I. The Difference Between Maritime Strategy and Sea Power Strategy
一、海洋战略与海权战略的区别
In discussing China’s maritime development in recent years, the two concepts of maritime strategy and sea power strategy are often confused and used interchangeably, so it is necessary to differentiate and clarify before starting the discussion. The development and utilization of offshore oil, natural gas, marine fishery resources, and tourism resources are, in actuality, economic activities. Due to the particular preference in academic circles for the word “strategy” in recent years, the term has been commonly misused. So much so that opening a hotel or planning a tourist attraction has been elevated to a strategy. In my opinion, the vast majority of the so-called maritime strategies are just economic development plans embellished with military terminologies.
近年来,在讨论中国海洋发展问题时,海洋战略与海权战略两个概念经常发生混淆、互为指代的现象,故而在展开讨论前,有辨析澄清的必要。对海底石油、天然气、海洋渔业资源、旅游资源的开发和利用实际上是经济行为。由于学界近些年来对“战略”一词有着特殊的偏爱,导致“战略”一词被普遍地滥用。以致开个酒店、规划一个旅游景点都上升到战略的高度。在笔者看来,时下流行的海洋战略中的绝大部分内容仅指经济上的开发计划,只是冠以军事术语而已。
Strictly speaking, only planning in the defense and military fields can be called a strategy in the real sense. One of the consequences of the misuse of the term “strategy,” is that national-level maritime strategy is often confused with military-level sea power strategy. Therefore, I will first define maritime strategy: it is the macroscopic planning of a coastal state according to its maritime interests, including economic, diplomatic, political, and military interests, and it is a comprehensive consideration and planning of these interests. Sea power strategy is the planning of a country’s military implementation that aims to fulfill its established economic, diplomatic, and political approaches to maritime interests. The issues discussed in this paper focus on the military aspect and the relationship between sea power strategy at the military level and maritime strategy at the national level.
严格地说来,只有国防军事领域的规划才是真正意义上的战略。滥用“战略”一词的后果之一,就是将国家层面的海洋战略与军事层面的海权战略经常混为一谈,因此笔者首先界定:海洋战略是一个濒海国家对海洋利益宏观的规划,包括经济、外交、政治和军事等方面, 是对这几个方面的统筹考虑和计划。海权战略是指一个国家在军事上执行海洋利益方面既定的经济、外交和政治方针的规划。本文所探讨的问题主要集中在军事方面,以及军事层面的海权战略与国家层面的海洋战略之间的关系。
II. The Origins of China’s Modern “Coastal Defense” Problem
二、中国近现代“海防”问题的由来
In the modern era, China’s sea power strategy has taken the form of “coastal defense,” the core of which has always been to prevent external invasion of the homeland from the sea. Because China was an agrarian society and depended on its arable land for survival, it was self-sufficient without the need to rely on the outside world. On the contrary, commercial trade with the outside world was not necessary for China, and the tendency for commerce to maximize its profits could even have a subversive impact on the normal agrarian social order, both ideologically and in real life. Chinese governments in history thus always adopted directive management of commerce to control its scale. The ancient navy (“water forces”) also assumed the role of looking out for overseas smuggling during normal times. Although it was nominally the state’s military force at sea, it actually performed the function of controlling the society internally.
近代以来,中国的海权战略以“海防”的形式出现,其不变的核心内容是防止外部从海上入侵本土。因为中国是农耕社会,依赖耕地而生存,自产自足无需依赖本土以外而生存。相反,外来的商业贸易并非中国必需,但是商业利润最大化倾向无论在思想观念上还是在现实生活中都可能对正常的农业社会秩序产生颠覆性的冲击,因而中国古代政府一向对商业采取指令性管理,以控制其规模。古代海军(水师)在平时兼有稽查海外走私的功能,虽然表面上是国家的海上军事力量,实际执行的是控制社会内部的职能。
In modern times, the survival conditions of typical Western maritime nations, such as the Netherlands and the UK, are completely different from those of Chinese agrarian society. Their survival depends on maritime trade, and the main economic structure of these countries is that of an “export-oriented economy.” The survival of maritime nations depends on a unique and stable economic structure constituted between their homelands and a certain region outside. Once this sort of economic structure is disrupted, the survival of such nations will be seriously threatened.
近代如荷兰、英国等典型的西方海洋国家的生存条件与中国农耕社会是完全不同的类型,它们的生存依赖海洋贸易,“外向型经济”是这些国家主要经济形态。海洋国家的生存依赖本土和本土之外某一地区构成稳定的、特殊的经济结构。一旦这种经济结构遭到破坏,国家生存便受到严重威胁。
Therefore, the mission of national defense for maritime nations is to defend the economic structure established between the homeland and overseas areas, including the “maritime lifelines” that connect the homeland to lands overseas. The navy is not only a main component of the national defense force, but also fundamentally an investment in the survival of the nation, just as land forces are an investment in the survival of inland agrarian societies. This dictates that a maritime nation’s scope of defense must go beyond its territory, and that military forces must champion the country’s own “maritime lifelines” and be deployed to overseas areas of vital interest that concern the survival of the homeland. This “long-distance defense” of maritime nations that goes beyond their homelands, in the eyes of the outside world, especially the eyes of non-maritime nations, is a form of military aggression that serves its expansion of economic interests and its subsequent cultural expansion.
于是,海洋国家的国防任务就是保卫本土与海外地区建立的经济结构,包括本土连接海外的“海上生命线”。海军军种不仅构成国防力量的主要成份,而且根本上是国家生存的成本投入,如同陆军军种是内陆农耕社会生存的成本投入一样。这就决定了海洋国家的国防范围必然越出本土,军事力量必须保障自己的“海上生命线”和投送到关系本土生存的海外重大利益区域。海洋国家这种超越本土的“远距离防御”在外部世界看来,尤其是非海洋国家看来是为经济利益扩张和随之而来的文化扩张服务的军事侵略。
Since the 17th century, with the advancement of navigation technology and the rise of capitalism in the Western world, the maritime trade of Western countries with the East gradually developed into the continuous aggressive expansion of modern colonialism. China, on the other hand, has been under the shadow of a long period of colonialist aggression since the Opium Wars, and suffered greatly from it. As an ancient agricultural nation, Chinese society generated a natural resistance towards the West in all aspects—political, economic, military, diplomatic, and ideological. Beginning in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, when the traditional threat of invasion from the northern steppe region, which had long threatened the Central Plains, was lifted, the issue of coastal defense—protection against invasion from the sea—emerged as a problem for China’s military defense and has lasted for more than a century. Fundamentally, this maritime threat came from the Western colonialist campaign in Asia that lasted for centuries.
17 世纪以来,随着西方世界航海技术的进步和资本主义的兴起,西方国家向东方的海上贸易逐渐发展为近现代殖民主义的持续侵略扩张。而中国自鸦片战争以来,一直笼罩在长期的殖民主义侵略的阴影下,深受其害。作为古老的农业国家,中国社会从政治、经济、军事、外交和意识形态各个方面产生对西方国家的天然抵制。在明末清初开始,当长期威胁中原地区的北方草原地区传统入侵威胁解除后,中国的军事领域产生前所未有的海防问题——防止来自海上的入侵,并且持续了一百多年。从根本上讲,这种海上威胁来自西方向亚洲持续了数百年的殖民主义运动。
III. The Transformation of Contemporary Chinese Society and the Emergence of “Maritime Lifelines”
三、中国当代社会的转型和“海上生命线”的出现
Before “reform and opening up” in the 1980s, the core concept of maritime defense in China’s sea power strategy was passed down from the emergence of the “Japanese pirates” in the Ming dynasty, i.e. preventing external military invasion from the sea. From Qi Jiguang and Yu Dayou’s defense against “Japanese pirates” in the Ming dynasty, the establishment of the Beiyang Fleet during the “Self-Strengthening Movement” in the late Qing dynasty, to the naval construction during the Republican era of China, the concept of coastal defense can be said to have been “consistent.” After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong also appealed: “In order to fight against imperialist aggression, we must build a strong navy.” After the end of World War II, the world soon entered the Cold War era of two camps, socialist and capitalist. The Western countries led by the United States adopted a hostile attitude towards China and imposed an economic blockade on the country, while China adopted the principle of “independence and self-reliance” in its national economic development and industrialization. Before “reform and opening up,” China had laid the preliminary foundations for a modern industrial system that was locally self-contained and not dependent on the international community. At that time, China’s national industrialization had begun to take shape, but its economic model was still an “inward-oriented economy” inherited from the tradition of thousands of years of agricultural society, in which basically everything, whether it was industrial or agricultural, raw materials or products, was obtained and consumed within national borders without depending on overseas markets.
在上个世纪 80 年代“改革开放”之前,中国的海权战略继承了自明代“倭寇”产生以来的海防核心观念,即防止来自海上的外部军事入侵。从明代戚继光、俞大猷防范“倭寇”,到晚清“洋务运动”建立北洋水师,再到民国期间的海军建设,海防观念可谓“一以贯之”, 1949 年新中国成立后,毛泽东也发出号召:“为了反对帝国主义的侵略,我们一定要建立强大的海军。”由于二战结束后,世界很快进入社会主义和资本主义两大阵营的冷战时代,以美国为首的西方国家对中国采取敌对态度,对中国实施经济封锁,中国在国民经济发展和工业化建设上采取的是“独立自主,自力更生”的方针。在“改革开放”前,中国初步建立了本土自成体系的、不依赖国际社会的、初具规模的现代工业化体系。当时,中国国家工业化已初具规模,但经济形态方面还是继承了数千年农业社会的“内向型经济”传统,无论工业还是农业、原料还是产品,基本都在本土获取和消费,并不依赖海外市场。
Because it was an independent and self-reliant “inward-oriented economy,” China had no strong need to develop a blue-water navy as Western maritime nations had done, driven by their “outward-oriented economies.” Defending the local industrial and agricultural production system was the main consideration for national defense. The defense task of the navy, army, and air force was to prevent the invasion and destruction of the homeland by external enemies from the sea, land, and sky. In this way, China’s national defense before reform and opening up had inherited the ancient traditional defense when it aimed to protect its inward-oriented economy, that is, the tradition of “land power-ism” that had been consistent for thousands of years. The manifestation of this tradition in sea power was that the defense only concerned the protection of coastal waters—which rendered it only an extension of land defense to the sea. The navy’s strategic deployment was aimed at “offshore defense” and “near seas defense,” roughly the same thinking as that of ancient naval traditions.
因为是独立自主的“内向型经济”,便没有西方海洋国家在“外向型经济”的动力下发展远洋海军的强烈需要,捍卫本土的工农业生产体系是国防的主要考虑。海陆空三军的国防任务就是防止外部敌人从海上、地面、天空对本土的侵略和破坏。这样,“改革开放”前的新中国国防在维护“内向型经济”方面继承了古代中国的国防传统,也就是几千年一以贯之的“陆权主义”传统。体现在海权方面,只是海岸线水域的防御,是陆上防御向海洋伸出的触角。海军战略部署是“近岸防御”和“近海防御”,与古代海军传统大致无二。
Beginning in the 1980s, China emerged from the devastation of the Cultural Revolution and quickly shifted onto the track of economic construction marked by reform and opening up. In the short span of three decades, as China has been interacting with, learning from, imitating, and catching up with the world, the country’s economy has basically been integrated into the international system, and its raw materials, product markets, and energy are all heavily dependent on imports and exports. The inward-looking economy has been transformed into an unprecedented outward-looking economy that relies on maritime transportation. China’s mode of economic survival has undergone a fundamental transformation, becoming similar to that of ancient Athens, Carthage, medieval Venice, and modern-day Netherlands and England. For the first time in China’s history, the issue of “maritime lifelines” has emerged, as well as the question of overseas areas of vital interest concerning the very survival of the homeland. In short, after three decades of “reform and opening up,” China has unwittingly changed from a traditional agrarian country into a modern maritime country.
上世纪 80 年代开始,中国从“文革”浩劫中走出来,迅速转入以“改革开放”为标志的经济建设轨道。在短短三十年时间里,中国在同世界交往、学习、模仿和赶超过程中,国家经济基本上已经融入世界体系,生产原料和产品市场以及能源都严重依赖进出口。“内向型经济”已转型为史无前例的依赖海洋交通的“外向型经济”。中国的经济生存方式发生了根本性的转型,变成类似古代雅典、迦太基、中世纪威尼斯和近现代荷兰、英国等国的经济生存方式。中国历史上首次出现了“海上生命线”的问题,以及关乎本土生死存亡的海外重大利益区域问题。总而言之,中国在“改革开放”三十年后不知不觉由传统农耕国家变成了现代海洋国家。
IV. The Transformation of China’s Defense and Sea Power Strategy
四、中国国防和海权战略的转型
The historical experience of European civilization reveals a fundamental principle of the emergence of sea power: once an “outward-oriented economy” state of existence that depends on sea routes emerges, it inevitably calls for strong sea power. In a world governed by Hobbesian culture in which the strong prey on the weak, the cannonballs follow the money, and the fleets follow the merchant ships. Today, when Hobbesian culture is yet to bow out from the stage of history, and when China’s economic model has been transformed into an “outward-oriented economic structure,” China’s sea power strategy faces two challenges. The first is that China does not fully possess the ability to fulfill the traditional mission of “preventing invasion at sea” on the level of conventional warfare. (At present, China essentially relies on nuclear weapons to prevent homeland invasions.) The second is the emergent issue of protecting “maritime lifelines” and “overseas areas of vital interests.” The previous naval strategy of “coastal defense” and “near-seas defense” falls far short of the requirements of the second task, forcing a shift to the “blue water defense.”
欧洲文明的历史经验揭示了海权发生的规律:依赖海洋通道的“外向型经济”生存状态一旦出现,必然召唤强大的海权。在弱肉强食的霍布斯文化笼罩的世界里,炮弹跟着金钱走, 舰队跟着商船走。在霍布斯文化尚未退出历史舞台的今天,当中国的经济生存形态转型为“外向型经济结构”时,中国的海权战略面临两个挑战:一是传统的“防止海上入侵”的能力在常规战争层面尚没有完全具备(目前本土不被军事入侵根本上依赖核武器威慑);二是新出现的“海上生命线”和“海外重大利益地区”的保护问题。而以往的海军战略“近岸防御”和“近海防御”则远远不能满足第二项任务的需要,被迫将转向“远洋防御”。
In addition, with regard to the nature of national defense as a whole, its first task is to defend the economy of the nation. For the first time in its history, but like all maritime nations historically, China’s scope of national defense extends beyond its homeland to cover “national maritime lifelines” and “overseas areas of vital interest” beyond its territory. This transformation of national defense, brought about by the dramatic change in the nation’s economic model, will not only require the building of a strong blue-water navy, but will also require the creation of other branches of military services based on the characteristics of modern warfare that are compatible with the strategy of “blue water defense.”
此外,就整个国防性质而言,国防第一任务就是捍卫国家的经济生存。与历史上所有的海洋国家一样,中国国防的范围有史以来第一次超越了本土,覆盖本土之外的“国家海上生命线”和“海外重大利益地区”。这种由国家经济生存方式巨变带来的国防转型不仅要求建立强大的远洋海军,而且根据现代战争的特点,还将需要建立与“远洋防御”相匹配的其它军兵种。
Given the current disputes regarding sovereignty over territorial waters, with the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as the focal points, in which the sovereignty of traditional territorial waters has been infringed to varying degrees, an important function of China’s sea power strategy is to protect China’s traditional sovereign waters. The strategy also includes containing “Taiwan independence” and securing the development of various resources within China’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. These disputes have led to tensions with Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, and other countries. In the long run, however, the main hidden dangers for China’s sea power strategy are not the traditional maritime border disputes, which now remain the center of attention. The long-term hidden dangers are those that involve the security of “maritime lifelines” that threaten the survival of the country and the “overseas areas of vital interests” that bear on China’s national stability. Lurking over the “national maritime lifelines” are military threats coming from the United States, Japan, and India.
当前出现的以东海钓鱼岛、南海的南沙群岛为焦点的领海主权争端,传统领海主权受到不同程度的侵害,中国海权战略的一个重要功能就是对中国传统主权海域的保护,也包括遏制“台独”,并保障领海和经济专属区内的各种资源开发安全。虽然,这些争端导致中国同越南、菲律宾、日本等国的紧张关系,但从长远来看,当前引人注目的传统海疆争端并非中国海权战略的主要隐患,长远隐患是危及国家生存的“海上生命线”和涉及国家稳定的“海外重大利益地区”的安全。在“国家海上生命线”上潜伏着来自美国、日本、印度的军事威胁。
V. The Dilemma of Sea Power under the Co-existence of Kantian and Hobbesian Cultures
五、康德文化和霍布斯文化并存状态下的海权困境
Most economically and ideally, the most assuring scenario for the “maritime lifelines” of a maritime nation would be the one when the world enters a Kantian system of permanent peace. With this as the goal, major powers in the current international community should voluntarily abandon all kinds of “self-interests” that are contrary to this goal and assume the responsibility for building a permanently peaceful order in the world. For the major powers, including China, to ensure maritime rights would mean relying on permanent peace in the world, rather than the traditional arms race and the prowess of military power at sea. However, as Hobbes said, “The relation of man to man in a state of nature, is essentially a condition of every man against every man.” The so-called state of nature, i.e., anarchy, can be extended to the international community, which will remain anarchic for the time being and even in the long run, as the United Nations does not have the authority of a world government, and UN mediation mechanisms are quite limited. Therefore, Hobbes’ view can also be expressed as follows: The relations between states in a state of nature are essentially also relations of war. Between states, the phenomenon of resorting to force when peaceful means are exhausted will persist. Therefore, if China does not have a strong navy and “blue water defense” capability beyond its homeland, it is likely to become the victim of this disadvantage in the future. If it were to use Kant’s notion of perpetual peace to guide its actions in a Hobbesian era, China would be making an anachronistic mistake.
从最经济最理想的角度而论,海洋国家的“海上生命线”最可靠的保障是世界进入康德永久和平的体系。以此为目标,在当今国际社会体系中的各主要大国应自觉地抛弃与此目标相悖的各种“私利”,担负起建设世界永久和平秩序的责任。包括中国在内的各大国自身的海权保障应建立在世界永久和平之上,而不是依赖于传统的军备竞赛和海上军事力量的强大。然而,诚如霍布斯所说:“自然状态下的人与人之间的关系,本质上是每个人对每个人的战争关系。”所谓自然状态即无政府状态,推至国际社会,由于联合国不具有世界政府的权威,目前乃至长远而论,国际社会仍将处于无政府状态,联合国协调机制相当有限。因此,霍布斯的观点也可表述为:自然状态下的国家与国家的关系,本质上也是战争关系。在国与国之间, 和平手段用尽后诉诸武力的现象还将持续下去。因此,如果中国没有强大的海军、不具备超越本土的“远洋防御”能力,将来恐深受其害。用康德永久和平的观念来指导霍布斯时代的行动,中国将犯时代性错误。
If China formulates its naval strategy by following the approach of traditional maritime nations, it will quickly find itself in a quandary, because this will cause a certain sense of insecurity among its neighbors and today’s powerful countries, and they will also build up their own navies and even join forces to contain China. In the eastward shift of the United States’ strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific, there is a clear trend towards organizing a maritime military alliance to contain China. Therefore, according to traditional realist strategic thinking, reckless naval development may trigger a regional arms race, and the result of such a race would likely be simultaneous growth of military power among neighboring countries or potential rivals, resulting in little change in the relative strengths of each country’s navy compared to what it was before, whereas the burden of maintaining military power would be greatly increased. At the same time, if this sort of traditional realist strategy is followed, China’s hopes for a “peaceful rise” will gradually drift away, and full-scale conflict will grow increasingly close. Thus, China is caught in a dilemma.
当中国按照传统的海洋国家途径来制定海军战略时,中国会发现很快陷入困境,因为这将引起周围国家和当今强国的不安,它们也将加强自己的海军建设,甚至联手对中国进行遏制。美国战略重心东移亚太就有明显的组织海上军事同盟以遏制中国的趋势。所以按传统现实主义战略思维,不顾一切地发展海军,既有可能引发地区军备竞赛,竞赛的结果也很可能因周边国家或潜在对手同步增长,致使海军相对力量同原先比没发生多少变化,而维持军力的负担反而大大加重。与此同时,按照这种传统的现实主义战略走下去,将与中国“和平崛起”的愿望渐行渐远,而离全方位冲突越来越近。于是,中国陷入了两难困境。
In the face of the world’s current situation and prospects, and in the face of this dilemma, China’s sea power strategy should have two strings to its bow. While being committed to the peaceful development of the world, it should also build a strong naval force to cope with possible future contingencies. In terms of what specific efforts China must make, it should try to build a naval power that meets its needs without causing uneasiness in other countries. China’s future navy should be ready to welcome the advent of a Kantian era of permanent peace but should also be ready to deal with a resurgence of the Hobbesian era of the strong preying on the weak.
面对世界这种现状和前景,面对两难的困境,中国海权战略应有两手准备。在致力于世界和平发展的同时,也要建设强大的海军力量以应付未来可能的不测。具体实施过程中,中国所要做的是:如何在建设符合中国需要的海军力量时,又不会引起他国的不安全感。中国未来的海军既要做好迎接康德永久和平时代的来临,又要做好应对霍布斯弱肉强食时代的卷土重来。
VI. The Course of China’s “Peaceful Rise” Will Determine its Choice of Sea Power Strategy
六、“和平崛起”走向决定中国海权战略的选择
China is rising, and at least for the present stage, it has been sincerely expressing its hope to the world for a peaceful rise. China is reflecting deeply on the experience and lessons learned from the rise of great powers in history, especially in the histories of modern Western nations, and it evidently wants to do its best to prevent its own rise from triggering a new round of turmoil in the world. However, China’s ability to “rise peacefully” depends first and foremost on its internal environment. Due to thousands of years of totalitarian tradition, China’s social power structure and economic structure have always had major flaws in terms of equality and fairness. If the social transformation inherits these fatal flaws and cements them into the modern social structure, Chinese society will stagnate amid the inevitable internal conflicts generated by this structure. Even if it does manage to struggle on and rise, it will not be a “peaceful rise” internally. If a country with an unequal social structure attempts to rise in the midst of fierce internal and external conflicts, it will bear high internal and external political risks. A “harmonious society” and a “harmonious world” are essentially the same, for their basic principles are both equality and justice. Diplomacy is the natural and logical extension of internal affairs from oneself to others, from the inside to the outside. A country that lacks internal equality, justice and harmony cannot bring peace to the world.
中国正在崛起,至少在当下和愿望上向世界真诚地表达着和平崛起的愿望。中国深刻地反思着历史上、特别是西方近现代历史上大国崛起的经验和教训,显然想竭力避免自己的崛起引发新一轮的世界大动荡。然而,中国能否“和平崛起”首先取决于内部环境。由于几千年的极权主义文化传统,中国社会权力结构和经济结构始终在平等和公平方面存在较大的缺陷。如果社会转型将这种致命的缺陷继承并固化为现代社会结构,那么中国社会将在这种结构所产生的不可避免的内耗中止步不前。即便是勉强地挣扎着崛起,从内部来讲也不是“和平崛起”。存在不平等社会结构的国家要在剧烈的内部冲突和外部冲突中崛起将承担较高的内外政治风险。“和谐社会”与“和谐世界”本质上是一致的,它们基本原则就是平等与公正。外交是内政自然和逻辑的延续,由己及人,由内及外,一个内部缺乏平等和公正、不和谐的国家是不可能给世界带来和平的。
Will China be able to rise peacefully when it overcomes the cultural and institutional ills brought about by thousands of years of tradition and becomes a more internally harmonious society? This does not depend entirely on China’s own aspirations. To a large extent, it depends on the external environment, on how China interacts with the outside world, and what degree of influence historical experience and traditional issues are imposing on its people. The rise of sea powers in the past was always by force of arms, and this has all become the content filling the imaginations of foreigners when it comes to China’s future rise. For them, China’s establishment of a blue-water, defense-oriented navy according to its needs seems to confirm, to some extent, both the implications of historical experience and what they imagine about the future.
当中国克服千年传统带来的文化、制度的痼疾,成为一个内部比较和谐的社会后,是否能够和平崛起?这也不完全取决于中国自己的愿望,很大程度上是取决于外部环境、以及中国被动地与外部世界的互动,取决于历史经验和传统惯性对人们的暗示强度。以往海权大国崛起无一不是通过武力,这一切成为某些外国想象中国未来崛起的内容,而中国建立必要的远洋防御性质的海军,似乎使历史经验的暗示同未来想象的内容得到了某种程度的证实。
Given the outside world’s suspicions, there may be two possible outcomes for China: First, China will try its best to prove by its actions that it is not following the old path of traditional great powers and will eventually win the trust of the external world with its sincerity. A peaceful and sincere China will then interact benignly with the external world that trusts it, and thereby achieve a peaceful rise. The second is that China, having tried with its utmost sincerity and effort, still fails to win the trust of the outside world. And with hostile interaction with the outside world, it is forced to abandon its peaceful rise and act in the way of traditional sea powers. Obviously, both possibilities exist. Thus, China’s ability to rise peacefully does not depend entirely on its own efforts, and at least half of it still requires external cooperation. These two possibilities will produce diametrically opposed outcomes for China’s choice of sea power strategy and will also produce diametrically opposed and far-reaching effects on the Asia-Pacific and the world.
面对外部世界对中国的疑虑,中国可能会出现两种结果:一是中国竭力以行动证明自己不走传统大国的老路,最终以真诚赢得外部世界的信任,具有和平诚意的中国与信任中国的外部世界进行良性互动,从而实现和平崛起。二是中国尽最大诚意和努力之后仍然无法赢得外部的信任,被迫在与外部进行敌对互动中,放弃和平崛起而按传统海权大国方式行事。显然,这两种可能性都存在。所以,中国能否和平崛起并不完全取决于自身的努力,至少一半尚需外部的配合。这两种可能性对中国海权战略的选择将产生截然相反结果,也会对亚太和全球产生截然相反的深远影响。
It must be stressed that the suspicions from the outside world, especially those from the West, are the result of centuries of East-West civilizational interaction. Now that the Western “masters” of “cannonballs following the money” and “military following the trade” thinking have fostered their own Eastern “disciple,” they are using their own ignominious past to try to figure out and predict the future actions of this Eastern “disciple.” Such suspicions are therefore anxieties and thoughts of containment produced by this mode of thinking.
需要强调的是,外部世界的疑虑,尤其是西方国家的疑虑,是在几百年来东西文明交往中,由“炮弹跟着金钱走”、“军事跟着贸易走”的西方“师傅”带出了自己的东方“徒弟” 后,以自己不光彩的过去来揣摩、想象东方“徒弟”的未来作为,而产生的焦虑和遏制的念头。
VII. High-end Science and Technology Give China the Opportunity to Develop its Sea Power
七、高端科学技术赐予中国海权发展的机遇
There is a view that in terms of geographical location and characteristics, central and western China are located in inland Asia, while the southeast is bordered by the sea, making it a composite country with both land and sea, so for China, sea power and land power should be developed simultaneously. In fact, whether a country is a sea or land power nation is not determined by its geographical location. The southeastern provinces of China are bordered by the sea and have 18,000 kilometers of coastline, but for thousands of years China was not a sea power state; it was a landlocked state of inland agrarian nature. The Japanese state consists of a series of small sea islands, but before the Meiji Restoration, it did not become a sea power state like the ancient Greek city-states, and for a long period of history, it was, like China, a closed agrarian society and a land power state. It can be seen that geographical location, though important, is not a decisive factor in determining whether a country is a sea power or land power nation.
有一种观点认为:从地理位置和特征看,中国中西部处于亚洲内陆,东南濒于海洋,属于陆海兼备的复合型国家,海权和陆权应并举。事实上,一个国家海权和陆权的属性并非由地理位置决定的。中国东南诸省濒临大海,有着一万八千公里的海岸线,但几千年来并没有成为海权国家,而属于内陆农耕性质的内陆国家。日本国由海上一连串大小岛构成,但在明治维新前,并没有像古希腊城邦国家那样成为海权国家,在很长的历史时期内和中国一样, 属于封闭型的农耕社会和崇尚陆权国家。可见,地理位置在决定国家海权还是陆权属性方面虽然重要,但并非决定性因素。
The history of Western civilization shows that the fundamental reason why coastal states have become sea power states lies in “an outward-looking economic structure dependent on maritime transportation.” Of course, this is also the fundamental driving force behind the lasting development of a sea power state’s navy. It is also not difficult to understand why, although there were many powerful navies (“water forces”) in the history of ancient China, they were all short-lived and transient. After thirty years of reform and opening up, the country has quickly transformed into a modern maritime nation with an “outward-looking economic structure dependent on maritime transportation.” Although there are concerns over “maritime lifelines,” China has nevertheless obtained lasting momentum for naval development.
西方文明的历史表明:“依赖海洋交通的外向型经济结构”才是滨海国家成为海权国家的根本原因。当然,也是一个海权国家海军持久发展的根本动力源。这也就不难理解中国古代历史上曾不乏出现过强大的海军(水师),但都是昙花一现,转瞬即逝。“改革开放”三十年后,国家迅速转型成“依赖海洋交通的外向型经济结构”现代海洋国家,虽有“海上生命线”之虑,但却获得海军发展的持久动力。
With its geographical location and strategy, early modern China had to deal with sea power coming from Japan on the one hand, and land power coming from Russia on the other. Its national strength was unable to cope, so there was a dispute in the late Qing Dynasty between Wang Wenshao’s “frontier defense,” Li Hongzhang’s “coastal defense,” and Zuo Zongtang’s “taking both frontier defense and coastal defense into account.” This reflects not only the financial strains at the time, but also the fact that the naval equipment and army equipment of that period were not “compatible.”
近现代中国的地理位置和战略,一方面要对付来自日本的海上强权,另一方面要对付来自俄罗斯的陆上强权,国力无法应付,因而有晚清王文韶“塞防”、李鸿章“海防”和左宗棠“塞防海防兼顾”之争议。这不仅反映了当时财政上捉襟见肘,也反映当时海军装备与陆军装备无法“兼容”。
In the twenty-first century, with the rapid development of science and technology, military technology, weaponry, and the means of warfare are closer to the “mutual compatibility” of land, sea, and air forces than in any previous era. In conventional warfare, air supremacy determines everything, and information power determines air supremacy, while in land, sea, and air battlefields, precision-guided missile attacks are the main means of warfare. Precision-guided weapons systems not only determine victory or defeat in extra-atmospheric space confrontations and atmospheric air power confrontations, but are also the key to victory in land and naval warfare. The high-end weapons systems and combat styles of land, sea, and air forces are already highly compatible with each other, which greatly reduces the cost of China’s national defense and frees it from the predicament in the last two centuries of not being able to achieve a land-sea balance on account of its geographical location. This is an opportunity given to China by today’s science and technology—an opportunity to develop China’s sea power.
二十一世纪科学技术发展日新月异,军事技术、武器装备和作战手段比过去任何一个时代都接近于陆海空军兵种的“相互兼容”。常规作战制空权决定一切,制信息权又决定着制空权,陆海空战场均以精确制导的导弹攻击为主要作战手段。精确制导武器系统不仅决定大气层外航天对抗和大气层制空权对抗的胜败,也决定陆战和海战的胜利。陆海空三军种高端武器作战系统和作战样式已经高度兼容,这就大大降低了中国国防的成本,摆脱上两个世纪因地理位置原因海陆不能兼顾的窘境。这是今天科学技术赐予中国的良机,也是赐予中国海权发展的机遇。
VIII. A Realistic Response for China’s Sea Power Strategy: Deterrence Posture
八、中国海权战略的现实应对——威慑姿态
From the high-profile involvement of the United States in the South China Sea during the summer before last [2010], and China’s maritime border disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, it is clear that these countries are still dominated by the traditional “vertical alliance” type of strategic thinking, which is essentially a strategic activity guided by Hobbesian principles. Therefore, China must temporarily put aside its idealism and handle matters in a realistic manner.
从美国前年夏天高调介入南海,越南、菲律宾与中国发生的海疆争端来看,这些国家仍然受传统“合纵”型战略思维支配,本质上是霍布斯原则指导下的战略行为。因此,中国必须暂时放下理想主义,以现实主义的态度应对之。
The essence of the current disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea is the gross disparity between China’s rising national status and the reality of encroachment on its sovereignty over its traditional maritime borders for a long period of time. China therefore needs to recover its sovereignty over its traditional maritime borders and drive out the encroaching countries. Due to its long-standing weak response to maritime encroachment in history, after China rapidly became tougher in recent years, this has been perceived by the outside world as an ominous sign of China’s maritime expansion. This kind of conflict is more acute. While the implications of historical experience and realistic anxieties about “maritime lifelines” and “areas of vital overseas interest” have produced a strong impulse for blue water defense on China’s part, it is intolerable for China to find its homeland’s traditional sovereign waters being encroached upon, and it is also an unacceptable situation in terms of sea power strategy.
目前东海、南海争端的实质是中国崛起的身份与传统海疆主权长期被侵占的现实严重不相称,中国要恢复对传统海疆行使主权,驱逐侵占国。由于长期对海疆被侵占反应软弱,这些年迅速变得强硬起来后,却被外部世界认为是中国海上扩张的不祥之兆。这种冲突比较尖锐。历史经验的暗示和“海上生命线”、“海外重大利益地区”的现实焦虑已经使得中国产生“远洋防御”的强烈冲动,而本土传统的主权海域却在被蚕食,这种现象是绝对不能容忍的, 也是海权战略上不能接受的一种势态。
Mutual political mistrust and suspicions about the future will inevitably lead to military precautions and sea power strategy collisions. The United States, today’s great sea power, may be the real opponent of China’s sea power strategy. The essence of the Sino-U.S. strategic conflict over sea power is the contradiction between China’s development of a reasonable and necessary blue-water navy commensurate with its national interests and the United States’ desire to maintain its former absolute naval superiority. This contradiction, even though not a life-or-death matter, is difficult to reconcile. Neither side will cede ground easily, and the trend is bound to induce an arms race between the two sides that is tense at times and relaxed at others. Since both countries possess nuclear weapons, the disparity between the cost of war and the actual benefits gained from it is too great, so the likelihood of a real armed conflict is not adequately high. Instead, two countries will often confront each other with sustained and assessable deterrence, and this assessable deterrence at sea will influence the adjustment of the national interests of both sides. For example, in January 2010, Hillary Clinton threatened to cut the maritime energy supply lines as a warning to China.
政治上的互不信任和对未来的猜疑必然带出军事上的防范和海权战略的碰撞。当今海权强国美国可能才是中国海权战略真正的对手。中美海权战略冲突的实质是:中国发展合理的、必要的符合国家利益的远洋海军同美国要保持以往海军绝对优势之间的矛盾。这种矛盾即便不是你死我活也是难以调和的,双方都不会轻易让步,其发展趋势必然是双方时缓时紧的军备竞赛。由于两国都拥有核武器,交战代价与实际利益收获太悬殊,因而真正发生兵戎相见的可能性不大,而往往以持续的可评估的威慑相对峙,并以这种可评估的海上威慑来影响双方的利益调整。比如希拉里在 2010 年 1 月以切断中国海上能源供应线向中国发出警告。
The establishment of a strong blue-water navy is to a large extent less about warfare and more about playing a deterrent role in order to defend national maritime interests and deter potential adversaries and surrounding coveters. Therefore, China cannot skimp on military spending. Maintaining a strong navy is far less expensive than the cost of wars it would be forced to wage caused by its inferiority in national defense.
建立强大远洋海军很大程度上不是用于作战,更多是发挥威慑作用,以便捍卫国家海上利益和震慑潜在对手及其周边觊觎者。所以,中国不能吝啬军费开支,维持强大海军的经费远远少于因国防不强而被迫进行的的战争的消耗。
IX. Current Direction and Strategic Tasks of China’s Sea Power Deterrence
九、当前中国海权威慑方向及战略任务
If neighboring countries deal with China with Hobbesian Jungle principles, then from a traditional realist point of view, the geopolitics of the South China Sea will be critical, not just as an issue of maritime resources, but as an issue that determines China’s future survival. If China loses the South China Sea, economically it will lose a huge amount of offshore oil, natural gas, and marine fishery resources. In terms of transportation, losing the South China Sea would also mean losing China’s own controllable part of its “maritime lifelines.” And militarily, China would lose its broad strategic depth of defense, and the line of defense would be compressed to the line of Hainan Island. From the perspective of the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific waters, once the navies of the United States, Japan, and India join forces, China’s southern sea gate will be closed. The future situation does not allow for optimism.
如果周边国家以霍布斯丛林原则与中国打交道,那么,以传统现实主义观点来看,南海的地缘政治将决定中国未来的生死存亡,而不仅仅是海洋资源的问题。如果中国丧失了南海, 经济上将损失巨量的海底石油、天然气和海洋渔业等资源;在交通方面,南海作为中国“海上生命线”自己可控部分亦将失去;在军事方面,中国将失去广阔的国防战略纵深,国防线将被压缩至海南岛一线。从亚太海域战略形势而论,一旦美国、日本和印度三国海军联手, 中国海上南大门将被关死。未来的形势不容乐观。
The main direction of deterrence in the future will be focused on the South China Sea. A strong navy will not only have to defend the traditional South China Sea region but must also be able to sail at any time into the Indian Ocean to deter the threats towards China’s “maritime lifelines” and overseas areas of vital interests.
未来主要的威慑方向是在南海。强大的海军不仅要保卫传统的南中国海域,还要随时驶入印度洋以遏制对中国“海上生命线”和海外重大利益地区的各种威胁。要预防出现最严峻的外部形势,美、日、印、澳加上东南亚愿意依附的越南、菲律宾等小国形成海上军事联盟。一旦形成这种战略对峙的态势,除了动用政治、经济和外交手段分化瓦解外,军事方面,中国的战略威慑优势是背靠巨型半岛大陆,借助岸基空军和导弹的掩护,处于内线作战的有利位置,外部海上松散之敌对联盟处于外线作战不利位置,中国可集中兵力各个击破之。
China should prevent the gravest external situation from emerging, when the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, along with small countries in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam and the Philippines have formed a maritime military alliance. Once such a strategic confrontation is formed, in addition to using political, economic, and diplomatic means to divide and defeat, on the military front, China’s strategic deterrence advantage lies in its geographic position backed by the giant peninsular mainland. It can take advantage of the cover of shore-based air and missile forces and would be in a favorable position for interior line operations, while the loose external maritime alliance of the enemies would be in a disadvantageous position for exterior operations, and China could therefore concentrate its forces to defeat them one by one.
强大海军的建立可改变对周边国家的战略态势。以越南为例,自古以来都是从路上山地强行进入其境,越北部崎岖山地,沿着细长的腹地延伸,后方补给困难重重,前进难以为继续。而强大海军一旦在海上展开,地形上犹如丝瓜面对快刀,可在其细长之海岸线任意一点登陆,其北方与我云南、广西接壤的巨型“头部”地区立刻陷于陆上被合围的困境,从而改变千百年来传统中越军事态势。强大的中国海军将使越南在北部军事部署上进退失据、手足无措,这一“以海遏陆”地缘军事战略态势无疑会影响其战争与和平的外交选择。
The establishment of a strong navy could change the strategic posture towards neighboring countries. In the case of Vietnam, for example, since ancient times China could only force its way into its territory via mountain roads. Northern Vietnam is covered with rugged mountainous terrain, which extends along the narrow hinterlands, causing many resupply difficulties for the rear, and making it hard to keep advancing. Once a powerful navy is launched at sea, geographically, it will be like cutting a knot with a sharp knife. One can land at any point along its long and thin coastline, and its giant “head” area bordering Yunnan and Guangxi will immediately be in a predicament of being besieged from both land and sea. The traditional Sino-Vietnamese military posture of thousands of years would thus be changed. A powerful Chinese navy would put Vietnam’s military deployments in the north in a hopeless situation, and this geo-military strategic posture of “using the sea to subdue the land” would undoubtedly affect its diplomatic choices on war and peace.
此外,在东海方向,一旦台海有变,强大的海军可兜围台湾,并随时威胁日本南方诸岛, 亦可游弋于太平洋心脏地带。在印度洋方向,除掩护中国“海上生命线”外,可从海陆夹击印度。如果中国海军具备这样的威慑能力,将是分化和挫败美国在亚太拼凑遏制中国海上军事同盟最有效的军事手段,将使周边国家考虑依附美日海上军事同盟时,不得不有所顾虑。
In addition, in the East China Sea, if there is a change in the Taiwan Strait, a strong navy could surround Taiwan and threaten Japan’s southern islands at any time, and could also cruise into the heart of the Pacific. In the Indian Ocean direction, in addition to protecting China’s “maritime lifeline,” it could attack India from land and sea. If the Chinese navy had this kind of deterrent capability, it would be the most effective military tool for dividing and defeating a maritime military alliance patched together by the United States in the Asia-Pacific to contain China, and it would make neighboring countries think twice before attaching themselves to the U.S.-Japanese maritime military alliance.
上述海军战略威慑并非为了争夺海上霸权,也非认定未来与某些国家“必有一战”,而是出于捍卫国家安全和维护地区和平必要的考虑,是和平外交必须的后盾,也是建立和谐海洋、和谐世界的必要手段,甚至是和平事业的一部分。因为,自古以来,有文事必有武备。文武之道,一张一弛,不可废武而求和平。任何形式的和平都是以暴力为基础的。即使孔子推崇备至的“周公吐哺、天下归心”的和谐世界,也需“西六师”、“成周八师”、“殷八师” 来维护。对于当下和未来,中国绝不可以以完全的理想主义颠覆人类和平的历史规律。