¹¹ Bonnie Glaser, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, called for a “red line” to be drawn against China and for the Huangyan Islands [Scarborough Shoal] to be included within the scope of application of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.¹²

Second, the United States has exercised diplomatic pressure and military coercion against China’s oil exploration and land reclamation in the South China Sea. In order to prevent China’s ongoing operations, i.e., to force China to “stop related behavior,” the United States has not only issued coercive threats but also used coercive measures. Regarding the HYSY-981 drilling platform’s “Zhongjiannan” project, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel said that all countries should “voluntarily freeze” such “provocative activities” through agreements. The U.S. Senate passed Resolution 412 urging China to immediately withdraw its drilling platform and escort vessels from the South China Sea and “restore the South China Sea to its original state.”¹³ In response to China’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael Fuchs floated a “triple freeze” proposal, namely that all parties would refrain from “seizing islands and reefs and establishing new outposts, changing the topographical status quo, and limiting unilateral actions against others.”¹⁴ Defense Secretary Ashton Carter urged related claimant countries to “immediately and permanently suspend” land reclamation activities; ¹⁵ and State Department Deputy Spokesperson Mark Toner proposed “three halts,” namely a halt to “land reclamation, new construction, and further militarization of outposts.”¹⁶ In the process of implementing coercion, the United States has adopted three tactics.

Unilateral diplomatic pressure. In addition to making explicit demands on China, U.S. officials, including Assistant National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State John Kerry, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, and State and Defense Department spokespersons, have used aggressive and derogatory language in response to China’s actions to defend its rights. For example, China’s actions are “provocative” and “do not contribute to regional peace and stability,” and the United States is “gravely concerned” about this and opposes “any country’s use of intimidation, coercion, or threats” to advance its own claims.

Attempting to use small groups or multilateral occasions to isolate China. The United States pushed the G-7 to issue a statement strongly opposing any attempt by any party to “unilaterally assert its territorial or maritime claims by intimidation, coercion, or force;”¹⁷ and the U.S., Japanese, and Australian defense ministers were “gravely concerned” about China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea.¹⁸ In an attempt to take the moral high ground and draw in regional countries to isolate China, U.S. Defense Secretary Carter also used the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue to slander China as building a “great wall of self-isolation.”

Military coercion. U.S. warships and bombers have entered within twelve nautical miles of China’s relevant islands and reefs on the pretense of so-called “freedom of navigation” or “mistaken intrusion,” trying to challenge China’s sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction with “coercive actions” that show off force and seriously undermine regional peace and stability.

Third, on cybersecurity and nonproliferation issues, the United States has imposed limited economic sanctions against China and threatened to escalate them. As the “Snowden affair” demonstrates, the United States has the world’s most powerful intelligence reconnaissance and collection capabilities, and its ability to spy on the political, economic, and military information of other countries is unrivaled. But from the United States’ point of view, China’s theft of U.S. companies’ trade secrets and intellectual property “through government-sponsored cyber operations” is not a traditional intelligence activity and “must stop.” To force China to accept its demands, the United States has resorted to diplomatic pressure, judicial prosecution, and economic coercion against China. To increase the credibility of economic coercion, the United States gave a small demonstration by imposing new sanctions on North Korea in January 2015, citing North Korea’s hacking of Sony Pictures. In April 2015, Obama signed an executive order stating that in the event of a cyberattack on critical U.S. infrastructure or computer systems resulting in serious damage, the president would declare a “state of emergency” and authorize the imposition of sanctions on individuals and organizations in other countries. In September of the same year, U.S. officials signaled their intention to sanction Chinese individuals and entities “involved in the theft of trade secrets,” in order to compel China to “stop its alleged activities of stealing business and economic information from U.S. institutions through the internet.”¹⁹ On the non-proliferation issue, in order to strengthen sanctions against Iran and bring it back to the negotiating table, the Obama administration, on the one hand, used domestic law to sanction Chinese companies such as Zhuhai Zhenrong and Kunlun Bank, and on the other hand, persuaded Saudi Arabia and other countries to increase their oil exports to China to induce China to cooperate by granting it exemptions. After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and launched the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite on Jan. 6 and Feb. 7, 2016, respectively, President Obama signed a bill on Feb. 18 to impose tougher sanctions on North Korea. The bill contains a “secondary sanctions” provision targeting companies that do large amounts of trade in steel, coal, and ore with North Korea.²⁰ The United States and South Korea also decided to push for the deployment of the THAAD system at U.S. bases in South Korea in order to increase strategic pressure on China.

The increase in U.S. coercive behavior toward China is a manifestation of the growing tension in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Looking back at the Obama administration’s China policy, the introduction of the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy was a key turning point. This policy triggered the escalation of the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands and South China Sea issues, forcing China to escalate actions to defend its rights based on its enhanced capabilities, which in turn drew a strong U.S. response. In addition, judging from the Sino-U.S. games on the cyber and Iranian nuclear issues, among others, the assertive U.S. policy toward China is not limited to the geopolitical sphere. Currently, President-elect Trump is still building his governing team, and the general directions of his foreign security strategy and China policy remain unknown. However, some clues can be seen in the rhetoric of Trump’s policy advisors and Trump himself. At the personal level, Trump espouses strength and does not show a strong tendency to export American ideology and values to the outside world, and his worldview is closer to realism. In terms of his team, Trump’s “inner circle” believes in “peace through strength,” criticizes the Obama administration’s “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy as too weak, and supports increasing military spending to build a stronger navy.²¹ From a partisan perspective, Trump is not a traditional Republican, but as a Republican president, he will be shaped to a considerable extent by that party’s tradition of favoring the military-industrial complex and hawkish defense policies.²² In terms of the future focus of foreign strategy, Trump’s ideas on striking hard at the Islamic State, urging allies such as Japan and South Korea to take greater responsibility for their defense, repairing U.S.-Russia relations, and so on, do not imply that the United States will relax its strategic investment in the Asia-Pacific. Given the U.S. strategic tradition of suppressing rising powers, the Republican Party’s tendency towards military hawkishness, and Trump’s economic assertiveness toward China, the United States will maintain, or at least not reduce, the use of deterrence and coercion strategies in its China policy.

III. Assessment of the Effectiveness of U.S. Deterrence and Coercion against China

The U.S. national security strategy, national defense strategy, and military strategy reports identify North Korea, Iran, the Islamic State, Russia, and China as the top five challenges. In response to these threats and challenges in the eyes of the United States, the Obama administration adopted policies ranging from the use of force and deterrence to coercion. The United States has continued to carry out military strikes against the Islamic State, implemented coercive diplomacy against the Syrian government, employed military deterrence and non-military coercion against Russia, increased coercion against North Korea, and implemented a combination of coercion and negotiations against Iran. Taken together, mainstream U.S. government and strategic community assessments suggest that U.S. policy toward Iran has been more successful because sanctions and diplomatic pressure were important factors contributing to Iran’s economic deterioration, leadership change, and the ultimate signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement.²³ Views on coercive diplomacy in Syria are polarized. Some believe that the Obama administration’s failure to take military action after the Syrian government “crossed the red line” seriously damaged the United States’ reputation. Others believe that U.S. military pressure and Russian proposals ultimately removed 1,300 tons of chemical weapons from Syria, achieving results that military strikes may not have achieved.²⁴ After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the United States did not issue military deterrence or coercion during Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea, but rather initiated diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. The Obama administration has argued that while U.S. and European pressure failed to prevent Russia from providing military support to Ukrainian “separatists,” it has deterred further Russian “aggression,” influenced Putin’s strategic considerations to some degree, and weakened Russia’s economic strength and military potential.²⁵ The effectiveness of coercion against North Korea has been similar to that against Russia, in that it has failed to force North Korea to freeze its nuclear program or abandon nuclear weapons, but weakened and isolated it.

As for the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence against China, the United States and China can, and certainly will, have different assessments. The difficulty in gauging the effectiveness of deterrence lies in the fact that the goal of deterrence is to deter behavior that the other side has not engaged in. The side that initiates deterrence can argue that it has successfully deterred the other side, while the target side can claim that it had no intention of undertaking a particular action in the first place. For example, the United States could argue that China’s failure thus far to designate an ADIZ in the South China Sea or to reclaim land on Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal] is the result of U.S. deterrence. China can ignore the U.S. argument and claim that what it does or does not do, and when it does it, falls within the scope of China’s sovereignty and is not subject to U.S. influence. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China will decide whether to establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea based on the level of threat to air security.²⁶ As for the deployment of defensive weapons on the Spratly Islands and declarations of the territorial waters, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones of relevant islands and reefs, China will adhere to the principle that we have the final say here and will act in our own interests. One can argue that the characteristics of deterrence are conducive to both sides saving face and reaching some degree of tactical stability, although this sort of stability is fleeting and fragile.

U.S. coercion against China is more difficult to assess, as it involves the choice of coercion targets, the contest of strength and will between the two sides, and their exit and disentanglement strategies. There are several issues involved.

First, there is the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship. Coercion can only be deemed effective if there is a direct causal link between the demands issued by the coercing party and the end result, but establishing this link is not easy. For example, on the issue of oil exploration in the South China Sea by the HYSY-981 [drilling platform], the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed on July 16 that the “Zhongjiannan” project had “completed its operations.” This came only six days after the U.S. Senate passed a resolution asking China to withdraw its drilling platform. While the United States could argue that the pressure worked, China said it had completed operations before the typhoon season and had “successfully obtained all relevant geological data according to plan.”²⁷ In addition, Vietnam’s behavior adds to the complexity of the assessment. On the issue of cybersecurity, the threat of U.S. sanctions came more than ten days after the United States and China reached a consensus on jointly combating cybercrime. Some U.S. scholars argue that coercion has produced results, and U.S. network security firms have reported that cyberattacks from China have dropped significantly since the agreement was reached.²⁸ But China can argue that it has long opposed cyberattacks and cyber commercial theft, and has been a victim of cyberattacks itself, and that it is in the mutual interest of both countries to promote the construction of a cooperative win-win mechanism for Sino-U.S. cooperation on cybersecurity law enforcement. China reduced its oil imports from Iran in 2011 and 2012. On March 2, 2016, it supported the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2270, which imposed “the toughest sanctions ever” on North Korea. However, China’s decisions were based on a variety of factors, including its non-proliferation responsibilities, stabilization of the situations in the Middle East and the Korean peninsula, and stabilization of Sino-U.S. relations. It is hard to say that the U.S. “secondary sanctions” played a key role in them.

Second, there are the issues of coercive capability, intention, and will. Rather than coercive ability, the behavior of both sides in the game are affected by the contest of will between them and their assessments of the consequences of coercion. In the land reclamation process of the islands and reefs under its control in the South China Sea, China did not heed U.S. demands to stop construction. During construction, the United States sent aircraft to conduct provocative close reconnaissance and harassment, but did not issue threats of force, and U.S. ships and aircraft did not intercept or ram Chinese operating vessels. Harry B. Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, told the Pentagon in February 2016 that using force to stop China from reclaiming land and implementing militarization was not the preferred U.S. measure: “The military does one thing very well, but I don’t think you would encourage us to stop China in that way. But the use of military force is one of the various options that the president has at his disposal.”²⁹ The United States may recognize that if it resorted to overly aggressive measures, it would certainly trigger a Sino-U.S. military confrontation or even conflict, which the United States does not want to see at the current stage. One U.S. strategist contacted by the author admitted that the United States does not have the ability to stop China unless it is prepared for a conflict with China. The fact is that, in carrying out construction on its own territory, China has a stronger will than the United States, and the likelihood of China backing down in the event of a military confrontation is extremely low. And if the United States were to engage in coercive diplomacy and lose, U.S. credibility would be tarnished. In practice, the United States has implemented a so-called “cost-increasing” strategy, which seeks to make China pay a greater price diplomatically and strategically through frequent exposure of China’s behavior to defend its rights, enhanced military cooperation with allies and partners, and pushing ASEAN to pressure China.³⁰

Third, there is the issue of the diplomatic resources used by each side. Each side in the game needs to grow its circle of friends in order to gain the advantage in strength, morality, politics, and diplomacy, and thereby fight for the initiative. On the South China Sea issue, the United States relies on allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and also actively draws in ASEAN and India, while using the G7 and the EU to make its voice heard. China, for its part, seeks support from Russia, Pakistan, and African countries, and uses the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to make its voice heard. This features prominently in whether the South China Sea issue should be resolved bilaterally or multilaterally, and whether it should be resolved through arbitration or negotiation. In the struggle between diplomatic isolation and counter-isolation, the kind of support provided by third parties, and the strength and durability of that support, influence the effectiveness of coercion. In meetings with Chinese state leaders, the leaders of several countries have expressed support for China’s position on the South China Sea issue.³¹ This shows that, as with the Taiwan issue, China is willing to devote political and diplomatic resources to gaining broad support from the international community, demonstrating a strong determination to defend its sovereignty. Diplomatic statements from countries that support the U.S. position are one thing, but whether they will give the United States operational support if the situation escalates is another. Even if those countries provide operational support for the United States, there are doubts as to whether it can be sustained in the long run.

Overall, U.S. coercion against China is not as strong as U.S. coercion against Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The fact that the United States has thus far not imposed economic sanctions on China on a larger scale or with harsher measures is related to the interweaving of competition and cooperation in the Sino-U.S. relationship, as well as to China’s ability to respond to coercion. The U.S. and Chinese economies are deeply interdependent, and the imposition of large-scale sanctions by one side will be met with severe retaliation by the other. Faced with the prospect of “killing 1,000 enemy soldiers but losing 800 of your own,” the United States has chosen to be cautious in its use of the sanctions tool. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a major developing country, and as a political entity that reasonably and lawfully defends its national sovereignty, China has strong resources and a firm will to respond to and defuse U.S. pressure on issues such as the South China Sea. China’s large circle of friends, especially its efforts to build a community of common destiny with ASEAN, and its similar political positions with Russia, Central Asian countries, and developing countries in general, means that China is not always at a disadvantage in legal, public opinion, and diplomatic battles with the United States.

IV. Considerations of China’s Response

With the deepening of structural conflict between China and the United States, and the further accentuation of geopolitical conflict in particular, both countries’ strategic room for maneuver is shrinking. In East Asia today, North Korea is stubbornly pushing for the operationalization of nuclear weapons and approaching the U.S. “red line.” The determination of the United States and South Korea to deploy the THAAD system, which seriously undermines China’s strategic security, Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to recognize the “1992 Consensus,” the continued promotion by Japan’s Abe administration of a strategy that names China as its main adversary, and the frequent entry of U.S. ships and aircraft into the territorial waters of China’s islands and reefs, portends that China and the United States may face more “close-up games.” In response to increased U.S. deterrence and coercion, China can either keep a low profile and endure its humiliation, or it can use bottom-line thinking to confront the United States and fight to defend its interests.

First, China needs to demonstrate a firm will to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty, but it can “gain mastery by striking after the enemy has struck.” On issues such as Taiwan, the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, and the South China Sea, where China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake, the Sino-U.S. game is being played at both the capability level and the will level. With the capability gap between China and the United States still wide, the battle of wills is more important. The stronger China’s strategic will, the more cautious the United States will be in exercising deterrence and coercion against China. If the U.S. government interprets the Taiwan Relations Act more broadly and uses the “Six Assurances” as a yardstick to greatly enhance the U.S.-Taiwan political and security relationship,³² prompting Tsai Ing-wen to go further and further down the road of “Taiwan independence,” China will have to invoke the Anti-Secession Law and carry out specific actions to deter the United States and Taiwan. If Japan’s Abe administration takes provocative steps on the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands or in developing relations with Taiwan, China could well test Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to force the United States to pressure Japan. Maintaining the peace and stability of the South China Sea and the safety of shipping lanes is in the interest of all parties, but if some other claimant and the United States put on a double act to challenge China’s bottom line, China can defy the U.S. warnings and deploy more defensive weapons on the islands and reefs under its control. In response to U.S. deterrence and coercion, China should be prepared to withstand the pressure and pay the price as the relevant contest is not only about sovereignty, but also about China’s rise and its position in the Asia-Pacific and the world order.

Second, [China needs to] make friends widely and be prepared to fight a “protracted diplomatic war” with the United States. Some policy elites from both parties in the United States see China as a long-term strategic competitor, and this kind of thinking has influenced and even dominated U.S. policy toward China.³³ In the East China Sea and South China Sea, the Sino-U.S. diplomatic game has gone beyond the regional level and is increasingly played out on the global stage. In recent years, ASEAN, the G7, and the EU have become the targets of U.S. diplomatic mobilization. China should keep in mind the intention and ability of the United States to isolate China through multilateral diplomacy. To maintain a “coalition of the willing” on a given issue, the United States may coalesce small groups by manufacturing tensions. However, collective coercion is a process that requires a sustained commitment of resources, and is difficult to sustain for a long time. China should be patient, wait for changes, and unite all the forces it can to defeat U.S. attempts. While strengthening Sino-Russian relations and enhancing the influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China must be committed to building good relationships with ASEAN, the EU, the Arab League, and the African Union. Arguably, the more popular China’s circle of friends becomes, the less incentive the United States will have to launch a diplomatic war against China.

Third, [China needs to] bolster its countermeasure and retaliation capabilities, especially in the economic sphere. The United States is unlikely to reconsider its policies and change course if coercion can be successfully implemented without paying a cost. The U.S. anti-globalization and anti-free trade forces represented by Trump will be reflected to varying degrees in U.S. economic and foreign policy toward China in the future. The weakening role of economic trade as a lubricant or ballast in Sino-U.S. relations and the relative decline in the influence of Wall Street, multinational corporations, and other interest groups on U.S. policy toward China seem to represent the general trend. In response to extreme U.S. trade protection measures, China should not be afraid to fight a trade war with the United States while appealing to the WTO. China also needs to actively explore countermeasures to the U.S. policy of frequently using economic or financial sanctions to achieve its diplomatic goals.³⁴ Economic warfare is a lose-lose game, but only an economic war of a certain scale can force the other side to be cautious, and in turn limit the scale of economic warfare.

Fourth, [China needs to] enhance military deterrence against the United States. The U.S. military’s deterrence of China on the Diaoyu [Senkaku] and Huangyan Islands [Scarborough Shoal] is supported by its forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region and the military strength of its allies. The United States has implemented the concept of “Air-Sea Integrated Warfare” and promoted the “Third Offset Strategy” in an attempt to offset China’s counter-intervention and “counter-interference” capabilities, and to enhance the U.S. military’s deterrence power and its ability to win wars after deterrence fails. The main way to counter U.S. deterrence is to enhance one’s own deterrence power, including nuclear and conventional deterrence. While strengthening the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, leveraging its geopolitical advantages, and making the best use of innovative technologies, China still needs to continuously improve the survivability of its land-based ICBMs and nuclear submarines, and find and continuously develop its own strategic net advantage in order to form core military competitiveness. ³⁵ China’s goal is not to engage in an arms race with the United States, but rather to continually increase the cost of U.S. military involvement and to balance or even weaken its deterrence power. In response to the rhetoric and actions of the U.S. military that maintain the credibility of its security commitments, China can avoid its sharp edges and can give tit-for-tat responses at the right times. If it chooses the latter, it will have to become more adept at applying deterrence and crisis management theory, and draw on U.S. experience to fight battles of wits and courage with the United States.

Fifth, to improve its strategic resilience, [China needs to] develop itself and strengthen its domestic ability to respond to crises. Great power games are played both diplomatically and domestically. Fierce games often evolve into crises, large and small. Whoever has a more stable backyard, and whoever receives greater domestic support, will have a better chance of winning. Since the end of World War II, the United States has carried out a great deal of deterrence and coercion around the world. It is experienced in policy coordination, use of force, information transmission, public opinion shaping, and domestic mobilization. After more than 30 years of peace, China’s national security decision-making apparatus, the capabilities of its military intelligence services, and the tolerance of society at large face both tests and opportunities for reinvention. China’s government needs to invest more resources in maintaining domestic stability, including strengthening its management of foreign NGOs and improving its enlightened ethnic policy. The public too needs to increase its psychological tolerance, and get used to the new normal in Sino-U.S. relations and China’s neighboring security environment. Accordingly, Chinese think tanks need to conduct more research on the deterrence and coercion strategies of major powers in the era of globalization, and provide more intellectual support to the country in case of emergency.

Given the deep economic interdependence between China and the United States and the asymmetric nuclear balance of terror, the likelihood of a large-scale conflict between China and the United States is low, and the triggering of a fierce diplomatic war and severe economic sanctions are low probability events. International politics is full of chances and drama, however, and major strategic changes often manifest themselves in unexpected ways. In the Western Pacific, neither China’s will to maintain its territorial sovereignty and integrity, nor the determination of the United States to maintain its security commitments, should be underestimated; the possibility of a third-party provocation triggering an intense game between China and the United States should also not be underestimated. The risks of escalating military deterrence, intensifying diplomatic battles, and economic sanctions “falling into place” between the two countries are on the rise, and the possibility that military coercion will occur around some major issues cannot be ruled out. As two major powers on the two sides of the Pacific Ocean, it is in the interests of China and the United States, as well as countries in the region, to build a new type of major power relationship, avoid strategic collisions, and prevent serious shocks to the Asia-Pacific order and the already beleaguered globalization process. A major way to manage Sino-U.S. differences and contradictions should be to strengthen strategic communication and establish crisis avoidance mechanisms, and use deterrence and coercion in the game only with extreme caution.