0 Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine conflict officially broke out in February 2022. Although it is called the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is not only Ukraine that is confronting Russia, but the entire U.S. and Western bloc, including the United States and European countries. It is the full eruption of a crisis in relations between Russia and the West, geopolitical contradictions, and conflicts of interest.¹ Looking at the overall trend of the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia launched a fierce offensive in the early stage of the conflict, but as the conflict continued to develop, the United States and the West gradually imposed effective restrictions on Russia in terms of the battlefield situation, and the two sides entered a stage of strategic stalemate. The situation has reversed itself to the extent that, in September, Ukraine tried to launch a large-scale counterattack against Russia in Kharkiv and Kherson, forcing Russia to issue a partial mobilization order and calling up 300,000 reservists to participate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The reversal of the battlefield situation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is directly related to the level of battlefield intelligence assurance of the opposing sides. The latest military intelligence report released by the U.S. Congress in mid-September pointed out that, although the Russian military took the strategic initiative at the outset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it has massive problems as regards information support issues such as communication efficiency. ² The U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report that also argued that factors such as the lack of secure communication methods in the Russia-Ukraine conflict had confronted Russia with massive shortcomings in intelligence assurance. ³ In contrast, the United States and the West possess absolute advantages in terms of their original battlefield intelligence assurance system and force construction. In addition, during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and the West have also profoundly grasped the trend of digitalization in the current security intelligence assurance sector and comprehensively employed a variety of cutting-edge technologies and their S&T derivatives to effectively enhance their own intelligence assurance capabilities. This has provided an important support that allowed them to gradually seize the battlefield initiative in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At present, we are in the midst of major changes unseen in a century and the international situation is very fluid. The strategic stability between China and the United States is also facing a series of challenges. In this context, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to deeply analyze and evaluate the digital transformation of U.S. and Western intelligence assurance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, analyze its application cases in actual combat, and clarify the lessons this holds for China’s security and intelligence work.

1 Emerging trends in U.S. and Western intelligence assurance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, both Russia and the United States and Western countries recognized that the Russia-Ukraine conflict was an unprecedented hybrid war and each side accused the other of being the initiator of this hybrid war⁴–⁵. However, judging from overall strategic advantages and disadvantages, the United States and Western countries were undoubtedly the proactive side that was more “swift and severe”⁶. In the all-encompassing hybrid war that the United States and Western countries waged against Russia, their intelligence assurance work has achieved tremendous practical results. The United States and other Western countries have provided Ukraine with intelligence and information network support, and even directly helped the Ukrainian military analyze intelligence and direct its intelligence system. ⁷ This played an important role in the U.S.–Western bloc gaining the upper hand throughout the entire progress of the conflict. In particular, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, U.S. and Western intelligence assurance work is deeply aligned with the overall trend of intelligence assurance work in the digital . This work has resulted in relatively successful practices in the application of digital technology, open-source intelligence acquisition, non-professional participation, and the use of dual-use technology. The specific experience gained is discussed in the following sections:

1.1 Digital S&T has become a strategic weapon for the United States and the West to carry out offensive and defensive intelligence operations

S&T innovation is a basic support for the development of intelligence work, and it plays a huge role in promoting military intelligence work. ⁸ In today’s era, digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, blockchain, and metaverse continue to develop, becoming important S&T-sourced driving forces that affect the development progress of human society. The rapid development of digital technology has brought about tremendous changes in modern intelligence assurance work. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and the West have employed artificial intelligence (AI), big data, recommendation algorithms, and other digital S&T on a large scale to provide intelligence assurance for the military operations of their own bloc, fully reflecting the overall contours of intelligence assurance work in the digital age and effectively enhancing the strategic initiative of their side. This has produced a series of case studies from actual combat operations.

First, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and the West have employed facial recognition technology on a large scale to achieve individualized collection of intelligence. For example, facial recognition technology based on AI analysis is used by the U.S. and Western bloc to confirm the identity information of Russian soldiers who died in battle and send relevant information to the families of fallen Russian soldiers through communication media with the intention of striking at Russian morale. ⁹ The Clearview AI system used by the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has powerful computing and intelligence processing capabilities, allowing more than 300 Ukrainian intelligence officials to conduct facial recognition searches at any time. The scope of intelligence collection includes family photos, social media content, and relationship details of targets. ¹⁰ At the current stage, although the moral debate on the use of facial recognition technology to identify personal information of hostile soldiers still exists, this technology has obviously improved the intelligence collection capabilities of the U.S. and Western bloc and possesses strong practical effectiveness.

At the same time, recommendation algorithms have also become an important technical means for the United States and the West to carry out intelligence offense and defense in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recommendation algorithms first appeared in 1992. In recent years, they have been further developed during the upsurge of large-scale development of social media throughout the world, becoming one of the most technologically sophisticated and hotly discussed digital technologies. In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and the West wantonly used their dominant position in the recommendation algorithm platforms to seize intelligence information on Russia, posing a serious challenge to Russia’s intelligence security. At the same time, politicians in the United States and the West also vigorously encouraged creators and S&T companies to conduct intelligence attacks on Russia ¹¹–¹². Therefore, in March 2022, the Russian government cited relevant laws and banned Western social media giants such as Facebook and Instagram, labeling their parent company Meta as “extremist.” ¹³ In addition, as the core technology of new media platforms, algorithms are not simply “led by the nose” by the personal preferences and tendencies of the platform users, but “the tail wagging the dog” will be seen in many scenarios. The platforms will convey their own values and intentions to users in a way that conforms to users’ psychology through technical operations such as big data algorithms. Because this approach is more in line with user preferences and tendencies, it is more likely to subtly win over users. This feature leads to algorithms with very strong intelligence attack and defense characteristics. In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, international recommendation algorithm platforms under the control of the West have taken an unequal approach in screening and pushing information that is beneficial to Russia or beneficial to the United States and the West ¹⁴–¹⁵. Furthermore, the United States and the West also used their superiority in algorithms to spread false information about Russia and conduct algorithmic intelligence detection of Russian sources of information and then block the channels. This blockade began on the eve of the Russia-Ukraine conflict¹⁶ and has continued throughout the course of the conflict, becoming more open and expanding. ¹⁷

1.2 Dual-use technology plays an important role in U.S. and Western intelligence gathering

In recent years, with digital technology playing an increasingly prominent role in the process of intelligence collection, analysis, and transmission, the importance of critical information infrastructure has also been highlighted. ¹⁸ Compared with typical military infrastructure, military-civil dual-use infrastructure has become an important supplement for improving the intelligence assurance level of sovereign states. In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, UAVs, Starlink satellites, and other highly dual-use S&T products have been used in-depth by the United States and the West, greatly improving their intelligence assurance capabilities.

First, civilian UAVs have fully filled their intelligence assurance role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The intrinsic characteristics of UAVs, such as small size, fast movement, and strong concealment, make them ideal equipment for military reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine was constantly developing UAVs specifically for intelligence reconnaissance. These UAVs evolved from the PD-2 UAV, are equipped with Gekata intelligence and reconnaissance components independently developed by Ukraine, and have long-range all-weather monitoring capabilities. ¹⁹ After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a video of the Ukrainian army using UAVs to search for Russian ground troops near Kyiv appeared on social media. ²⁰ On the stage provided by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, not only have various types of military UAVs played an important role, but a large number of civilian UAVs have been converted to military use. After the conflict broke out, Ukrainian military equipment suffered heavy attacks. Confronting Russia’s siege of Kyiv, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense directly called on the citizens of Kyiv to donate their UAVs to defend against the Russian attack. According to Western media reports, prompted by the appeal of the Ukrainian government, not only the Ukrainian people, but also people from other Western countries donated civilian UAVs including the DJI-brand UAVs to Ukraine. ²¹ On the battlefield, civilian UAVs are not only used by Ukraine to discover Russian military deployments and to grasp Russian military dynamics in advance, but they can also become small bomb-loaded ground attack weapons after a partial modification. In addition, a large number of civilian UAVs are used to record scenes from the war, which are then widely disseminated through social media and also play a role in guiding public opinion. ²²

At the same time, the Starlink satellite system developed by the U.S. company SpaceX has become an important technical support for the intelligence assurance of the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, announced that he would provide Ukraine with Starlink satellite services, which greatly improved the intelligence assurance capabilities of the Ukrainian military during the conflict. In particular, a large number of Ukrainian armed personnel responsible for intelligence and reconnaissance on the front line of the Russia-Ukraine battlefield used a large number of personal Starlink satellite terminals for battlefield intelligence sharing and information communication, ²³ which effectively avoided the emergence of a predicament where Ukraine was cut off from communicating with the outside world by Russia. In addition, the Starlink satellite system has also enhanced Ukraine’s intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities vis-a-vis Russia. The Ukrainian air reconnaissance force not only used the Starlink system to find and destroy a large number of Russian tanks, mobile command centers, and other military vehicles, but there is information showing that the Starlink satellite system played an important intelligence reconnaissance and firepower guidance role in the process of Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva. This also led to Russia issuing serious warnings concerning Starlink satellites. ²⁴

1.3 Open-source networks have become an important source of security intelligence for the United States and the West

Currently, the Western world has gradually established absolute dominance in cyberspace by virtue of its own advantages in network technology and global institutions. In contrast, Russia has long occupied a subordinate position in cyberspace. As of 2021, the total number of Russian users of the four open-source network platforms dominated by the United States and the West, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, reached 217 million. ²⁵ On the whole, before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the gap between the Western world and Russia in terms of open-source network platforms was extremely pronounced. Therefore, open-source networks became an important way for the United States and the West to capture Russian security intelligence during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which had a tremendous impact on the overall direction taken by the conflict situation.

On the one hand, the use of open-source networks by the United States and the West to capture Russian security intelligence actually began before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A large number of on-site photos and even videos showing Russia’s military deployments appeared on international social media, making Russia’s military operations “transparent”. The United States and the West use open-source networks to discover and report relevant Russian military deployments. Their main goal is to strengthen the international community’s awareness of the belief that “Russia is preparing to launch a military attack on Ukraine” and induce Russia to use force against Ukraine, giving the Western world the excuse it sought in order to impose sanctions on Russia. ²⁶ A few hours before the Russia-Ukraine conflict officially broke out, based on an analysis of the “traffic jam” that appeared on the main road from Belgorod, Russia to Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, on Google Maps, a U.S. open-source intelligence analysis team concluded that a Russian attack on Ukraine might be imminent. ²⁷

On the other hand, in the course of the war following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, open-source networks have also become an important path by which the United States and the West capture Russian security intelligence. During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, various scenes of the war were disseminated in real time on international social media dominated by the United States and the West, attracting the attention of users all over the world, and relevant information related to Russia has become an essential way for the United States and the West to capture open-source intelligence. During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, open-source intelligence analysts in the United States and the West used open-source network information to track military infrastructure and assess incidents and casualties on the ground. For example, open-source intelligence was used by the United States and the West to detect whether Russia used cluster munitions in civilian areas. ²⁸

1.4 Non-professionals have become important entities relied on by the U.S. and the West for intelligence assurance

The rapid development of open-source intelligence has enabled a large number of non-professionals to use their own technical capabilities and deeply participate in the security intelligence collection system. This is profoundly reflected in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. For example, after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Justin Peden, a 20-year-old college student from Alabama in the United States quickly became a sensation because he used open-source networks to analyze and judge military information such as Russia’s military deployments and missile attack coordinates. He disclosed his analysis on social media under the account “The Intel Crab,” which attracted 270,000 followers. ²⁹

Not only that, but the rapid development of UAV technology has also given non-professionals the opportunity to deeply intervene in the intelligence offense and defense in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out, a non-governmental organization called “Aerorozvidka” ( “aerial reconnaissance” in Ukrainian) organized a large number of amateur drone enthusiasts to conduct UAV reconnaissance along the Ukrainian border using self-made UAVs and motion-sensing cameras in order to monitor Russia’s military deployment. This greatly improved the U.S. and Western bloc’s dynamic monitoring level of Russia’s military deployments. ³⁰ After the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, Aerorozvidka also claimed that it used UAVs equipped with thermal imaging cameras to discover a column of Russia’s mechanized ground troops stretching for 40 miles in Ivankiv to the northwest of Kyiv, and then carried out an effective attack. ³¹ In addition, according to a report by the Associated Press, some Ukrainian UAV enthusiasts who originally used amateur UAVs for wedding photography and farmland fertilization began to use drones to conduct dynamic surveillance on Russia’s military deployments and report them to the Ukrainian army after the Russia-Ukraine conflict. ³² There was even a 15-year-old Ukrainian boy named Andrii Pokrasa called the “Drone Boy.” He was a UAV enthusiast and, during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, he used a civilian drone his father bought him in the summer of 2021 to accurately discover a column of Russian military vehicles on the outskirts of Berezhivka, 40 kilometers west of Kyiv, and reported it to the Ukrainian army. This helped Ukrainian artillery pinpoint and destroy the Russian military convoy. ³³

2 Lessons for China’s intelligence assurance work

The realization of high-efficiency intelligence assurance by the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a successful attempt to adapt intelligence work to the digital age. It has played an important role in promoting the improvement of the intelligence assurance capabilities of the United States and the West in actual combat, and it requires our attention and vigilance. In the context of the post-Russia-Ukraine conflict situation, the strategic competition between China and the United States and the West is still severe, and China is faced with provocation and coercion from the United States and the West in many fields. Therefore, it is of great strategic significance to properly plan to deal with the latest trends in U.S. and Western intelligence assurance work in the context of digitalization and to learn from U.S. and Western experience in intelligence assurance gained in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Specifically, this includes the following five areas:

2.1  Raise the level of strategic analysis and evaluation of intelligence assurance work in the digital age

The advent of the digital age has brought about a new situation for the intelligence assurance work of sovereign states. In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and the West have given full play to the boosting effect of digital technology. Through digital technologies such as AI, big data, and remote control of UAVs, they have empowered intelligence assurance work and amply enhanced intelligence assurance capabilities in actual combat environments. In this context, China also needs to fully strengthen its overall understanding of intelligence assurance work in the digital age and further promote strategic analysis and evaluation in this field. Specifically, more relevant work needs to be done in three areas: First, strengthen the dynamic monitoring of cutting-edge issues in the field of international digital intelligence assurance. The development of digital technology is changing with each passing day, and its impact on intelligence assurance is also constantly changing. To strengthen strategic analysis and evaluation for digital intelligence assurance, we must first conduct real-time dynamic monitoring of digital intelligence assurance and accurately grasp the forefront of digital intelligence development. Second, we must establish working groups in competent departments such as the National Security Council. Strategic analysis and evaluation for intelligence assurance work in the digital age needs to give play to the leading role of government departments effectively. At the present stage, the Central National Security Committee is the core institution for implementing the overall national security concept and improving national security capacity building. Under digitalization conditions, it is also necessary to build dedicated strategic analysis and evaluation organizations in the relevant functional departments of the National Security Council to give full play to their coordinating role. Third, we must establish a regular exchange and analysis mechanism for experts and scholars from various fields in industry, academia, research, and government. Strengthening strategic analysis and evaluation for intelligence assurance work in the digital age also requires that experts and scholars in relevant fields of industry, academia, research, and business departments play their important roles and conduct in-depth analysis and trend analysis and evaluation on relevant cutting-edge issues.

2.2 Comprehensively categorize and review the risks from U.S. and Western digital intelligence penetration facing China

Only by taking precautions in advance can we proceed with calm and confidence. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the strategic embarrassment suffered by Russia in the digital intelligence attack and defense by the United States and the West demands our full attention. At the present stage, it is necessary to comprehensively categorize and review the risks from U.S. and Western digital intelligence penetration that China may face and make proper preparations for them. Specifically, the corresponding approach to risk is mainly reflected as follows: First, it is necessary to comprehensively categorize and review the risks of open-source cyberspace intelligence leaks. In the digitalized environment, open-source cyberspace has become an important path for intelligence acquisition. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the use of open-source networks by the United States and the West also poses a major threat to Russia’s intelligence security. Therefore, at the present stage, China also needs to comprehensively categorize and review the risks of intelligence leaks in open-source cyberspace such as social media and online interactive platforms and focus on discovering those that, in international emergencies, will become a risk source for hostile forces to steal our security information. At the same time, platforms with recommendation algorithms are a path with intelligence leakage risk on which we must focus. At this stage, recommendation algorithms are very popular, and they are also the most likely path by which open-source intelligence analysts can capture information. They have a huge user base and are prone to leak risks. Therefore, at the present stage, on the one hand, we must categorize and review the risks of domestic recommendation algorithm platforms. On the other hand, we must also analyze and evaluate the leak risks of overseas recommendation algorithm platforms with Chinese investment and backgrounds in advance, so as to prevent relevant companies from becoming caught up in conflicts with other countries and maintain the security of China’s overseas interests. In addition, it is necessary to continuously improve security risk review mechanisms for the corresponding civilian technology. While promoting economic and social development, the continuous development of digital technology will also generate a series of leakage risks, especially the ease with which the leakage risks in many civilian technologies are overlooked. Therefore, in the process of digital technology development, we must continuously and dynamically monitor the leakage risks of relevant civilian technologies, strengthen the construction of security risk review mechanisms, and resolutely maintain China’s intelligence security.

2.3  Vigorously promote military-civil fusion in the development of cutting-edge digital S&T in the intelligence field

The advent of the digital age has not only placed corresponding external pressure on China’s intelligence assurance work, but also brought certain opportunities. At the present stage, China can learn from the relevant experience of the United States and the West in using military-civil fusion technology in the Russia-Ukraine conflict to improve its own intelligence assurance capabilities. Further efforts will be made in the following three areas: On the one hand, military-civil fusion in the field of satellite communication can be strengthened to provide communication technology support for intelligence assurance. In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Starlink satellite system has a huge multiplier effect on the intelligence assurance work of the U.S. and Western bloc and has played an important role. At the present stage, China’s aerospace satellite technology is developing rapidly, but the development of its civil aerospace sector still lags behind that of the United States and Western countries. Therefore, we can make full use of the good foundation of China’s aerospace industry, vigorously promote continuous improvement in the development level of civil aerospace industrialization, and provide more diversified paths that China’s intelligence assurance can rely on in the context of international emergencies. On the other hand, we must also constantly raise the development level of military-civil fusion in UAVs and other intelligence monitoring equipment. By virtue of their intrinsic technical characteristics, UAVs have greatly enhanced the intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities of the U.S. and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China occupies a world-leading position in civilian UAV technology, and UAV companies such as DJI occupy a huge proportion of the international civilian drone market. At the present stage, we must also make full use of the good foundation provided by China’s civilian UAV technology and further strengthen the development of military-civil fusion so that China’s UAV intelligence monitoring technology will become better and more sophisticated. In addition, we can also promote the development of military-civil fusion in AI recognition. In the battlefield environment, the use of artificial intelligence terminals to conduct big data analysis on relevant military personnel and equipment can greatly improve the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence collection. Therefore, we can also learn from the relevant experience of the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, develop relevant military-civil fusion technology terminals, and conduct in-depth discussions on related technologies on the ethical level.

2.4 Strive to improve the security awareness of the whole people, especially young people, regarding open-source intelligence

The improvement of the national security awareness of the entire population is an important basis for effectively safeguarding national security. At present, in the face of the latest situation in the field of intelligence in the age of digitalization, it is of great significance to enhance the security awareness of the population in this field, and especially that of young people, so they understand the hot issues of open-source intelligence in the digital age represented by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In terms of specific improvement paths, we can focus on advancing along the following three paths: First, create a batch of popular science works with the theme of U.S. and Western open-source intelligence applications in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The intelligence assurance of the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict fully embodies the distinctive characteristics of intelligence work in the digital age and is of great significance as a source of inspiration and lessons. However, to improve the safety awareness of the whole population, and especially young people, we must incorporate practical cases in the Russia-Ukraine conflict to produce a batch of popular science books featuring distinctive characteristics and thorough analyses that are easy to understand. This is an important path by which we can improve the Chinese public’s understanding of issues such as open-source intelligence. Second, we must give full play to the important role of experts and scholars and carry out a series of related topical lectures. At present, Chinese short video platforms and other online platforms are developing rapidly and have a huge user base. They are an important way to promote public security awareness education. They can allow relevant experts and scholars to play their important role and carry out a series of popular science lectures, using actual combat scenarios such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict as specific cases, to publicize key issues such as open-source intelligence. Third, we must guide young people to understand and master the technical means of using open-source networks to search for information. Improving the public’s understanding of open-source intelligence in the context of digitalization should not be limited to passive responses, but should also focus on guiding young people and technical personnel in relevant civil fields to gradually master the technical methods of using network platforms for in-depth information retrieval. This can continuously cultivate the public’s deep understanding of open-source intelligence issues, while also laying a solid foundation of talent reserves for the development of the military-civil fusion industry in this field.

2.5  Use international cooperation to implement international laws and regulations on the infringing behavior of the United States and the West on the digital security of other countries

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the practice employed by the United States and the West of using digital means to improve their intelligence assurance capabilities has brought about a revolution in modern intelligence. Among these changes, the methods of introducing civilian facilities such as Starlink into conflicts are still a gray area at the current stage of international law. If this trend is allowed to develop further, it will pose severe challenges to the intelligence security of China and most other countries. Therefore, China needs to join hands with relevant countries, allow international law to play its role, and effectively regulate the new intelligence methods of the United States and the West. Specifically, this includes: First, it is necessary to further clarify the wartime status of military-civilian dual-use communications and intelligence infrastructure such as Starlink. The Starlink satellite system has brought about a revolution in communication infrastructure, and it has played a huge role in the intelligence assurance of the U.S. and Western bloc in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It has the potential for massive expansion in the future through the construction of portable personal terminals and even direct links to mobile phones. However, as Starlink is an S&T product with novel military and civilian attributes, there is insufficient legal support for its reasonable regulation by international law. Therefore, it is necessary to give play to China’s constructive role and rely on platforms such as the International Telecommunication Union and the International Arms Control Organization to continuously refine the regulations on S&T products such as Starlink. In addition, it is also necessary to form international legal restrictions on the acquisition of open-source cyberspace intelligence. Cyberspace is an important new frontier of national security, and open-source cyberspace is also an important field for intelligence attack and defense in the context of digitalization. During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and the West took advantage of their dominant position in open-source cyberspace to capture a large amount of Russian intelligence. In the face of the wanton use of open-source cyberspace to capture security intelligence by the United States and the West, China and other relevant countries must carry out in-depth cooperation to promote the continuous improvement of international regulations on open-source cyberspace and effectively safeguard the security interests of all countries.

3  Conclusion

This paper provides a comprehensive categorization and review of U.S. and Western intelligence assurance practices in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and their lessons. This paper argues that, in the context of the digital age, the intelligence assurance work of the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict conforms to the overall digital transformation trend in intelligence assurance. Its practical experience is reflected in the following points: Digital S&T has become a strategic weapon for the United States and the West to carry out offensive and defensive intelligence operations and dual-use technology plays an important role in U.S. and Western intelligence gathering. At the same time, non-professionals have become important entities relied on by the U.S. and Western for intelligence assurance and open-source networks have become an important source of security intelligence for the United States and the West. The achievement of highly efficient intelligence assurance by the United States and the West in the Russia-Ukraine conflict demands our attention and vigilance. Its lessons are that we must raise the level of strategic analysis and evaluation of intelligence assurance work in the digital age, comprehensively categorize and review the risks from U.S. and Western digital intelligence penetration facing China, vigorously promote military-civil fusion in the development of cutting-edge digital S&T in the intelligence field, strive to improve the security awareness of the whole population, especially young people, regarding open-source intelligence, and also use international cooperation to implement international laws and regulations on the infringing behavior of the United States and the West on the digital security of other countries.