Wu Yi, the director of the political economy research department at the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, analyzes Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) elections, which took place in January 2024. Wu argues that the strong performance of the KMT (Beijing’s preferred party) and TPP in the elections mean the LY will serve as a stabilizing force for cross-Strait relations going forward, given the support in both parties for greater cross-Strait engagement and shared opposition to what Wu frames as the “independence” leanings of Lai Ching-te, then the president-elect from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Zhang Hua, a leading scholar on Taiwan at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, analyzes the likely cross-Strait policies of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s newly elected president. Zhang suggests that Lai has and is likely to tailor his cross-Strait approach based on the audiences he is addressing and his various roles—as president, as leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, and as a potential presidential candidate for 2028. Zhang also suggests that Lai’s cross-Strait policy is likely to become sharper-edged in a second term.

In this piece, the CCP Central Committee Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC), known under its public regulatory-body name as the Cyberspace Administration of China, outlines a vision for cybersecurity policy and regulation. The piece suggests that private industry, critical information infrastructure, and cybersecurity providers will be vital partners in improving China’s cybersecurity in the years to come. Cybersecurity, CAC argues, cannot be achieved without more government visibility into private industry’s data on cybersecurity threats and incidents.

Guo Kai, the executive president of CF40, a think tank focusing on finance and economic issues, argues that the problem of overcapacity is being used in the U.S. to drive election politics, rather than being viewed purely as an economic concern. Domestically, he attributes overcapacity as a negative externality to China’s rapid manufacturing growth, and makes several policy recommendations to address the issue.

The head of China’s Ministry of State Security, Chen Yixin, reflects on efforts to implement the “Overall National Security Outlook” ten years after Chinese leader Xi Jinping first introduced the concept in 2014. Chen highlights the 2020 National Security Law in Hong Kong, more formalized national security education, and the build out of a national security legal and regulatory architecture as key accomplishments over the past decade. Looking ahead, Chen emphasizes the need to further advance China’s national security through a variety of mechanisms, including greater technological self-reliance, improved counter-sanctions mechanisms, and more assertive efforts to advance China’s security principles on the international stage.

In this transcript of a keynote speech given by Ding Xiaoxing, the director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), he outlines the major trends and features of the war in Ukraine two years on. He highlights the emergence of commercial technology on the battlefield and the high human and financial costs of the war, and argues that continued U.S. aid to Ukraine will be a decisive variable impacting the war’s future dynamics.

This report, written by a group of scholars at the Renmin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies led by Wang Wen, the institute’s president, takes stock of Russia’s war in Ukraine at its second anniversary. The chapters delve into geopolitical, economic, financial, and military dimensions of the war, and draw conclusions for China. They recommend Beijing strengthen technology self-reliance, enhance the security of its energy supplies, improve its diplomatic narratives, and take a more active role in global economic standards-setting.

Feng Yujun, a leading scholar of China-Russia relations, outlines Russia’s evolving geopolitical posture and outlook two years into its war in Ukraine. Feng explores how Russia is adapting diplomatically and economically to war-induced isolation from West, including by expanding its relations with the Global South. Moscow’s relations with Beijing remain strong, Feng argues, although framings of the partnership as “limitless” have ceded from official Chinese discourse.

This piece from two Russia scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) is a part of the 2024 version of an annual volume on international politics published by the Institute of World Economics and Politics at CASS. The authors explore factors influencing the dynamics and future of the war in Ukraine two years in. They argue that political factors (such as 2024 elections in the United States and Europe, and Putin’s growing preoccupation with regime security) will shape the intensity of the war, while economic factors will influence its duration.

Zhang Jie, a prominent scholar at the Xi’an International Studies University, suggests India’s intensified engagement with Global South aims to amplify New Delhi’s voice in global governance, compete with China for geopolitical influence, and deepen ties with Washington. Zhang suggests other Global South countries are unlikely to be receptive to this engagement, given their inherent suspicion of India’s growing ties with the West and fear of friction with China.