Under current circumstances, a discussion of the United States’ “New Monroe Doctrine” and its impact on China–U.S.–Latin America relations is particularly timely. At the very beginning of 2025, Latin American issues quickly became a focus of widespread attention. This was mainly because, after Donald Trump returned to the White House, the United States significantly intensified its diplomatic engagement with Latin America. After taking office, Secretary of State Marco Rubio made Latin America the destination of his first overseas trip, visiting four countries in the region. In addition to vigorously advancing the migration agenda, he also sought to place constraints on China–Latin America cooperation. Trump went even further, brazenly defying global opinion by renaming the Gulf of Mexico the “Gulf of America,” claiming that the United States would retake the Panama Canal, annex Greenland, and turn Canada into the 51st state of the United States. Against this backdrop, revisiting the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, probing the underlying logic of U.S.–Latin America relations, and assessing their future trajectory is of great significance.

1. The Diplomatic Practice and Policy Logic of the Monroe Doctrine

In the more than 200 years since President James Monroe give his address to Congress in 1823, this doctrine has undergone different stages of development and taken on different policy forms. It has constituted the underlying logic guiding the United States’ handling of its relations with Latin America and its shaping of the order in the Western Hemisphere, serving the expansion of U.S. hegemony from the regional level to the global level. Its influence has continued to this day. Broadly speaking, the Monroe Doctrine has gone through the following six stages of development.

The first was the “Emerging Assertiveness” [锋芒初露] stage (1823 to the late 19th century). After the United States put forward the Monroe Doctrine, in view of its relatively weak national strength, it in fact did not intervene much in the acts of aggression and interference carried out in Latin America by countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and the Netherlands. In December 1845, U.S. President James K. Polk invoked the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and coined the term “Monroeism.” The statement he made in his State of the Union address—that the United States cannot only intervene in threats that already exist but can also take action against threats that may occur—came to be known as the “Polk Corollary.” This corollary provided the theoretical basis for U.S. territorial expansion and foreign intervention. After the Civil War, U.S. economic and military strength grew rapidly, giving the country the capacity to compete with the European great powers, and the United States began to present itself as Latin America’s “protector.” The Monroe Doctrine also gradually developed the “Grant Corollary” and the “Olney Corollary”: first prohibiting the European great powers from possessing territory in the Americas and later asserting that the United States had the right to provide protection for the Western Hemisphere. This substantively transformed doctrine from advocating for “the Americas for the peoples of the Americas” to “the Americas for the United States.”

The second stage was the “Big Stick Wielding” [挥舞大棒] stage (from the late 19th century to the 1920s). In the first two to three decades after the turn of the 20th century, U.S. national strength continued to grow, and the United States successfully excluded the European great powers from the Western Hemisphere, basically establishing its hegemonic position in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine was correspondingly adjusted and refashioned, shifting from defense to intervention. In December 1904, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine. Using the alleged low level of civilization in Latin America as a pretext, and under the banner of opposing European great-power intervention, he argued that “the United States must exercise international police power in the Western Hemisphere.” This interpretation came to be known as the “Roosevelt Corollary.” According to this corollary, even if other countries in the Americas were not subject to interference by the European great powers, the United States could still intervene in their affairs. The Monroe Doctrine thus became, in a true sense, a principle of regional hegemony, and the United States’ hegemonic ambition to control Latin America was laid bare beyond any doubt. 

The third stage was the “Limited Good-Neighborliness” [有限睦邻] stage (the 1930s and 1940s). Under the dual impact of the Great Depression and the surge of nationalist movements in Latin America, during this period, the United States was compelled to alter its expansionary strategy, making limited adjustments to its Latin America policy and shifting from military force intervention to economic and diplomatic intervention. In March 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (also known as “the younger Roosevelt” in Chinese) formally put forward a more moderate and flexible “Good Neighbor Policy” toward Latin America, declaring respect for its own rights as well as those of other countries, pledging to abandon armed intervention in Latin America, and pursuing reciprocal trade policies in the economic sphere.

The fourth stage was the “All-Out Containment of the Soviet Union” [全力遏苏] stage (the Cold War period). During this period, the United States adjusted its overall strategy to compete with the Soviet Union on a global scale. Successive U.S. administrations continuously infused the Monroe Doctrine with new content and the imprint of the times, using such means as economic assistance, regime subversion, and military conquest to prevent Latin America from drawing close to the Soviet Union, thereby consolidating the United States’ hegemonic position in Latin America.

The fifth stage was the “Temporary Retrenchment” [暂时蛰伏] stage (from the end of the Cold War to the first decade of the 21st century). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a world pattern of “one superpower and multiple major powers” took shape, and the United States became the sole superpower. Through deliberate repackaging and embellishment, the Monroe Doctrine achieved a transformation from advocating for “the Americas for the United States” to “the world for the United States.” In March 1990, President George H. W. Bush emphasized the need to establish a “new partnership” with Latin America. President Bill Clinton largely carried forward the Latin America policy from the latter part of George H. W. Bush’s administration, shifting the focus of U.S. work in Latin America from security to economy, and from aid to trade. At President Clinton’s initiative, the first “Summit of the Americas” was held in Miami, United States, in December 1994. During the Obama administration, President Obama himself and then–Secretary of State John Kerry both declared that “the Monroe Doctrine has ended,” and to a certain extent supported the development of relations between China and Latin American countries. A China–U.S.–Latin America affairs consultation mechanism was established at the time. However, the United States did not truly abandon the Monroe Doctrine. Instead, it implemented a “Monroe Doctrine without the name of the Monroe Doctrine,” attempting to reshape the United States’ dominant position in Latin America.

The sixth stage is the “Forceful Return” [强势回归] stage (2017 to the present). In 2018, President Donald Trump declared at the United Nations General Assembly that the Monroe Doctrine would once again be adopted as the official foreign policy of the United States. Then–Secretary of State Rex Tillerson openly praised the Monroe Doctrine as a major U.S. achievement, while then–U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton asserted that “the Monroe Doctrine is alive and well.” The “New Monroe Doctrine” thus made its entrance onto the stage. China became the primary target following the return of the Monroe Doctrine, and the United States has continuously sought to suppress China’s presence in Latin America. The Biden administration largely inherited the Trump administration’s Latin America policy. Although it announced that Latin America is the United States’ “front yard” rather than its “back yard,” it has nevertheless continued to regard Latin America as its own “yard.” In 2025, since the beginning of Trump’s second term, the “New Monroe Doctrine” has been pursued even more brazenly.

In conclusion, over the course of more than 200 years, the Monroe Doctrine has undergone continuous development and evolution. Although it has taken different forms at different stages, with varying degrees of intensity and strength, the shadows of exclusionism and interventionism have always accompanied the Monroe Doctrine. These constitute the two principal policy logics underlying the United States’ pursuit of the Monroe Doctrine, consistently present without interruption and serving the objective of constructing U.S. regional hegemony and global hegemony.

2. The Main Components of Trump’s “New Monroe Doctrine” Foreign Policy 

Since the start of Trump’s second term, the United States has clearly increased its attention to and investment in Latin America. Within the governing team, the weight of officials “knowledgeable about Latin America” has risen noticeably, especially with the appointment of Latino politician Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. At the very beginning of 2025, shortly after taking office, Rubio visited Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, and in March, he traveled to Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados, advancing the U.S. agenda on priority issues such as migration, security, and the so-called “China threat.” In addition, multiple senior Trump administration officials have had extremely frequent interactions with political leaders of Latin American countries. The agenda of Trump’s “New Monroe Doctrine” mainly includes the following aspects.

First, the forced repatriation of migrants. Disregarding international moral obligations and basic human rights, the Trump administration has used a combination of coercion and inducements to forcibly repatriate illegal migrants from Latin American countries. Under pressure, the majority of Latin American countries have had no choice but to compromise with the United States.

Second, intervention in regional security issues. Citing threats to U.S. national security posed by regional organized crime, drug trafficking, and related activities, the Trump administration has accused Latin American countries of ineffective security governance, and has stated that it would not hesitate to resort to the use of force to intervene, coercing Latin American countries into making concessions. In particular, on the issue of fentanyl, it has accused the Mexican government of insufficient efforts to crack down on drug trafficking organizations, while at the same time accusing China of “allowing drugs to flow into the United States.”

Third, wielding the tariff cudgel and advancing economic hegemonism. The Trump administration has imposed “reciprocal tariffs” indiscriminately on Latin American countries. Forced into negotiations with the United States, Latin American countries have, to varying degrees, made concessions in response to the economic extortion carried out by the United States.

Fourth, courting the right and attacking the left to divide Latin America in order to rule it. Dividing Latin America has long been a consistent policy of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine. After Trump took office, the United States stepped up sanctions against radical left-wing countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, hoping to “use pressure to force change.” At the same time, it strengthened its support for right-wing forces in the region, especially far-right forces, and used platforms such as the “Conservative Political Action Conference” to intensify interactions with far-right forces.

Fifth, blatantly advancing an expansionist policy. Trump personally holds the 25th president of the United States, William McKinley, in extremely high regard. McKinley, who was in office from 1897 to 1901, is well known for promoting tariff policies and launching the Spanish–American War, and was a key figure in the expansion of U.S. hegemony from the Western Hemisphere into the Pacific region. Beyond emulating McKinley in tariff policy, Trump has also made no secret of his pursuit of expansionism. Although the U.S. Department of State’s Special Envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone, described Trump’s Latin America policy as “non-imperialist expansionism,” its imperialist nature cannot be denied. In addition to forcibly renaming the Gulf of Mexico as the “Gulf of America” and attempting to retake the Panama Canal, Trump has also threatened to annex Greenland and turn Canada into the 51st state of the United States. These expansionist words and deeds are systematic and consistent.

Sixth, suppressing and excluding China’s presence in Latin America. One of the policy logics of the Monroe Doctrine is exclusionism, and the primary object of exclusion under Trump’s “New Monroe Doctrine” is China. This policy orientation was already quite evident during Trump’s first term and during the Biden administration. Since the start of Trump’s second term, this policy orientation has manifested itself in more systematic policy actions: claiming that “China controls the Panama Canal and secretly supports the BlackRock consortium’s port transaction with Hong Kong–based Hutchison Whampoa;” forcing the Panamanian government to withdraw from Belt and Road cooperation; attempting to pressure the Argentine government to withdraw from the China–Argentina currency swap agreement; hyping China’s astronomical cooperation projects with Argentina and Chile; spreading false claims about the military-civil dual-use nature of infrastructure projects such as the Port of Chancay; and threatening to impose “port entry fees” on Chinese-made vessels and vessels flying the Chinese flag, among other measures. It can be said that the Trump administration’s policy of suppressing China has both relied on traditional approaches and continuously experimented with new methods.

Overall, the “new” in Trump’s “New Monroe Doctrine” is mainly reflected in new issues and new means, but in essence it has not departed from the Monroe Doctrine’s basic policy logic of more than 200 years, namely, maintaining U.S. regional hegemony through interventionism and exclusionism. From this perspective, the so-called “New Monroe Doctrine” is nothing more than old wine in new bottles.

3. Stance of Latin American Countries on China–U.S.–Latin America Relations

Over more than 200 years of history, Latin American countries have gained a deeper understanding of the Monroe Doctrine. In the early stage, quite a few Latin American countries had high hopes for it and genuinely embraced the principle of “the Americas for the peoples of the Americas,” believing that the Monroe Doctrine would help Latin American countries safeguard their sovereignty and independence. However, as U.S. expansionist ambitions continued to swell, the underlying nature of the Monroe Doctrine became increasingly apparent, and Latin Americans increasingly came to recognize that what the Monroe Doctrine actually pursued was “the Americas for the United States.” The Monroe Doctrine has increasingly degenerated into a policy instrument through which the United States controls Latin America and seeks regional hegemony. The essence of its policy lies in maintaining hegemony, under the guidance of a domineering ideology, through acts of bullying.

From this perspective, the more than 200-year history of the Monroe Doctrine in practice is a history of struggle between the United States and Latin America, a struggle of control and resistance to control, intervention, and resistance to intervention. Against the backdrop of the deepening evolution of great changes unseen in a century and the rapid rise of the “Global South,” the Trump administration has taken up the Monroe Doctrine once again. Under the principle of “America First,” it has pursued imperialist and expansionist policies, attempting to return the international order of the Western Hemisphere to the “law of the jungle.” It must be said that this is an error of the times, and it will naturally promote a profound awakening among the peoples of Latin America and trigger their intense resistance.

Given the United States’ traditional influence in Latin America, the Trump administration’s high-pressure policies and extortionate diplomacy toward the region have been able to succeed to a certain extent. However, when it comes to major interests involving sovereignty and security, Latin American countries will not make concessions lightly. For example, on the issue of canal sovereignty, the government of Panama has made its position unmistakably clear, stating that it will not respond to the “false questions” raised by the United States and that there is no room whatsoever for negotiation on issues of sovereignty. The United States has sought to have the government of Argentina rescind the China–Argentina currency swap agreement. Despite the close relationship between the Javier Milei administration and the Trump administration, Argentina has nevertheless insisted on renewing the agreement. 

From this perspective, although the Trump administration’s pursuit of the “New Monroe Doctrine” will, to a certain extent, create disruptions for China–Latin America relations and can, to a certain extent, achieve its policy objectives, it also has its limitations. Today, the drive among Latin American countries to pursue autonomous reforms has become increasingly pronounced. Moreover, the rapid development of China–Latin America relations over the past several decades has led Latin American countries to recognize that China offers an option different from their other historical extraregional partners, and they do not wish to sacrifice China–Latin America relations as the price paid for developing U.S.–Latin America relations. 

Over the past several decades, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, China–Latin America relations have achieved a historic, leapfrog-style development. Under the guidance of head-of-state diplomacy, mutual political trust between China and Latin America has continued to increase, the positioning of their relationship has steadily improved, and policy communication has proceeded smoothly. Economic and trade relations have developed rapidly, becoming the “ballast stone” and “propeller” of the development of bilateral relations. In addition, the two sides have made significant progress in mutual learning on development, exchanges on governance experience, and international cooperation. Latin American countries have given strong support to China’s proposal of a China–Latin America community of common destiny, have actively joined cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, and have endorsed the three major global initiatives.

In terms of cooperation methods, China and Latin America have pioneered a new configuration in which bilateral cooperation and overall cooperation proceed in parallel and mutually reinforce one another. It can be said that, at present and for a long period to come, the fundamental conditions of China–Latin America relations—characterized by a high degree of mutual political trust, strong economic complementarity, deep mutual learning in development, and close mutual support in international affairs—will not change. The endogenous driving force of the bilateral relationship is extremely strong and will not be undermined by interference from U.S. factors. Against the backdrop of Trump’s tariff policies disrupting the international economic and trade order and the “New Monroe Doctrine” damaging U.S.–Latin America relations, the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum was held as scheduled in Beijing. This meeting became an opportunity for the two sides to further enhance mutual trust, build consensus, and deepen cooperation.

In sum, the “New Monroe Doctrine” embodies “America First” and unilateralism, whereas the concept of a China–Latin America community of common destiny embodies a destiny shared by all and genuine multilateralism. Hegemony, domineering behavior, and bullying expose the “New Monroe Doctrine” as an error of the times, while consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits point to the bright prospects for China and Latin America to jointly advance the Belt and Road Initiative and build a community of common destiny.