Translation Tag: national security
The CCP Politburo holds “collective study sessions” on a semi-regular basis, in which an outside academic or government expert leads a discussion on a selected topic. Such sessions are important signals as to what issues the senior leadership finds important. The 16th collective study session of the 20th Central Committee Politburo was held on July 31, 2024 and was presided over by Xi Jinping. At this session, Xi delivered a speech emphasizing the need to improve, strengthen and modernize the sea, air, and border defense systems to achieve China’s modernization and ensure overall national security.
The head of China’s Ministry of State Security, Chen Yixin, reflects on efforts to implement the “Overall National Security Outlook” ten years after Chinese leader Xi Jinping first introduced the concept in 2014. Chen highlights the 2020 National Security Law in Hong Kong, more formalized national security education, and the build out of a national security legal and regulatory architecture as key accomplishments over the past decade. Looking ahead, Chen emphasizes the need to further advance China’s national security through a variety of mechanisms, including greater technological self-reliance, improved counter-sanctions mechanisms, and more assertive efforts to advance China’s security principles on the international stage.
This article was written during the consultation period for new national security legislation through Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Shao Shanbo, previous head of the former Hong Kong Central Policy Unit (a government think tank advising the Chief Executive that was revamped under a new name in 2018), addresses criticism voiced within Hong Kong and by external observers over the bill’s potential breadth. Prominently, he argues that terms such as “incitement” are not vague because they have been clarified by legal precedents within the city’s common law system.
Scholars from Huaqiao University explore the implications of generative AI for China’s prosperity and national security, following the launch of ChatGPT. They emphasize the pivotal role leadership in AI research and applications will play in global power distributions going forward, given implications for standards-setting ability, productivity growth, and information control.
Da Wei, a professor at Tsinghua University, argues the Xi-Biden summit in November 2023 revealed U.S.-China relations have entered a “new normal” characterized by four features: mutual acceptance that tension will continue indefinitely, mutual assessment that full-blown conflict would be unacceptable, mutual understanding that neither country will fulfill its strategic goals completely, and mutual observation that economic and social resilience is possible amidst intense bilateral competition.
Zhao Xiaozhuo, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, explains the trajectory of the Ukraine war in terms of two types of warfare: “mechanized warfare,” centered mostly on large-scale platforms such as aircraft and tanks, and “information warfare,” which more systemically integrates such platforms with other tools, including low-cost, dual-use technologies such as drones and social media. Zhao argues that Ukraine has used the latter to its advantage, which has enabled it to—among other things—take out Russian combat platforms through precision strikes.
Zhang Gaoyuan, a security scholar at Peking University, draws lessons for China amid what she terms the digital transformation of intelligence gathering. Zhang argues dual-use technology such as drones and Starlink satellites, open-source social media information, and efforts by non-combatants have been pivotal in guaranteeing Ukraine a steady flow of battlefield intelligence. As a prognosis for China, she promotes greater research into the opportunities and risks digital technologies present for intelligence acquisition and security.
Huang Bin, a former defense industry executive, draws lessons for Beijing from the Russia-Ukraine war, which he sees as worth attention due to rising turbulence in China’s security environment. Huang argues China should increase its military spending as a share of GDP, invest in systems that enhance battlefield situational awareness, step up the production of equipment for special operations, improve its military logistics capabilities, and leverage patriotic education to expand its counterespionage network.
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 18th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 19th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Xi Jinping), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 19th Central Committee).
Xi Jinping delivered this address to the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC), soon after being appointed for a third term as Chinese Communist Party general secretary at the 20th Party Congress.